Morales v. Supreme Maint.
| Decision Date | 24 June 2022 |
| Docket Number | 1:21-cv-01044-KWR-JHR |
| Parties | AMANDA MORALES, Plaintiff, v. SUPREME MAINTENANCE INC., WADE HUNT, and GLORIA SANCHEZ, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Mexico |
THIS MATTER comes before the Court upon Defendants' Supreme Maintenance Inc., Wade Hunt, and Gloria Sanchez Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 32), filed May 2 2022, and Motion to Strike Plaintiff's Surreply (Doc. 36), filed June 8, 2022. Having reviewed the parties' pleadings and the relevant law, the Court finds that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 32) is well-taken in part, and therefore, is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. Defendants' Motion to Strike (Doc 36) is WELL-TAKEN, and therefore, is GRANTED.
This case arises from the alleged discrimination, wrongful termination, and retaliation against Plaintiff Amanda Morales by her employer, Defendant Supreme Maintenance Inc. Plaintiff was employed as a janitorial worker by Supreme Maintenance from February 21, 2019 to December 30, 2019. See Doc. 1, at 8 ¶ 1. Defendants Wade Hunt and Gloria Sanchez worked as the operations administrator and operations director, respectively. Id. at 7.
Plaintiff first alleges that she faced sex discrimination. Plaintiff alleges that her job was advertised as paying between $9.50 to $13.00 per hour, Doc. 1, at 8 ¶ 3, however, Plaintiff was only paid $9.15 per hour and was paid less than male employees and other employees without similar experience. Id. ¶¶ 3-4.
Next, Plaintiff alleges that she experienced discrimination on the basis of her national origin. Plaintiff claims that Supreme Maintenance had a “preference” for employees who spoke Spanish, a language which Plaintiff could not speak. Id. at 13-14. Plaintiff asserts that as a result of her inability to speak Spanish, she did not receive the same work or the same wages as other employees. Id. at 14.
Plaintiff also alleges that she faced unsafe working conditions. Plaintiff alleges that Supreme Maintenance failed to provide janitorial employees with proper cleaning supplies and instructed Plaintiff to use “corrosive chemicals” without any protective gear or training. Id. at 89, ¶¶ 9-11. Plaintiff alleges that she later became ill and experienced nausea, headaches, “heart palpitations, anxiety, nerve damage[,]kidney[] and lung damage” as a result. Id. ¶ 13. Plaintiff was later hospitalized due to her symptoms, and when she informed her supervisors, she was allegedly “call[ed] names, threatened [and] belittled” her instead. Id. ¶¶ 13-15. Plaintiff claims that she was “mistreated” by managers and faced a hostile environment as a result. Id. ¶¶ 26-27.
Additionally, Plaintiff alleges that she faced sexual harassment at work. Plaintiff was assigned by Supreme Maintenance to clean a call center for Concentrix Corp. Id. ¶ 1. Plaintiff alleges that Jamie Martinez, a facility manager at Concentrix, repeatedly “propositioned [Plaintiff] for sexual favors.” Id. ¶¶ 18-19. Plaintiff repeatedly declined Mr. Martinez' advances, however he began to “yell, complain, [and] be aggressive” in response. Id. Plaintiff informed her supervisor of these incidents, and her supervisor encouraged her to inform officials at Supreme Maintenance. Id. ¶ 23. Plaintiff alleges that she reported these incidents to Defendants Sanchez and Hunt, but that same day, she was told that her “hours were going to be cut.” Id. ¶¶ 24-25.
Plaintiff alleges that in retaliation for lodging her complaint, Mr. Martinez falsely accused Plaintiff's husband, who also worked at Supreme Maintenance, of theft. Id. ¶¶ 29, 43-44. Plaintiff further alleges that she repeatedly asked Supreme Maintenance to investigate her sexual harassment claims, however, Defendants Sanchez and Hunt declined to act even after she provided an audio recording of an incident between herself and Mr. Martinez. Id. ¶¶ 25, 34-37, 47-51.
Plaintiff asserts that Supreme Maintenance stated it was terminating her position because she failed to appear for scheduled shifts, id. ¶¶ 47-51, but maintains that she was fired when she requested that Defendants Hunt and Sanchez investigate her sexual harassment claims and when she informed them that she intended to pursue action with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). Id. at 18. After her termination, Plaintiff attempted to collect unemployment benefits, but alleges that Supreme Maintenance obstructed Plaintiff's efforts. Id. at 12 ¶¶ 52-53.
Plaintiff later filed a complaint with the EEOC and the New Mexico Environment Department. Id. ¶¶ 54-56. Plaintiff then filed suit asserting the following 14 claims[1]: Wage Protection (Count I); National Origin Discrimination (Count II); Unsafe Working Conditions (Count III); Infliction of Emotional Distress (Count IV); Workplace Injury Retaliation (Count V); Workplace Injury (Count VI); False Reporting to the New Mexico Environment Department (Count VII); Sexual Harassment (Count VIII); Retaliation (Count IX); Wrongful Termination (Count X); Unemployment Benefits Fraud (Count XI); Breach of Implied Contract (Count XII); Hostile Work Environment (Count XIII); and Spousal Affiliation (Count XIV). Defendants now file the instant motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Doc. 32.
Rule 12(b)(6) permits the Court to dismiss a complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must have sufficient factual matter that if true, states a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677 (2009). A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678. As such, a plaintiff's “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). All well-pleaded factual allegations are “viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Brokers' Choice of Am., Inc. v. NBC Universal, Inc., 757 F.3d 1125, 1136 (10th Cir. 2014).
In ruling on a motion to dismiss, “a court should disregard all conclusory statements of law and consider whether the remaining specific factual allegations, if assumed to be true, plausibly suggest the defendant is liable.” Kansas Penn Gaming, LLC v. Collins, 656 F.3d 1210, 1214 (10th Cir. 2011). The Court must draw all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff's favor. Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1217 (10th Cir. 2007). However, mere “labels and conclusions” or “formulaic recitation[s] of the elements of a cause of action” will not suffice. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
The Court is mindful that Plaintiff in this action appears pro se. A pro se litigant's pleadings are to be construed liberally and are held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). The Court can overlook the “failure to cite proper legal authority,” “confusion of various legal theories,” “poor syntax and sentence construction,” or “unfamiliarity with pleading requirements.” Id.
However, the Court cannot assume the role of advocate for a pro se litigant, id., and the Court cannot “supply additional facts [or] construct a legal theory for [the] plaintiff that assumes facts that have not been pleaded.” Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d 1188, 1197 (10th Cir. 1989).
Defendants move to dismiss Count I (Wage Protection, Title VII)[2], Count II (National Origin Discrimination), Count V (Workplace Injury Retaliation), Count VI (Workplace Injury), Count XIII (Hostile Work Environment), and Count XIV (Spousal Affiliation) asserting that Plaintiff has failed to exhaust her administrative remedies under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) or the New Mexico Human Rights Act (“NMHRA”). See Doc. 32, at 6.
The NMHRA makes it an unlawful for an employer to discriminate against any qualified person because of race, age, religion, color, national origin, ancestry, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, pregnancy, childbirth, physical or mental handicap or serious medical condition, or spousal affiliation. See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 28-1-7(A). The NMHRA requires an individual to first exhaust his or her administrative remedies before bringing a lawsuit. See Luboyeski v. Hill, 1994-NMSC-032, ¶ 7, 117 N.M. 380, 382, 872 P.2d 353, 355. To exhaust administrative remedies under the NMHRA, a person must: (i) file a complaint with the New Mexico Human Rights Bureau or the EEOC making sufficient allegations to support the complaint; and (ii) receive an order of nondetermination from the New Mexico Human Rights Division. See Mitchell-Carr v. McLendon, 1999-NMSC-025, ¶ 16, 127 N.M. 282, 287, 980 P.2d 65, 70.
Likewise, Title VII forbids employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1); Brown v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 82 (1976). “To bring a Title VII claim, a plaintiff must file a charge of discrimination with either the EEOC or an authorized state or local agency and receive a right to sue letter.” Brown v. Keystone Learning Servs., 804 Fed.Appx. 873, 882 (10th Cir. 2020). Failure to exhaust administrative remedies is now an affirmative defense and not a jurisdictional bar. See Lincoln v. BNSF Ry. Co., 900 F.3d 1166, 1181-86 (10th Cir. 2018).
Defendants argue that Plaintiff did not file “a charge of discrimination based on national origin, unequal pay,...
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