Morales-Cruz v. Univ. of Puerto Rico, No. 11–1589.

CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (1st Circuit)
Writing for the CourtSELYA
Citation676 F.3d 220,95 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 44473,114 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1185
PartiesMyrta B. MORALES–CRUZ, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. UNIVERSITY OF PUERTO RICO et al., Defendants, Appellees.
Docket NumberNo. 11–1589.
Decision Date10 April 2012

114 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1185
676 F.3d 220
95 Empl.
Prac. Dec. P 44,473

Myrta B. MORALES–CRUZ, Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
UNIVERSITY OF PUERTO RICO et al., Defendants, Appellees.

No. 11–1589.

United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.

Heard March 5, 2012.Decided April 10, 2012.


Myrta B. Morales–Cruz, pro se, with whom Daliah Lugo Auffant and Lugo Auffant Law Offices were on brief, for appellant.

María D. Trelles Hernández, with whom Jorge E. Pérez Díaz and Pietrantoni Méndez & Alvarez LLC were on brief, for appellees.

Before LYNCH, Chief Judge, TORRUELLA and SELYA, Circuit Judges.

SELYA, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff-appellant Myrta B. Morales–Cruz claims that she experienced gender-based discrimination and retaliation when the University of Puerto Rico School of Law (UPRLS) refused to extend her probationary period of employment and, thus, effectively removed her from its faculty. She sued UPRLS and a number of its officials under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2(a), 2000e–3(a). The district court dismissed her action. After careful consideration, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

This appeal follows a dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Consequently, we draw the facts from the amended complaint, supplementing them with materials susceptible to judicial notice. See Haley v. City of Boston, 657 F.3d 39, 44 (1st Cir.2011).

UPRLS hired the plaintiff in 2002 as an adjunct professor. A year later, it offered her the tenure-track position of assistant professor, which carried with it a potential of tenure after the successful completion of a five-year probationary period.

During this five-year interval, the plaintiff taught various courses and, along with a male professor, led the community development section of the school's Legal Aid Clinic (the Clinic). At some point, the plaintiff's co-teacher began a sexual dalliance with one of the Clinic's female students. The student became pregnant as a result of this liaison.

In 2008—near the end of her probationary period—the plaintiff requested a one-year extension before undergoing her tenure review. This request went to the personnel committee, a three-professor body. Although the final arbiter of such matters is the University's administrative committee, that committee receives recommendations from both the UPRLS's personnel committee and its Dean.

While the matter was pending before the personnel committee, the Dean (defendant-appellee Roberto Aponte Toro) met with the plaintiff. He questioned her about her knowledge of the sexual relationship between her co-teacher and the pregnant student and chastised her for failing to report it to him. At the time there was no internal regulation either prohibiting student-teacher relationships or mandating reports about such relationships.

On May 7, 2008, the personnel committee recommended, by a two-to-one vote, that the plaintiff's extension request be granted. The dissenter, defendant-appellee Carlos Díaz–Olivo, wrote a forceful report as to why the extension should be denied. In this missive, Díaz–Olivo discussed the scandal involving the pregnant student and concluded that the plaintiff's actions regarding that matter manifested poor judgment, “personality flaws,” and difficulty handling “complex and sensitive” situations.

On May 12, the Dean recommended the extension to the administrative committee but added that he shared the concerns expressed in Díaz–Olivo's dissent. He called the plaintiff “insecure,” questioned her judgment, and noted that granting her tenure would “sentenc[e] the Law School and the University to thirty years with an intelligent, albeit immature ... and fragile ... resource.”

When the plaintiff received word of these comments, she wrote to defendant-appellee Gladys Escalona, then Chancellor of the University and the chair of the administrative committee. The plaintiff says that she sent the letter both to clarify her actions with respect to the student-teacher relationship and to denounce the supposedly discriminatory remarks made by others. Shortly after the Dean learned of this correspondence, he wrote a letter to the administrative committee reversing his earlier position and recommending the denial of the one-year extension.

Chancellor Escalona appointed an ad hoc committee to review the plaintiff's case.1 In the course of the ensuing review, the plaintiff alleges that the Chancellor, the Dean, Professor Díaz–Olivo, and certain members of the administrative committee (also named as defendants) continued to malign her character, impugn her abilities, and refer to her dismissively. At the end of the day, the administrative committee voted to deny the extension. This refusal effectively terminated the plaintiff's employment at the expiration of the probationary period.

Title VII requires an individual who claims to have suffered discrimination or retaliation to file an administrative charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) prior to commencing a civil action. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(b), (e)(1), (f)(1); Clockedile v. N.H. Dep't of Corr., 245 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir.2001). Of course, a Title VII civil action is “constrained” by the allegations limned in the administrative charge; that is, “the judicial complaint must bear some close relation to the allegations presented to the agency.” Jorge v. Rumsfeld, 404 F.3d 556, 565 (1st Cir.2005).

In this case, the plaintiff seasonably filed an administrative charge. The defendants' position is that the charge, as framed, relates solely to retaliation and, thus, the plaintiff's discrimination claim should be dismissed for non-exhaustion of administrative remedies. See id. at 564–65.

We do not think that it is necessary for us to enter this controversy. The charge-filing requirement is mandatory but not jurisdictional, see id. at 565, and the plaintiff's discrimination claim is easily resolved on the failure of the pleadings. Accordingly, we bypass the question of exhaustion of administrative remedies.

After obtaining a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(f)(1), the plaintiff sued UPRLS and the individual defendants in the federal district court. The operative pleading is the plaintiff's amended complaint, which alleged gender-based discrimination, retaliation, and other claims not pursued on appeal. The defendants moved to dismiss, contending that the plaintiff had failed to state an actionable claim. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). The district court granted the motion. Morales–Cruz v. Univ. of P.R., 792 F.Supp.2d 205 (D.P.R.2011). This timely appeal followed.

II. ANALYSIS

A familiar standard applies to appellate review of Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal orders. We assay such orders “de novo, assuming the truth of all well-pleaded facts contained in the operative version of the complaint and indulging all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor.” Nisselson v. Lernout, 469 F.3d 143, 150 (1st Cir.2006).

To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint need contain only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Even though this rule “does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ ... it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). Plausibility is the touchstone by which the sufficiency of a complaint is gauged. See id. at 1949–50...

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  • Roberts v. Archbold Med. Ctr., CASE NO.: 7:14–cv–210 (WLS)
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 11th Circuit. Middle District of Georgia
    • November 16, 2016
    ...circuit has concluded that gender stereotyping is sex discrimination under Title VII. See, e.g., Morales–Cruz v. Univ. of Puerto Rico, 676 F.3d 220, 224–25 (1st Cir. 2012) ; Back v. Hastings On Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 119 (2d Cir. 2004) ; Bibby v. Philadelphia Coca Cola ......
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    • United States District Courts. 1st Circuit. United States District Courts. 1st Circuit. District of Massachusetts
    • March 31, 2017
    ...be accepted as true) from its conclusory legal allegations (which need not be credited).'" Id. (quoting Morales-Cruz v. Univ. of P.R., 676 F.3d 220, 224 (1st Cir. 2012)). "At the second step, the court must determine whether the remaining factual content allows a reasonable inference that t......
  • Crimson Galeria Ltd. v. Healthy Pharms, Inc., Civil Action No. 17-cv-11696-ADB
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 1st Circuit. United States District Courts. 1st Circuit. District of Massachusetts
    • August 21, 2018
    ...be accepted as true) from its conclusory legal allegations (which need not be credited).’ " Id. (quoting Morales-Cruz v. Univ. of P.R., 676 F.3d 220, 224 (1st Cir. 2012) ). "At the second step, the court must determine whether the remaining factual content allows a reasonable inference that......
  • Coastal Counties Workforce, Inc. v. Lepage, 1:17–cv–00417–JAW
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 1st Circuit. United States District Court (Maine)
    • January 3, 2018
    ...be accepted as true) from its conclusory legal allegations (which need not be credited).’ " Id. (quoting Morales–Cruz v. Univ. of P.R. , 676 F.3d 220, 224 (1st Cir. 2012) ). "Second, the court must determine whether the factual allegations are sufficient to support ‘the reasonable inference......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
398 cases
  • Roberts v. Archbold Med. Ctr., CASE NO.: 7:14–cv–210 (WLS)
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 11th Circuit. Middle District of Georgia
    • November 16, 2016
    ...circuit has concluded that gender stereotyping is sex discrimination under Title VII. See, e.g., Morales–Cruz v. Univ. of Puerto Rico, 676 F.3d 220, 224–25 (1st Cir. 2012) ; Back v. Hastings On Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 119 (2d Cir. 2004) ; Bibby v. Philadelphia Coca Cola ......
  • Harihar v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Assocation, Civil Action No. 15-cv-11880-ADB
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 1st Circuit. United States District Courts. 1st Circuit. District of Massachusetts
    • March 31, 2017
    ...be accepted as true) from its conclusory legal allegations (which need not be credited).'" Id. (quoting Morales-Cruz v. Univ. of P.R., 676 F.3d 220, 224 (1st Cir. 2012)). "At the second step, the court must determine whether the remaining factual content allows a reasonable inference that t......
  • Crimson Galeria Ltd. v. Healthy Pharms, Inc., Civil Action No. 17-cv-11696-ADB
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 1st Circuit. United States District Courts. 1st Circuit. District of Massachusetts
    • August 21, 2018
    ...be accepted as true) from its conclusory legal allegations (which need not be credited).’ " Id. (quoting Morales-Cruz v. Univ. of P.R., 676 F.3d 220, 224 (1st Cir. 2012) ). "At the second step, the court must determine whether the remaining factual content allows a reasonable inference that......
  • Coastal Counties Workforce, Inc. v. Lepage, 1:17–cv–00417–JAW
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 1st Circuit. United States District Court (Maine)
    • January 3, 2018
    ...be accepted as true) from its conclusory legal allegations (which need not be credited).’ " Id. (quoting Morales–Cruz v. Univ. of P.R. , 676 F.3d 220, 224 (1st Cir. 2012) ). "Second, the court must determine whether the factual allegations are sufficient to support ‘the reasonable inference......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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