Morales v. State
| Decision Date | 24 April 1968 |
| Docket Number | No. 41130,41130 |
| Citation | 427 S.W.2d 51 |
| Parties | Mary MORALES, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee. |
| Court | Texas Court of Criminal Appeals |
Morehead, Sharp, Boyd & Tisdel, by Robert L. Gibbins, Jr., Plainview, for appellant.
Leon B. Douglas, State's Atty., Austin, for the State.
The offense is Murder without Malice; the punishment, five (5) years.
The record reflects that the 19-year-old appellant, Mary Morales, was charged with the murder of a baby, apparently born to her out of wedlock.
Appellant urges at the outset that the trial court erred in failing to afford her a preliminary trial on the issue of her present insanity; that it further erred in failing to halt the trial on the merits when such issue was raised by the evidence and conduct a hearing on that issue and obtain a jury finding thereon before proceeding further; that it compounded such errors when it improperly charged the jury on such issue at the conclusion of the trial. We are in accord with appellant's position.
Prior to trial appellant's counsel filed a written motion alleging that the appellant was presently of 'unsound mind' and requesting a preliminary trial on the issue of her competency to stand trial, but the court, in full accordance with Article 46.02, Sec. 1, Vernon's Ann.C.C.P., 1965, overruled the motion upon the District Attorney's refusal to consent to such proceeding.
In Townsend v. State, Tex.Crim.App., 427 S.W.2d 55, this day decided, we said:
'In view of the foregoing, we hold that where an accused makes a timely motion or request for a preliminary hearing on his competency to stand trial, based upon allegations that because of present insanity he is unable to make a rational defense to the main charge, he is entitled to such hearing if it be with the required consent and approval. If such consent and approval are not given, he is not entitled to such preliminary hearing before a jury. However, he is still entitled not to be tried while incompetent to make a rational defense, regardless of the consent of the prosecutor or approval of the trial court. Otherwise, the very purpose of Article 34, (2nd sentence) supra, would be subverted. Therefore, as in the case at bar, where a timely demand or request for a preliminary hearing supported by affidavit is denied for want of consent, the trial judge is nevertheless under the duty, after the selection of the jury on the trial on the merits and preferably prior to the reading of the indictment, to forthwith afford the accused a hearing on his competency to stand trial. Under such procedure the same jury, if the defendant is found presently sane, may well pass on competency and subsequently on guilt or innocence (and even punishment), but the jury would be given the opportunity to pass on competency to stand trial uncluttered by evidence of the offense itself.
'We further hold that the failure of the appellant to pursue the issue of present competency at the trial on the merits even though available to him under the conditions prescribed in Article 46.02, Sec. 2, supra, does not constitute a 'waiver' where a proper and timely demand for a preliminary hearing has been made and refused. 6
'Our holding may be characterized as affording an accused when his request for a preliminary hearing on present insanity has been properly presented and refused for want of consent or approval, a procedure for the preservation of his rights under the second sentence of Article 34, supra, which will satisfy due process requirements as well.'
While appellant's motion for a preliminary hearing was not supported by an affidavit and it does not appear that appellant's counsel called the court's attention to the availability of supporting psychiatric testimony, and while the allegations in the motion could have been fuller, we deem the motion sufficient to invoke the rule laid down in Townsend.
We need not, however, rely upon the Townsend decision alone for this reversal.
In Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 86 S.Ct. 836, 15 L.Ed.2d 815, the Supreme Court declared that the trial and conviction of an incompetent defendant constitutes a denial of due process and that state procedures must be adequate to protect this right.
In Pate the Supreme Court reversed a state court murder conviction and remanded the cause for a new trial for the failure of the trial judge to conduct an inquiry in the accused's competency once the issue was raised. The Court observed that while the accused had never claimed to be incompetent, the uncontradicted testimony (by lay witnesses) relating to his defense of insanity also revealed a long history of pronounced irrational behavior and bizarre acts which alone was sufficient to raise the competency issue. All nine justices in Pate agreed that a trial judge has a constitutional duty to conduct an inquiry into an accused's competency once the issue is raised, though the majority and dissent disagreed as to whether the facts in Pate had raised the issue.
While the Supreme Court did not reveal the extent of the inquiry required to satisfy due process requirements, it clearly appears the court intended that a separate hearing for determination of competency was necessary.
As we indicated in Townsend v. State, supra, Pate would require...
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Ex parte Hagans
...Ann., Art. 46.02, § 4(a). See Cavender v. State, Tex.Cr.App.1974, 515 S.W.2d 277; Townsend v. State, supra; Morales v. State, Tex.Cr.App.1968, 427 S.W.2d 51." Martin v. Estelle, The necessity of the separate hearing on the question of competency is so that the determination of an accused's ......
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Martinez v. State, 04-81-00089-CR
...from the case before us also is Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978) and Morales v. State, 427 S.W.2d 51, 55 (Tex.Cr.App.1968). The appellant in Mincey was in the hospital with a tube in his mouth, depressed almost to the point of coma, his condition was suf......
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Martin v. Estelle, 75-3547
...Ann., art. 46.02, § 4(a). See Cavender v. State, Tex.Cr.App.1974, 515 S.W.2d 277; Townsend v. State, supra; Morales v. State, Tex.Cr.App.1968, 427 S.W.2d 51. The reason for this concern for a separate hearing on the question of competency to stand trial is, quite obviously, so that a determ......
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Pittman v. State
...Reliance is had upon Article 38.22, V.A.C.C.P., and Morales v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 427 S.W.2d 51. We reaffirm what was said in Morales v. State, supra, but we fail to find any timely objection to the court's charge on the Particular basis contained in this ground of error. See Article 36.14......
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Defenses and special evidentiary charges
...TES You can make this fit the facts — this is a rough example to meet the suggestion of such a charge, when necessary. Morales v. State, 427 S.W.2d 51 (Tex.Crim. App. 1968). Actually, the trial court will make its own determination of voluntariness first and enter it of record, deciding t......
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Table of cases
...U.S. 1149 129 S.Ct. 1030 (2009) 6:100 Morales v. State 357 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) 3:1745, 3:xxviii:b, 3:1790 Morales v. State 427 S.W.2d 51 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968) 3:560 1:100, 6:70, 6:170, 6:370 Moore v. State 882 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) Moore v. State 969 S.W.2d 4 (Tex. ......