Opinion of the Justices to the House of Representatives

• Decision Date: 29 July 1975
• Parties: OPINION OF THE JUSTICES TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 388

333 N.E.2d 388

368 Mass. 831

OPINION OF THE JUSTICES TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.

July 29, 1975.

[368 Mass. 832] On July 29, 1975, the Justices submitted the following answers to questions propounded to them by the House of Representatives.

To the Honorable the House of Representatives of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts:

The Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court respectfully submit these answers to the questions set forth in an order adopted by the House of Representatives on June 25, 1975, and transmitted to us on July 2, 1975. The order recites the pendency before the House of a bill, House No. 6092, Appendix A, entitled, 'An Act to further regulate certain programs of financial and medical assistance.' It is stated that '(g)rave doubt exists as to the constitutionality of said bill, if enacted into law.' A copy of the bill was attached to the order. The bill proposes, inter alia, certain amendments to §§ 1 and 4 of c. 117, and § 6 of c. 118 E, of the General Laws, and these particular amendments are the occasion of the questions which are:

'1. Would the provisions of section 1 of said House, No. 6092, Appendix A, which delegate to the department of public welfare the power to determine eligibility for assistance without establishing any guidelines therefor be in violation of Article XXX of Part the First of the Constitution of the Commonwealth providing for the separation of the Legislative, Executive and Judicial departments?

'2. Would the provisions of section 2 of said House, No. 6092, Appendix A, making certain unemployed parents ineligible for assistance be in violation of the federal statutes in view of the decision in Paul R. Philbrook etc. Appellant v. Jean Glodgett et al and Caspar W. Weinberger, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, Appellant vs. Jean Glodgett et al (--- U.S. ---, 95 S.Ct. 1893, 44 L.Ed.2d 525) United States Supreme Court No. 74-1820 and 74-132-June 9, 1975?

'3. Would the provisions of said section 2 of said House, No. 6092, Appendix A, making a person who has no dependent '4. Would the provisions of section 6 of said House, No. 6092, Appendix A, which delegate to the department of public welfare the power to provide financial assistance for such medical care or services as said Title XIX and regulations adopted thereunder by the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare require, without any further guidelines, be in violation of Article XXX of Part the First of the Constitution of the Commonwealth providing for the separation of the Legislative, Executive and Judicial departments?'

children and who is determined by the department in accordance with its regulations to be employable ineligible for assistance under chapter 117 of the General Laws be in violation of the Due Process Clause and of the Equal Protection Clause in view of the [368 Mass. 834] decision in Morales vs. (M)Winter, (393 F.Supp. 88) United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit? ¹

In response to our invitation to interested persons to file briefs, briefs were received from the Governor of the Commonwealth, the Secretary of the Executive Office of Human Services, the Commissioner of Public Welfare, Action for Boston Community Development, Inc., Western Massachusetts Legal Services, the Boston Legal Assistance Project, Massachusetts Law Reform Institute (the latter three on behalf of various individuals and welfare rights organizations), and Jack H. Backman as an individual.

1. Questions 1 and 4 may be treated together since each is concerned with whether a particular delegation of power to the Department of Public Welfare (the department) would violate the separation of powers guaranty of art. 30 of our Declaration of Rights. In each case the question asks if the delegation would be proper without further guidelines set forth in the statute.

The principles governing the permissible extent of a delegation of legislative power to an administrative agency have often been stated by this court. One recurrent theme is that specific standards need not be set out in the statute where the agency can find general guidance in the purposes and overall scheme of the statute. A typical formulation of the test is that which appears in Massachusetts Bay Transp. Authy. v. Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 348 Mass. 538, 544, 205 N.E.2d 346, 351 (1965): 'The standards for action to carry out a declared legislative policy may be found not only in the express provisions of a statute but also in its necessary implications. The purpose, to a substantial degree, sets the standards. A detailed specification of standards is not required. The Legislature may delegate to a board or officer the working out of the details of a policy adopted by the Legislature.' See Commonwealth v. Hudson, 315 Mass. 335, 341-342, 52 N.E.2d 566 (1943); Commonwealth v. Diaz, 326 Mass. 525, 527-528, 95 N.E.2d 666 (1950); Opinion of the Justices, 334 Mass. 721, 743, 136 N.E.2d 223 (1956); Corning Glass Works v. Ann & Hope, Inc. of Danvers,--- Mass. ---, --- - --- ^a, 294 N.E.2d 354 (1973), and cases cited; Cooper, State Administrative Law, 68-69 (1965). As will appear more fully below, we believe that sufficient guidelines may be gleaned from an examination of the statutory framework and purposes surrounding each of these two proposed amendments to bring them within this principle.

Question 1 refers to a proposal in § 1 of House Bill No. 6092, Appendix A, to rewrite the first paragraph of § 1 of c. 117, as most recently amended through St.1974, c. 623, § 2, the Commonwealth's so-called General Relief (GR) program. As presently written, c. 117, § 1, provides that the Commonwealth, acting through the department We look first to § 2 of the bill, which would amend c. 117, § 4, by setting out a number of specific classes of persons who would be ineligible for GR benefits. Although § 4 includes no description of those who are eligible, there can be no doubt that the only test for those not declared to be ineligible is financial need. Any other possible criteria are eliminated if only by way of negative inference from the exclusions in § 4. This conclusion finds further support in the traditional purpose of c. 117 as a relief program for all those in need, and from the manifest object of the proposed amendment to restrict the scope of c. 117 only in specified areas.

'shall assist, to the extent practicable, all poor and indigent persons residing therein, whenever they stand in need of such assistance. The aid furnished shall be determined by the department on the basis of the circumstances surrounding each application shall be sufficient to maintain an adequate standard of living for the poor and indigent applicant and his immediate family who are eligible as hereinafter provided, (and) shall be in an amount to be determined in accordance with budgetary standards of the department . . ..' This language may be contrasted with that which would replace it were the bill to be adopted: 'The commonwealth, acting by and through the department of [368 Mass. 836] public welfare, shall provide assistance of residents of the commonwealth found by the department to be eligible for such assistance in accordance with this chapter.' The argument is made by some of the amici that adoption of this amendment would delegate to the department complete authority to devise any relief program it desired, giving it unbridled discretion to determine who would be eligible for benefits and what benefits would be provided. We believe this argument overlooks a number of significant guidelines and safeguards which emerge from consideration of c. 117 as a whole, particularly when read together with c. 18, which establishes the Departments of Public Welfare.

That the proposed bill fails to prescribe the contours of a general standard of need does not render it invalid. In fact, the department is required by G.L. c. 18, § 2(B)(g), to formulate a standard budget of assistance, the adequacy of which is reviewable annually. This is not an improper delegation of authority. See Massachusetts Housing Fin. Agency v. New England Merch. Natl. Bank, 356 Mass. 202, 214, 249 N.E.2d 599 (1969) (upholding delegation to agency to determine what constitutes 'low income'). The department has traditionally determined the standard of need for recipients and undoubtedly has developed an expertise in the complexities of this matter. See McNamara v. Director of Civil Serv., 330 Mass. 22, 27, 110 N.E.2d 840 (1953); Cooper, State Administrative Law, 75-79, 83-84 (1965). Its discretion in determining the standard of need and, hence, the eligibility test for GR, is circumscribed through a number of devices. For example, its provision of welfare services must be 'fair, just and equitable.' G.L. c. 18, § 2(B)(d). Any potential for arbitrariness is checked by ensuring the opportunity for judicial review of regulations promulgated under the authority of G.L. c. 18, § 10, and for review of individual determinations of ineligibility. G.L. c. 18, § 16; c. 30A, §§ 7, 14. See Davis, Administrative Law, § 2.00-5 (Supp.1970); Cooper, State Administrative Law, supra, at 81-82.

Objection is made that under the proposed amendment the department is no longer required to provide recipients with sufficient assistance 'to maintain an adequate standard of living.' While this is true, the result is not to give the department untrammeled discretion to decide what benefits to provide. Rather the Legislature, in determining the amount of the appropriation for c. 117, makes the critical choice with regard to the level of benefits. With whatever funds it has available, the department is charged with formulating 'the policies, procedures and rules necessary for the full and efficient implementation' Question 4 refers to a proposal in § 6 of House Bill No. 6092, Appendix A, to amend G.L. c. 118E, § 6, as most recently amended by St.1973, c. 1068, § 2....