Morales v. Minter, Civ. A. No. 74-1404-F and 74-4898-F.

• Decision Date: 22 April 1975
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 74-1404-F and 74-4898-F.
• Citation: 393 F. Supp. 88
• Parties: George MORALES et al. v. Steven A. MINTER et al. Theresa RYAN et al. v. Steven A. MINTER et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

393 F. Supp. 88

George MORALES et al. v. Steven A. MINTER et al.

Theresa RYAN et al. v. Steven A. MINTER et al.

Civ. A. Nos. 74-1404-F and 74-4898-F.

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts.

April 22, 1975.

William A. Breitbart, Western Mass. Legal Services, Springfield, Mass., for plaintiffs in 74-1404-F.

Richard T. Egan, Joseph A. Pelligreno, Asst. Attys. Gen., Springfield, Mass., for defendants in 74-1404-F.

Lisa Fitzgerald, Richard A. Gross, Patrick King, Boston Legal Assistance Project, Boston, Mass., for plaintiffs in 74-4898-F.

Danielle deBenedictis, Asst. Atty. Gen., Boston, Mass., for defendants in 74-4898-F.

Before McENTEE, Circuit Judge, and SKINNER and FREEDMAN, District Judges.

OPINION

FREEDMAN, District Judge.

This three-judge court was convened, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281 and 2284, to determine the constitutionality of a state welfare statute, M.G.L. c. 117, § 4.¹ Before us are two factually unrelated class actions (Ryan v. Minter and Morales v. Minter) which have been consolidated because plaintiffs in both actions seek declaratory and injunctive relief from the enforcement, by officials responsible for the actions of the Massachusetts Department of Public Welfare "the Department", of the statute in question, insofar as it (and the Department's regulations² promulgated pursuant to it) limits the respective plaintiffs' eligibility for benefits under the Massachusetts program of public assistance known as General Relief "GR". Since plaintiffs in each case claim that the operation and enforcement of M.G.L. c. 117, § 4, and its companion regulations by the defendants, violates their due process and equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, jurisdiction is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) and (4), the jurisdictional counterpart to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Oral argument pertaining to all constitutional issues was heard on December 19, 1974.

The original defendants in both actions were Mr. Steven A. Minter, Commissioner of the Massachusetts Department of Public Welfare, and Mr. Peter Goldmark, Secretary of the Executive Office of Human Services. They have subsequently been replaced in office by Mr. Jerald Stephens and Ms. Lucy Benson, respectively, who are now defendants herein. Fed.R.Civ.P.25(d)(1).

Defendant Stephens, pursuant to M. G.L. c. 118A, § 1, is charged with the administration of a program of financial assistance for aged and disabled persons who reside within the Commonwealth. Defendant Benson has executive responsibility, pursuant to M.G.L. c. 6A, § 16, for the policies and practices of the Department of Public Welfare.

In Morales v. Minter, the Department itself is claimed to be a defendant. Yet this Court, in a § 1983 action, has no jurisdiction over the political subdivisions of the states. City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507, 93 S.Ct. 2222, 37 L.Ed.2d 109 (1973); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L. Ed.2d 492 (1961).

The facts in each case are not disputed. In Ryan v. Minter, each plaintiff applied to the Social Security Administration for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits. Although each presumably was eligible for SSI, none received immediate payments because there is customarily a two or three month waiting period³ from the date of application until the date applicants actually begin to receive their SSI checks.

Since the plaintiffs had no source of income other than public assistance, they applied to the Department for emergency benefits under GR to hold them over pending their receipt of SSI benefits. Yet their applications were denied, pursuant to M.G.L. c. 117, § 4 and M.P.A.P.M., c. I, § D, p. 1, ¶ 1, and p. 4, ¶ 12, because each was 65 years of age or older. It is undisputed that each plaintiff would be eligible for GR but for the age restriction imposed by the statute and its accompanying regulations.⁴, ⁵ The General Relief Program was established in Massachusetts to ". . . assist, to the extent practicable, all poor and indigent persons residing therein, whenever they stand in need of such assistance. . . ." M.G.L. c. 117, § 1. The program is funded solely by the Commonwealth as opposed to other public assistance programs which are fully or partially funded by the federal government. Therefore, so as to conserve state funds, the Department gives GR benefits only to those indigents who are not eligible for federally or partially federally funded assistance programs. See, M.P.A.P.M. c. I, § D, p. 4, ¶ 12, and c. XI, § C, part 7, p. 1, ¶ 1. Such partially federally funded benefits were available, prior to January 1, 1974, to members of plaintiffs' class under a number of separate grant-in-aid programs⁶ within the Social Security Act. Consequently, M.G.L. c. 117, § 4, was formulated to deny GR benefits to these applicants.

The statute caused little or no controversy before January 1, 1974 because applicants received their Social Security checks shortly after they applied for benefits. Each state administering a grant-in-aid program was required to give ". . . assistance . . . with reasonable promptness to all eligible individuals." 42 U.S.C. §§ 302(a)(8), 1202(a)(11), and 1352 (a)(10). "Reasonable promptness" was defined in the Handbook of Public Assistance Administration to mean not more than thirty (30) days from the date of application. Hence, if indigent applicants could hold out for a month or less, they had no reason to seek emergency funding from the Commonwealth or elsewhere.

That state of placidity terminated on January 1, 1974, the effective date of a new Title XVI of the Social Security Act, entitled "Supplemental Security Income For Aged, Blind, and Disabled" (S.S.I.), 42 U.S.C. § 1381 et seq., which repealed and replaced the former grant-in-aid programs to the states in support of their adult welfare programs under the Social Security Act. In essence, the new SSI program "federalized" and consolidated the previous programs of aid to the indigent aged, blind and disabled.

The new SSI provisions establish a federal "floor" of annual assistance for each aged, blind, or disabled person. 42 U.S.C. § 1382(b)(1) and (2). In order to avoid causing a reduction of aid to persons in states like Massachusetts which had a pre-1974 level of assistance higher than the SSI "floor" amount, the statute allows for state supplementation of the uniform federal grant ("the floor"). 42 U.S.C. § 1382e. The state may pay this supplement directly to the recipient or, as in the case of Massachusetts, may contract with the Social Security Administration so that the federal agency makes all eligibility determinations and provides the supplementation as a part of the boosted monthly SSI grant. In turn, the agency subsequently receives reimbursement from the Commonwealth for the additional monies expended. Id.

Unlike the former grant-in-aid programs, the SSI provisions establish no duty on the part of the Social Security Administration to make eligibility determinations and payments within a specified period of time.⁷See, 42 U.S.C. § 1383(a)(1). As stated above, the indigent aged residing in Massachusetts must now wait two or three months before their SSI payments begin to arrive. Yet the Congress, apparently acting in recognition of the financial burden imposed upon SSI applicants by this prolonged waiting period, amended the new Title XVI to provide in part:

. . . the Secretary may, upon written authorization by an individual, withhold benefits due with respect to that individual and may pay to a State (or a political subdivision thereof . . .) from the benefits withheld an amount sufficient to reimburse the State (or political subdivision) for interim assistance furnished on behalf of the individual by the State (or political subdivision). 42 U.S.C. § 1383(g)(1).

Thus, if Massachusetts were to furnish "interim assistance payments" under GR to aged SSI applicants awaiting their initial SSI payment, the amendment provides a vehicle whereby the state would be fully reimbursed by the federal government. Nevertheless, the state has chosen not to avail itself of this opportunity.

Despite this, the Department does, in fact, extend GR benefits during the waiting period to persons eligible for SSI who are disabled but who are under age sixty-five. M.G.L. c. 117, § 1, and M.P.A.P.M., c. I, § D, p. 4, ¶ 12 (revised 12/74). Determinations of eligibility for such interim benefits must be made, as all eligibility determinations under GR must be made, within two weeks from the date of application. M.G.L. c. 117, § 5. ". . . The department may render assistance in the form of food orders and shelter . . . pending its determination . . .." Id. Nevertheless, GR is denied to those awaiting their first SSI payment if they are over the age of 65. M.G.L. c. 117, § 4, and M.P.A.P.M., c. I, § D, p. 1, ¶ 1, and p. 4, ¶ 12.

The second case before us, Morales v. Minter, pertains to the other extreme of the statute's spectrum of eligibility, to wit, the denial of GR benefits to any person below the age of 18. M.G.L. c. 117, § 4. It is brought by the named plaintiffs as a class action on their own behalf and, pursuant to Rule 23(a) and (b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on behalf of all other persons similarly situated. Allegedly, the class so represented consists of all poor and indigent persons residing within the Commonwealth who: (1) are emancipated, (2) are under the age of 18, (3) meet all of the financial eligibility requirements for GR, (4) are ineligible for any other public assistance programs available within the Commonwealth, and (5) would be eligible for GR but for the application of M.G.L. c. 117, § 4, and M. P.A.P.M., c. I, § D, p. 1, ¶ 1. Because we find difficulties in allowing some of the named plaintiffs to sue as representatives of the defined class, we must examine these plaintiffs' claims of representativeness in greater depth than was necessary with the Ryan plaintiffs.

Three plaintiffs in this...