Morales v. Schmidt

Decision Date06 April 1972
Docket NumberNo. 71-C-29.,71-C-29.
Citation340 F. Supp. 544
PartiesJuan G. MORALES, Plaintiff, v. Wilbur J. SCHMIDT, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Western District of Wisconsin

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Paul Hahn, Madison, Wis., for plaintiff.

Mary V. Bowman, Asst. Atty. Gen., Madison, Wis., for defendant.

JAMES E. DOYLE, District Judge.

This is a civil action for injunctive relief. Jurisdiction is based upon 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis.

In his complaint, plaintiff alleges that he is presently confined in the Wisconsin State Prison; that the defendant is the Secretary of the Department of Health and Social Services of the State of Wisconsin; that the defendant has general supervision over the rule-making policies of the prison and that he is "directly liable for the conduct and actions of his agents therein"; that plaintiff wrote a letter to the sister of his wife Sandra; that the name of the sister-in-law was on his approved correspondence list at the time; that the letter was intercepted by his social worker, an agent of the defendant, read by the social worker, and neither mailed to the sister-in-law nor returned to plaintiff; that after the interception of plaintiff's letter, defendant caused the name of the sister-in-law to be removed from the list of plaintiff's approved correspondents; that plaintiff seeks to resume correspondence with the sister-in-law; and that, by virtue of defendant's action, plaintiff is unable to write to her. Plaintiff seeks an injunction requiring the defendant to replace the sister-in-law's name on his approved correspondence list.

Plaintiff has moved for a temporary restraining order to bar the defendant and his agents from preventing him from corresponding with "his relatives and family as said in the complaint."

Defendant has not answered the complaint, but has responded to the motion for a temporary restraining order and has moved for summary judgment dismissing the action with prejudice. The motion is supported by an affidavit of the warden of the prison, to which are attached the disputed letter from the plaintiff to his sister-in-law and certain related prison memoranda. In response to the motion, plaintiff's counsel has filed an affidavit by counsel, to which is attached a copy of a letter written by plaintiff to his counsel subsequent to the filing of defendant's motion for summary judgment.

Based upon the entire record, I find that there is no genuine issue as to the material facts alleged in the complaint and summarized above. I find also that there is no genuine issue as to the following material facts: In the course of reading the disputed letter, and from an ensuing conversation with the plaintiff, the prison administrators acquired reasonable cause to believe that the plaintiff was the father of an illegitimate child born to his sister-in-law; that the child was born while the plaintiff was married to Sandra; that plaintiff remained married to Sandra at the time the disputed letter was written; that Sandra was unaware that plaintiff was the father of her sister's child; and that by corresponding with Sandra's sister, plaintiff desired to preserve his illicit relationship with her, while also intending to live with Sandra and their children following his release. I find also that there is no genuine issue as to the material fact that the prison administrators' decision not to mail the disputed letter to the sister-in-law and their decision to remove her name from the approved correspondence list were based upon their opinion that plaintiff should not be permitted to correspond with a woman with whom he had had an illicit sexual relationship and with whom they believe he intended to persevere in this relationship following his release from prison. Finally, I find that there is no genuine issue as to the material facts that the crime for which the defendant was imprisoned was possession of heroin; and that the letter in question was returned to the plaintiff after the prison officials had held it for more than two weeks.

Defendant contends that he is responsible only for the general administration of the Department and not "for the day to day enforcement of regulations" of the prison. This assertion is made in the brief of counsel for the defendant, and is not supported by affidavit or other proofs. I conclude that the complaint adequately alleges that, for the purpose of an action for injunctive relief as contrasted with an action for damages, the defendant Schmidt, by virtue of his supervisory function, is responsible for the actions of his agents which are the basis of the complaint; no pleading denies the allegation. Injunctive relief against this defendant and his agents would be an efficacious remedy for plaintiff's grievance. Schnell v. City of Chicago, 407 F.2d 1084, 1086 (7th Cir. 1969).

This is but one of a flood of constitutional lawsuits by prisoners. These suits have heavily burdened correctional authorities by requiring them to gather and to organize factual information for court pleadings, and to appear occasionally in court. The federal courts are also heavily burdened by this radical addition to their caseloads, and the absence of plaintiffs' counsel in most cases and the physical restraints upon the plaintiffs frequently render judicial administration unusually difficult. Many of these suits by indigent prisoners are wholly without merit under any view of the facts or the law; many are mischievous; some malicious. The plaintiffs are uninhibited by financial pressures. For many of these plaintiffs, that the very bringing of the suits in such numbers creates a serious problem for correctional authorities and the courts is a matter of indifference, and, perhaps, of wry satisfaction.

The courts have been resistive. "Lawful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the considerations underlying our penal system." Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285, 68 S.Ct. 1049, 1060, 92 L.Ed.2d 1356 (1948). Frequently rejection of a prisoner's challenge is expressed in terms of judicial deference to correctional administrators. "Inmates of State penitentiaries should realize that prison officials are vested with wide discretion in safeguarding prisoners committed to their custody. Discipline reasonably maintained in State prisons is not under the supervisory direction of federal courts." United States ex rel. Morris v. Radio Station WENR, 209 F.2d 105, 107 (7th Cir. 1953). See United States ex rel. Knight v. Ragen, 337 F.2d 425, 426 (7th Cir. 1964). See Cruz v. Beto, United States Supreme Court, March 20, 1972, 405 U.S. 319, 92 S.Ct. 1079, 31 L.Ed.2d 263 (dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Rehnquist). "... It is not the function of the courts to superintend the treatment and discipline of prisoners in penitentiaries, but only to deliver from imprisonment those who are illegally confined. Stroud v. Swope, 187 F.2d 850, 851 (9th Cir. 1951)."

If this negative view were absolute, and if it were controlling upon federal district courts today, it would be rather easy to decide the present case. But the view was never absolute ("limitation of many privileges and rights," Price v. Johnston, supra; "wide discretion" and "discipline reasonably maintained," United States ex rel. Morris v. Radio Station WENR, supra), and its negativism is not controlling today. "Cruel and unusual punishments," of course, may not be inflicted. But even beyond the Eighth Amendment, it is clear that prisoners enjoy many constitutional protections. "... (A)lthough the rights of a person serving a valid state sentence of imprisonment are greatly limited, he does have some federally protected rights which he may redress by a sec. 1983 action against those who have custody of him." United States ex rel. Campbell v. Pate, 401 F.2d 55, 57 (7th Cir. 1968). These rights definitely include: some degree of assistance in the preparation of legal pleadings and papers, Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 89 S.Ct. 747, 21 L.Ed.2d 718 (1969); access to a certain minimum of legal books and materials, Younger v. Gilmore, 404 U.S. 15, 92 S.Ct. 250, 30 L.Ed.2d 142 (1971); protection from racial segregation within a prison, at least in the absence of unusual circumstances, Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333, 88 S.Ct. 994, 19 L.Ed.2d 1212 (1968); and the equal protection of the laws with respect to religious beliefs, Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546, 84 S.Ct. 1733, 12 L. Ed.2d 1030 (1964), and Cruz v. Beto, United States Supreme Court, March 20, 1972, 405 U.S. 319, 92 S.Ct. 1079, 31 L. Ed.2d 263. Although the holding in Haines v. Kerner, January 13, 1972, 404 U.S. 519, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652, is not wholly clear, it seems to be that a state prisoner states a cause of action under § 1983 when he alleges that he suffered aggravation of preexisting physical ailments by reason of certain conditions of confinement and that there was an absence of procedural due process with respect to the imposition of a disciplinary measure within the prison. Many other federal constitutional rights of state prisoners have been recognized and protected by federal courts of appeals and federal district courts, and some federal district courts have considered it necessary to provide broad injunctive relief to vindicate such rights. See Sostre v. Rockefeller, 312 F.Supp. 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), reversed, modified, and affirmed in parts, Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971); Clutchette v. Procunier, 328 F.Supp. 767 (N.D.Cal. 1971); and Landman v. Royster, 333 F.Supp. 621 (E.D.Va.1971).

In all this, I find virtually no guidance to a federal district court today in its effort to decide whether the Fourteenth Amendment forbids a state1 to regulate the life of a prisoner in the specific manner challenged in the lawsuit. To say that the federal courts should generally defer to the judgment of...

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    ...mail. E.g., Jackson v. Godwin, 400 F.2d 529 (CA5 1968) (decided on both equal protection and First Amendment grounds); Morales v. Schmidt, 340 F.Supp. 544 (WD Wis. 1972); Fortune Society v. McGinnis, 319 F.Supp. 901 (SDNY 1970). Other courts phrase the standard in similarly demanding terms ......
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