Moran v. Clarke
| Decision Date | 06 July 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. 4:98-CV-556.,4:98-CV-556. |
| Citation | 323 F.Supp.2d 974 |
| Parties | Thomas MORAN, Plaintiff, v. Anne Marie CLARKE, et al. Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri |
Stanley E. Goldstein, Liberman and Goldstein, Clayton, MO, Eli Karsh, Lackenbach and Siegel, Scarsdale, NY, Mark H. Neill, John C. Pleban, Pleban and Associates, LLC, St. Louis, MO, for Plaintiff.
Priscilla F. Gunn, Rabbitt and Pitzer, Joy Urbom Taylor, Greensfelder and Hemker, St. Louis, MO, Erin M. Matis, Gallop and Johnson, Clayton, MO, for Defendants.
At the conclusion of a five day jury trial in the present case, the jury returned verdicts for Defendants on all of Plaintiff's claims. Presently before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion for New Trial which presents the Court with five bases for which Plaintiff contends he is entitled to a new trial pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59. For the reasons explained below, the motion is denied.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a) states in pertinent part, "[a] new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues (1) in an action in which there has been a trial by jury, for any of the reasons for which new trials have heretofore been granted in actions at law in the courts of the United States." A motion for a new trial is addressed to the sound judicial discretion of the trial court. "No fixed standard applies to the grant or denial of Rule 59 relief." 12 James Wm. Moore's Et Al, Moore's Federal Practice § 59.13[1], at 59-43 (3d. ed.1998). "[A]uthority to grant a new trial, moreover, is confided almost entirely to the exercise of discretion on the part of the trial court." Allied Chemical Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 36, 101 S.Ct. 188, 66 L.Ed.2d 193 (1980). The key question is whether a new trial should be granted to avoid a miscarriage of justice. See Beckman v. Mayo Found., 804 F.2d 435, 439 (8th Cir.1986).
Plaintiff contends that Juror Four, Mr. Tommy Greene, should have been struck for cause from the venire pool because of his inability to be impartial. During voir dire Mr. Greene said he remembered both the Gregory Bell incident and the resultant media coverage. Upon questioning from Defendants' counsel, Mr. Greene admitted it would be "difficult" to suppress those memories and emotions he felt at the time of the incident, but ultimately stated that he could set aside his feelings and return a verdict based solely on the evidence in the case.
The Court possesses broad discretion in determining juror qualifications "because it is in the best position to assess the demeanor and credibility of the prospective jurors." United States v. Elliott, 89 F.3d 1360, 1365 (8th Cir.1996). For a party to strike a venire member for cause, that party must show "actual partiality" based on the circumstances of the case. Walzer v. St. Joseph State Hosp., 231 F.3d 1108, 1112 (8th Cir.2000) (citing United States v. Tucker, 137 F.3d 1016, 1029 (8th Cir.1998)). Potential jurors maintain a presumption of impartiality so long as "the jurors can conscientiously and properly carry out their sworn duty to apply the law to the facts of the particular case." United States v. Wright, 340 F.3d 724, 733 (8th Cir.2003) (quoting United States v. Evans, 272 F.3d 1069, 1078 (8th Cir.2001)). The test for evaluating impartiality is "whether the prospective juror can lay aside his impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court." Id. (quoting United States v. Johnson, 906 F.2d 1285, 1288 (8th Cir.1990)). In the present case, Plaintiff has the "burden of showing that the jury which actually heard the evidence was not impartial." Wright, 340 F.3d at 734.
In the present case, Plaintiff's sole basis for challenging Mr. Greene's impartiality stems from questioning by Defendants' counsel during voir dire. Although Mr. Greene stated that he had strong feelings and emotions about the Bell incident when it occurred, Mr. Greene ultimately stated that he could set aside his feelings and return a verdict based solely on the evidence in the case. At no point did Mr. Greene say that he was angry or that he harbored any negative emotions toward Plaintiff or anyone else in particular; he stated only that he felt anger about the incident. Given the horrific details of the incident and the effect it had on the city of St. Louis, that members of the community had strong feelings and emotions regarding the incident is both understandable and expected. Without more, Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden of proving impartiality. Plaintiff's motion for new trial is, therefore, denied as to paragraph one. See Wright, 340 F.3d at 734-735 ().
Plaintiff next contends that the Court improperly overruled his peremptory challenges exercised against Juror No. 4 (Mr. Greene), Juror No. 6 (Mr. Willie Jones) and Juror No. 11 (Mr. Phillip Tate). After Plaintiff attempted to use his four peremptory challenges to strike the only four African-American venire persons on the prospective jury panel, Defendants protested, citing Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). The Court sustained Plaintiff's challenge as to one prospective juror and agreed with Defendants in overruling the other three challenges.
Use of race discrimination in the exercise of peremptory challenges to exclude venire members violates a criminal defendant's Fourteenth Amendment equal protection rights. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 84, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986) (citing Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 203-04, 85 S.Ct. 824, 13 L.Ed.2d 759 (1965)). In Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 630, 111 S.Ct. 2077, 114 L.Ed.2d 660 (1991), the United States Supreme Court extended the same principle to private litigants in civil cases. Additionally, the Court in Edmonson held that a litigant may raise the equal protection rights of the excluded venire member on his or her behalf. Id. at 628-29, 111 S.Ct. 2077.
A litigant "may not justify peremptory challenges to venire members of one race unless venire members of another race with comparable or similar characteristics are also challenged." Elmahdi v. Marriott Hotel Servs., Inc., 339 F.3d 645, 651 (8th Cir.2003) (quoting Reynolds v. Benefield, 931 F.2d 506, 512 (8th Cir.1991)). The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals employs a three-part analysis when considering the merits of an objection to a party's preliminary strike under Batson. United States v. Brooks, 2 F.3d 838, 840 (8th Cir.1993) (citing Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 358-59, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991)). See also Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-98, 106 S.Ct. 1712. Each of the three steps "involves a factual determination entitled to a presumption of correctness unless overcome by clear and convincing evidence." Hall v. Luebbers, 341 F.3d 706, 713 (8th Cir.2003) (citing Weaver v. Bowersox, 241 F.3d 1024, 1030 (8th Cir.2001)).
A party raising a Batson objection must first make a prima facie showing that the opposing party "exercised peremptory challenges on the basis of race." Brooks, 2 F.3d at 840 (citing Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 358, 111 S.Ct. 1859). During this first step, the district court's determinations are awarded great deference upon review because the "prima facie step is highly fact-intensive." Weaver, 241 F.3d at 1030.
If the challenging party is successful at step one, the burden shifts to the opposing party to provide "a race-neutral explanation for striking the prospective jurors in question." Brooks, 2 F.3d at 840 (citing Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 358-59, 111 S.Ct. 1859). A strike is "race-neutral" if "the explanation is facially based on something other than the juror's race, i.e., if discriminatory intent is not inherent in the stated reason." Id. The opposing party may meet its burden by providing the Court with an explanation that does not have to be "persuasive, or even plausible." U.S. Xpress Enters. v. J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc., 320 F.3d 809, 813 (8th Cir.2003) (quoting Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 131 L.Ed.2d 834 (1995)). At this point, only "the facial validity of the explanation" is relevant and necessary. Id. Reasons given for a strike may appear "unconvincing," but nonetheless "implausible reasons may be legitimate, and, therefore, as long as the reason is facially neutral, `it must be deemed sufficient at this second stage, even if it bears no relation whatsoever to the case to be tried or the person's ability to serve as a juror.'" Id. (quoting Elem v. Purkett, 64 F.3d 1195, 1198 (8th Cir.1995)). A proffered explanation for a strike will satisfy the second step of the Batson analysis even if it is "fantastic" or even "silly or superstitious," so long as the reason given is facially race-neutral. Elem, 64 F.3d at 1198 (quoting Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768, 115 S.Ct. 1769).
If the opposing party provides a race-neutral explanation for the strike, the Court must determine "whether the defendant carried the burden of proving purposeful discrimination." Brooks, 2 F.3d at 840 (citing Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 359, 111 S.Ct. 1859). The Court's ultimate decision may hinge on whether the Court finds the reason for striking offered in step two race-neutral and not pretextual. Jackson v. City of Little Rock, 26 F.3d 88, 90 (8th Cir.1994). The Court may also consider both the "truthfulness and neutral...
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Moran v. Clarke
...v. Clarke, 309 F.3d 516 (8th Cir.2002); Moran v. Clarke, 213 F.Supp.2d 1067 (2002), Moran v. Clarke, 359 F.3d 1058 (2004); Moran v. Clarke, 323 F.Supp.2d 974 (2004). In the most recent district court proceeding, the matter went to trial. During voir dire, Moran moved to strike for cause two......