Morales v. State

• Decision Date: 11 March 2021
• Docket Number: NUMBER 13-19-00507-CR
• Parties: JOAQUIN MORALES, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

JOAQUIN MORALES, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.

NUMBER 13-19-00507-CR

COURT OF APPEALS THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG

March 11, 2021

On appeal from the 111th District Court of Webb County, Texas.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Chief Justice Contreras and Justices Hinojosa and Silva

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Silva

Appellant Joaquin Morales appeals his convictions of assault-family violence, impeding breath or circulation, a third-degree felony, and assault causing bodily injury, a Class A misdemeanor.¹ See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01(a)(1), (b)(2)(B). By two issues, Morales argues (1) the evidence was legally insufficient to sustain either conviction, and (2) the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his motion for mistrial. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

On October 16, 2018, Marco Camero, a Laredo Police Department (LPD) officer, was dispatched to a residence between 4 p.m. and 5 p.m. At trial, Camero stated he spoke with the complaining witness, Christina Herrera, who indicated an assault had occurred approximately twelve hours earlier around 5 a.m. Camero testified that Herrera had visible "markings to her neck area and injuries on her face." According to Camero, Herrera also appeared "kind of scared" and "concerned." Herrera claimed she had been hit in the face with a "half empty beer can" and strangled outside in the porch area by Morales, her live-in boyfriend. Camero said while there were no beer cans in the outdoor area, he did observe several empty beer cans inside the residence.

The following day, LPD Investigator David Buenrostro interviewed Herrera. Buenrostro opined that photographs taken of Herrera corroborated what she stated had occurred. Photographs depicting Herrera with red markings on the left and right sides of her neck, lacerations on her nose and above her left eye, and dried blood across her forehead were admitted at trial.

On October 19, 2018, Buenrostro contacted Morales, and he agreed to provide a statement to law enforcement. According to Buenrostro, Morales denied hitting orstrangling Herrera, but he admitted to pouring a beer on her head "because [Herrera] had poured a beer on him also."

Morales's full statement to police was read into the record:

On the morning of Oct[ober] 16th at around 5 a.m., [Herrera] and I started an argument due to her being drunk. She started complaining about me not helping out and making false accusations and started insulting me with lesser words. I let her know that if there was a problem with me staying there, I could grab my things and leave. As I made the move to get up, she got up and spilled the beer she was drinking over my head. As she did that, I too grabbed the beer, spilled it on her, and walked inside to get my phone, my pants, and my guitar. I kissed my sick daughter goodnight, and [I] started to walk away from the premises. As I was walking away, she proceeded to chase me. So, I started to walk away. I did not want any trouble on her because she has probation[,] and she shouldn't be drinking. She immediately threatened me over text messages[,] saying she was gonna call the cops if I didn't go back. I wasn't drunk, and I had no motive to do such a thing to my daughter's mom.

Text messages between Herrera and Morales with time stamps indicating they were sent between 5:47 a.m. and 6:15 a.m. on October 16 were also read into the record.

[Herrera:] You gonna ditch everything just like that? I work tomorrow and your daughter is sick.

[A close-up photograph of Herrera showing a bloody forehead was sent between text messages.]

Reporting that to cops if you don't answer[.]

[Morales:] [Y]ou shouldn't be drinking[.] Good l[u]ck[.] Luck[.] If [I']m going down for shit I didn't do[,] I[']m taking you down with me[.]

[Herrera:] Lol have fun on the run[.] Oh you didn[']t hit me on the head? How did I bleed like this then? Tell me?

[Morales:] [Y]our stupid ass probably did that to yourself[.]

[Herrera:] Lmao you can never take the blame for something you did[.] I would never do this cause [I']m the only one who looks after the l[o]ve of my life[.] Go to [h]ell.[Morales:] [Y]eah[,] you tell yourself that[.]

[Herrera:] Ok then.

Herrera testified that she and Morales have a daughter together and dated for about six years. Herrera stated that in the hours leading up to the assault, she and Morales had been drinking outside. Herrera said the conversation escalated after she asked Morales to "help [her] with the chores around the house or cleaning up a bit" because he was living there with her rent-free while she was the sole financial provider. Herrera said, "[Morales] got upset and he told me that he didn't have to do any of that because he said, 'it's not like we're married or anything.'" Herrera testified that, "[o]ut of impulse and frustration," she "poured [her] open[] can of beer over his head." Morales then "proceeded to pour his beer over [her] head." When Morales attempted to go inside the home, Herrera told him he had to leave. "[Morales] turned around[,] and he pushed me to the floor . . . . [T]hat's—he mounted on top of me and he had put both of his hands around my neck and he started to strangle me."

Herrera testified that Morales strangled her for "about one minute," she was unable to "say anything because [she] couldn't breathe," and she felt pain in her neck and pressure in her head. Herrera explained she was ultimately able to push Morales off of her, and he returned inside the home while she sat outside, trying to catch her breath. Herrera testified that as she was standing up, Morales came walking out of the house holding an open beer can. Herrera said Morales struck her face with the beer can, and she felt "a lot of pain" and a burning sensation. Herrera testified that she fell down to the floor, and she watched him walk out to the driveway and turn the street corner.

The State questioned Herrera as to why she sent the text messages asking for him to return, and the following exchange ensued:

[Herrera:] I felt scared, but I wanted to give him a chance to come back and to be with his daughter. He was also a big support system to me in that manner in that he would watch her while I would work.

[State:] Okay, and why did you want to give him a chance?

[Herrera:] [U]m, it's—I've done it before. Like this has happened before, and I've done it and he's—

[Defense counsel:] Objection, Your Honor, to the reference, Your Honor, and it's a violation of his due-process rights, and I'm going to move for a mistrial.

THE COURT: All right. Mistrial is denied, and the jury is instructed to disregard that last answer. Answer only the question.

[Herrera:] Yes, ma'am.

. . . .

[State:] Okay. Now, I want to ask you: what was the nature of you all's relationship?

[Herrera:] [U]m, it was very toxic. We—we had a lot of altercations.

[Defense counsel:] I'm going to object, Your Honor. May we approach?

THE COURT: Yes.

[(]Whereupon the following bench conference was h[eld)]:

[Defense counsel:] Your Honor, it's obvious like she's already like given up, and she's going into other incidents by the fact that she's mentioning that he's very toxic and things like that. So, I'm going to ask for the Court—for the State to instruct the witness not to make references to incidents. It's happened once, and it's going to happen again, and it's a clear violation—there's no way you can cure that from the jury. It requires a mistrial, Your Honor.

[State:] Your Honor, this is a family violence case, and as to 38.371 of the Code, it provides that in a case of family violence—it provides for the introduction, not to show character, but to show the nature of the relationship and what it was like.

THE COURT: . . . I'm still going to ask you to watch it. So, if you need to talk to her about it—

[Defense counsel:] I'm still going to object, Your Honor. That's something that was not provided as part of the notice that they would—

THE COURT: Well, the nature of their relationship I can understand, but if she's going to[,] specifically going to get into other offenses, then that's going to be stricken by the Court. So, that's what you don't need to get into, unless the door is opened, and you'll need to watch that. I'll have an instruction in the Charge under "bad acts." Objection is sustained.

(Bench conference ended)

. . . .

[State:] Okay. Ms. Herrera, I'm going to ask you—without telling me about specific instances, okay, and please don't give me specific instances—but what was the surrounding nature of you all's relationship? Could you describe it?

[Herrera:] He was violent.

Morales did not thereafter object.

On cross-examination, Herrera was asked how she could "trust" Morales enough to have him in her home if he was "really violent or very violent as [she has] stated." Herrera replied that she trusted him to take care of their daughter.

As part of his case-in-chief, Morales called a friend, Stephanie Garza, to testify. Garza testified she met Morales in February 2018. On October 16, 2018, she received aphone call from Morales between 5:30 and 5:45 a.m. Garza stated she picked Morales up at a convenience store and noted that while he smelled "like alcohol," she did not see any blood on him or his belongings. "When I saw him[,] he started crying." Garza said Morales told her that he and Herrera had gotten into an argument, she spilled beer on him, and he then did the same to her. Morales told Garza that he went back inside the house to "grab his belongings, kiss his daughter goodnight, and that's when he ran out."

The jury returned a guilty verdict on both counts, and Morales and the State reached an agreement as to a recommendation on punishment. Pursuant to the recommendation, the trial court assessed punishment at one year in the county jail for the Class A misdemeanor assault to run concurrent with the felony assault sentence of five years' incarceration in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division.

This appeal followed.

II. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

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