Moran v. Hearst Corp.

• Decision Date: 28 December 1976
• Citation: 40 N.Y.2d 1071,360 N.E.2d 932,392 N.Y.S.2d 253
• Parties: , 360 N.E.2d 932 Gregg S. D. MORAN, Appellant, v. HEARST CORPORATION et al., Respondents, et al., Defendants. Daniel D. MORAN, Appellant, v. HEARST CORPORATION et al., Respondents, et al., Defendants.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 253

392 N.Y.S.2d 253

40 N.Y.2d 1071, 360 N.E.2d 932

Gregg S. D. MORAN, Appellant, v. HEARST CORPORATION et al., Respondents, et al., Defendants.

Daniel D. MORAN, Appellant, v. HEARST CORPORATION et al., Respondents, et al., Defendants.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Dec. 28, 1976.

Donald S. Engel and Frank L. Miller, New York City, for appellants.

Richard H. Sugarman and Barry S. Agdern, New York City, for Hearst Corp., respondent.

Harold L. Crossman, New York City, for Mary Sanford, respondent.

MEMORANDUM.

The order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed.

The publications complained of in this case fall short of defamation as a matter of law (cf. James v. Gannett Co., 40 N.Y.2d 415, 419, 386 N.Y.S.2d 871, 353 N.E.2d 834). It would serve no useful purpose in this otherwise trivial case to analyze and then to controvert the innuendos that appellants assert can be read into the gossipy tales which were retailed in the challenged magazine article. Moreover, in any defamation case it is perilous, and may be misleading, to generalize about rules unless their consideration is necessary to the disposition of the individual case. The hazard is both tempting and particularly to be eschewed when the applicable law, as in this field, is subject to fluctuating change, due in large measure to the struggles of modern courts in delineating the scope of First Amendment rights.

FUCHSBERG, Judge (concurring in result).

I cannot say that, as a matter of law, the published statements here were incapable of being read to imply that Gregg Dodge Moran had mishandled or mismanaged the funds she collected for charity and that the Morans' marital relationship was beset by strains owing to both partners' extracurricular activities. Even granting defendants' contention that the article in question made clear that the statements being reported were only 'gossip', the tone, style, and arrangement of the 'gossip' was such that the average reader might well be inclined to conclude that where there is smoke there is fire. I would, therefore, hold that it was for a jury to decide whether the average reader would in fact reach that conclusion.

However, I concur in the result reached by the majority only because the plaintiffs in the present context failed to meet the requirement of sufficient allegation that their reputations were actually harmed by the publication of gossip already published and unchallenged some three years prior to the publication of the article...