U.S. v. Evans
| Decision Date | 11 September 2001 |
| Docket Number | 00-2650E,00-2785E,Nos. 00-2576E,00-2786EM and 00-2931EM,s. 00-2576E |
| Parties | (8th Cir. 2001) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, APPELLEE, v. MONROE EVANS, ALSO KNOWN AS TY, ALSO KNOWN AS DADDY, APPELLANT. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, APPELLEE, v. DERRY EVANS, ALSO KNOWN AS BUJIE, ALSO KNOWN AS BOOGIE, ALSO KNOWN AS DARNELL WASHINGTON, ALSO KNOWN AS SHON PERRY, APPELLANT. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, APPELLEE, v. TERRANCE ROBERTS, ALSO KNOWN AS TERRY, ALSO KNOWN AS TERRANCE EVANS, APPELLANT. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, APPELLEE, v. CLEM EVANS, ALSO KNOWN AS BIG CLEM, ALSO KNOWN AS CLEM L., APPELLANT. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, APPELLEE, v. JOHNNY LEE EVANS, ALSO KNOWN AS JEROME, ALSO KNOWN AS BUNNY, APPELLANT. Submitted: |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. [Copyrighted Material Omitted]
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[Copyrighted Material Omitted] Before Loken, Richard S. Arnold, and Fagg, Circuit Judges.
Appellants Derry Evans, Terrance Roberts, Monroe Evans, Clem Evans, and Johnny Lee Evans appeal their convictions of multiple counts relating to transporting individuals in interstate commerce for prostitution in violation of the Mann Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2421-2423, money laundering, 18 U.S.C. § 1956, and conspiracy to commit those offenses. The most substantial arguments that they raise on appeal concern: (1) whether a juror provided adequate assurance of his impartiality; (2) whether an incorrect jury instruction on money laundering--that omitted the need to find an effect on interstate commerce--requires reversal; (3) whether the District Court's general "knowledge" instruction conflicted with the Court's specific "knowledge" instruction under the money-laundering statute; and (4) whether there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction of Derry Evans for conspiracy to launder money.
For the reasons that follow, we affirm the convictions and sentences of Derry Evans, Terrance Roberts, and Johnny Lee Evans in their entirety. We also affirm the convictions of Monroe Evans and Clem Evans. Regarding those two defendants, however, we reverse for resentencing with respect to the counts for which, both sides agree, they were sentenced in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause. For those defendants, we remand the case to the District Court for further proceedings.
The defendants were convicted of being part of an interstate conspiracy--based in Minneapolis, Minnesota--involving the recruitment, transportation, control, and abuse of prostitutes. The conspiracy began in the early 1980s and lasted until the time of the defendants' arrest. The defendants are all relatives. Monroe Evans, 50 years old at the time of trial, Clem Evans, 53, and Johnny Lee Evans, 46, are brothers.1 Terrance Roberts, 26, is the son of Monroe Evans, and Derry Evans, 28, is a nephew of the brothers. The facts will be further stated as relevant to the points urged on appeal.
Following a two-week jury trial, the defendants were found guilty on March 27, 2000. The District Court2 entered final judgment on the verdicts. This appeal followed.
Derry Evans was convicted under the Mann Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2422(a), of knowingly persuading, inducing, or enticing an individual to travel in interstate commerce to engage in prostitution; under 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a), of three counts of transporting an individual under the age of 18 in interstate commerce with the intent that the individual engage in prostitution; and under 18 U.S.C. § 371, of conspiracy to violate the Mann Act. He also was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) of money laundering and under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) of conspiracy to launder money. In addition, he was convicted under 42 U.S.C. § 408(a)(7)(B) of fraudulent use of a social security number.
Following his conviction, the District Court sentenced Derry Evans to 85 years in prison. Based on a total offense level of 43 and a criminal history category of VI, the imprisonment range under the Sentencing Guidelines was life. However, the statutory maximum punishment for the crimes of which he was convicted was 85 years. Therefore, pursuant to U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5G1.2(d) (1998), the District Court imposed consecutive sentences to the extent of the combined statutory maximum to achieve a sentence as close as possible to the Guidelines' result. The length of the sentence is not an issue on appeal.
Derry Evans argues that the District Court erred in denying his motion to remove a juror who, following his exposure to other jurors' misconduct, refused to give unequivocal assurances that he could be fair and impartial.
On the fourth day of trial, in response to the complaint of one of the jurors--juror 15--about the conduct of certain members of the jury, the Court conducted a voir dire of the jury. In the voir dire, juror 8 testified that he had overheard conversations among other jurors concerning the lack of professionalism and lack of interest of defense counsel, and concerning television coverage of the trial. During his examination by the government's lawyer, the following colloquy took place:
Later, during examination by defense counsel, the following exchange occurred.
Id. at 90-91 (emphasis added).
Citing Thompson v. Altheimer & Gray, 248 F.3d 621 (7th Cir. 2001), and United States v. Gonzalez, 214 F.3d 1109, 1114 (9th Cir. 2000), Derry argues that the District Court's failure to remove juror 8, despite juror 8's equivocal responses to questions about his impartiality and his ability to keep an open mind, was error.
The Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to trial "by an impartial jury." Impartiality is presumed "so long as the jurors can conscientiously and properly carry out their sworn duty to apply the law to the facts of the particular case." Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 184 (1986). Although removal of a juror is appropriate if "a juror has formed an opinion as to the issue to be tried," Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 155 (1878), "[i]t is sufficient if the juror can lay aside his [pretrial] impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court." Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 723 (1961). District courts have substantial discretion in conducting voir dire, so our review is for abuse of discretion. United States v. Blom, 242 F.3d 799, 805-06 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 1984 (2001) () (quoting United States v. McNally, 485 F.2d 398, 403 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 978 (1974)); United States v. Jones, 193 F.3d 948, 951 (8th Cir. 1999).
In Thompson, a race discrimination case brought by an employee against her employer, the Seventh Circuit considered the district court's failure to remove a juror who expressed a belief that some plaintiffs' claims against their employers are spurious and that her background as an owner of a business would "cloud" and "sway" her judgment in the case. 248 F.3d at 624, 626. The court expressed its concern that, in response to questioning, the juror "said she would try to be fair, but she expressed no confidence in being able to succeed in the attempt." Id. at 626. The court reversed and remanded for a new trial, concluding that the district judge had not pushed "hard enough to determine whether [the juror] could relinquish her prior beliefs for purposes of deciding the case." Id. In Gonzalez, a criminal case in which the defendant was convicted for distributing cocaine, the Ninth Circuit considered the district court's failure to remove a juror who, after being asked three times if she could put aside her personal experiences and serve fairly and impartially, responded equivocally with answers such as, "I'll try." 214 F.3d at 1111. The juror had testified on voir dire that she had been married to someone who regularly bought and sold cocaine, had a child with that person, and then divorced him on account of his involvement with drugs, all within approximately five years of sitting on the jury. As the court noted, the activities of the juror's husband, which led to her divorce...
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