Morales v. State

• Decision Date: 26 June 1896
• Citation: 36 S.W. 435
• Parties: MORALES v. STATE.<SMALL><SUP>1</SUP></SMALL>
• Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

36 S.W. 435

MORALES v. STATE.¹

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

June 26, 1896.

Appeal from district court, Angelina county; James T. Polley, Judge.

Patronia Morales was convicted of murder in the first degree, and appeals. Reversed.

Mann Trice, for the State.

HENDERSON, J.

Appellant was convicted of murder in the first degree, and his punishment assessed at death, and he prosecutes this appeal.

1. In this case the court gave a very lengthy charge. After defining murder in the first and second degrees, and malice, both express and implied, he then proceeded to charge on murder in the first and second degrees, manslaughter, and self-defense. No exception was taken to this charge, but, inasmuch as it is the duty of the court to correctly charge the law applicable to the case, it becomes our duty to review said charge. In order to present this matter properly, we will quote in extenso from the charge itself:

"(9) If, about the time and place charged in the indictment, the defendant went to the house of the deceased, and there stabbed and killed the deceased, and that such killing was in the perpetration of robbery, or in the attempt at the perpetration of robbery, then the defendant would be guilty of murder in the first degree; or if, about the time and place charged in the indictment, the defendant stabbed and thereby killed the deceased, and at the time he thus stabbed him the deceased had done nothing to or towards the defendant which, of itself, or by words accompanying it, made it reasonably appear to the defendant, viewing it from his standpoint, that he, the deceased, then intended to kill the defendant, or to inflict on him some serious bodily injury, and thereupon the defendant stabbed the deceased, and inflicted on him a wound or wounds from which he died, and the defendant thus inflicted said wound on the deceased in the execution or in pursuance of a formed design to kill the deceased, and that such design was formed in the mind of the defendant when his mind was sedate and deliberate, and therefore with express malice, such killing thus done would also be murder in the first degree.

"(10) If, about the time and place charged in the indictment, the defendant intentionally and unlawfully stabbed and killed the deceased, and at the time he thus stabbed him the deceased had done nothing to or towards the defendant which, of itself, or by words accompanying it, made it reasonably appear to the defendant, viewing it from his standpoint, that the defendant then intended to kill the deceased, or to inflict on him some serious bodily injury, then such killing under such circumstances would be murder in the second degree, and, if you so believe beyond a reasonable doubt, you will convict the defendant of murder in the second degree, and assess his punishment at confinement in the penitentiary for any period of time you see fit, being not less than five years.

"(11) If, about the time and place charged in the indictment, the defendant went home with the deceased, and, after they had arrived at the deceased's house, the deceased cursed and abused the defendant, and in the dark made an assault upon the defendant, and the defendant stabbed and killed the deceased, and at the time he thus stabbed the deceased he was moved by anger, fear, or sudden resentment arising out of the provocation then offered to him by the deceased, then he would be guilty of manslaughter.

"(12) In connection with and bearing upon the law of self-defense, you are instructed if, about the time and place charged in the indictment, the defendant and the deceased went to the house of the deceased, and, after arriving there, the deceased made a violent attack upon the defendant, and cursed and abused the defendant, and from the acts and declarations of the deceased it reasonably appeared to the defendant that his life was in danger, or that serious bodily injury was then about to be inflicted upon him by the deceased, and, acting under such belief and apprehension, the defendant stabbed and killed the deceased, then the defendant would not be guilty of any offense, and, if you so believe, you will acquit the defendant on the ground of self-defense. And, in passing upon the question as to whether the defendant acted in self-defense, the facts and circumstances transpiring at the time of the killing must be viewed from the standpoint of the defendant, and from none other; and in connection with this portion of the charge, if you have a reasonable doubt as to what the real facts are, you will give the defendant the benefit of the doubt, and acquit him.

"(13) Keeping in view the foregoing rules of law, if you find, from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant, Patronia Morales, in the county of Angelina, and state of Texas, at any time before the 15th of October, 1895, did stab and thereby kill Juarez Hernandez, and that such killing was with malice aforethought, either express or implied, then you will convict the defendant of murder, and you will then inquire as to whether he is guilty of murder in the first degree or murder in the second degree; and in this connection you are instructed, if you believe, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant stabbed and killed the deceased, and that such killing was done in the perpetration of robbery, or in the attempt at the perpetration of robbery, or that he stabbed and killed the deceased in pursuance of a formed design to kill him, which design was formed when his mind was cool, calm, sedate, and deliberate, and thereby upon express malice, in either case you will convict the defendant of murder in the first degree, and assess his punishment at death or by confinement in the penitentiary for life.

"(14) If you have a reasonable doubt as to whether the defendant is guilty of murder in the first degree, you will acquit him of that offense, and inquire whether he is guilty of murder in the second degree. And in this connection, if you believe that the defendant unlawfully and voluntarily stabbed and killed the deceased with malice aforethought, as that term has heretofore been explained, but that such killing was not done in the perpetration or in the attempt at perpetration of robbery, or with express malice, as that term has heretofore been explained to you, then you will find the defendant guilty of murder in the second degree, and assess his punishment at confinement in the penitentiary for any term you see fit, not less than five years.

"(15) If you have a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the defendant of murder, you will acquit him of that offense, and inquire whether he is guilty of manslaughter; and in reference to manslaughter you are instructed that if you find, from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant, in the county of Angelina and state of Texas, at any time within three years before the 15th day of October, 1895, did stab and kill Juarez Hernandez, and that such killing was done under the immediate influence of sudden passion, arising from an adequate cause, as these terms have heretofore been explained to you, then you will convict the defendant of manslaughter, unless you acquit the defendant on the ground of self-defense, as the term `self-defense' has heretofore been explained in this charge. If you should convict the defendant of manslaughter, you will assess his punishment at confinement in the penitentiary for any term of years you see fit, not less than two years, nor more than five years."

We will point out such defects in the charge as occur to us. Appellant was convicted of murder in the first degree, and, if the charge on first degree, and the charges on less degrees of culpable homicide, and the charge on self-defense were of such a character as not to present the issues clearly and fairly to the jury, they were calculated to impair the rights of the defendant. It would appear that, in the first portions of said charges above copied, the court intended merely to state the legal principles governing the case, and then to apply the principles so laid down to the facts of the case. For instance, after the court states what he has to say on the law of self-defense, he then says, "Keeping in view the foregoing rules of law," and then proceeds to charge the jury, applying the law to the facts of the case. If this be true, then as to self-defense the court merely laid down the principles governing the law of self-defense, and has not applied the law to the facts on this subject. But it rather appears to us that the first portion of said charge was an attempt to charge the law as applicable to the facts of the case, and the last portion was but a reiteration in different form of the preceding charges on the same subject. If this be true, then the jury were charged on the law of self-defense. In the charge of the court on murder in the first degree (see paragraphs 9 and 13), the charge as to murder in the first degree in the perpetration of robbery or attempted perpetration of robbery appears to be in accordance with the approved forms. See Sharpe v. State, 17 Tex. App. 486. In said last-mentioned paragraphs, the court then proceeds further to charge on murder in the first degree committed upon express malice. The court combines with this charge something in the nature of a charge on self-defense, and, when analyzed, both of these charges in a roundabout way instruct the jury, in effect, that if they believe that the killing was not done in...