Moran v. Loeffler-Greene Supply Co.
| Decision Date | 18 June 1957 |
| Docket Number | LOEFFLER-GREENE,No. 37348,37348 |
| Citation | 316 P.2d 132,1957 OK 149 |
| Parties | John C. MORAN, Plaintiff in Error, v.SUPPLY COMPANY, a Common Law Trust, Defendant in Error. |
| Court | Oklahoma Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. It is the general rule that if a contract is made with a known agent acting within the scope of his authority for a disclosed principal, the contract is that of the principal alone, unless credit has been given expressly and exclusively to the agent, and it appears that it was clearly his intention to assume the obligation as a personal liability and that he has been informed that credit has been extended to him alone, and such rule is applicable to contracts executed by attorneys in behalf of their clients.
2. An attorney has no implied authority to endorse the name of his client to a negotiable instrument merely because of the relationship of an attorney and client, or because of his rightful possession of a negotiable instrument which requires endorsement for negotiation.
Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas of Oklahoma County; Carl Traub, Trial Judge.
Action for breach of contract resulting in a judgment for plaintiff and defendant appeals. Reversed.
James C. Williamson, Oklahoma City, for plaintiff in error.
Charles E. Dierker and Tom S. Williams, Oklahoma City, for defendant in error.
This action was brought by Loeffler-Greene Supply Company, a Common Law Trust, hereinafter referred to as plaintiff, against John C. Moran, hereinafter referred to as defendant, to recover damages for an alleged breach of contract. After trial to a jury, a verdict was returned for plaintiff in the amount of $971.24, upon which judgment was rendered, and defendant had perfected this appeal.
The action is an attempt by a creditor to collect the indebtedness of its debtor from the debtor's lawyer, personally. It arose substantially in th emanner hereafter set forth.
During the year 1952, one Fred D. Harber and Electro-Way of Oklahoma, Inc., became indebted to plaintiff in the sum of $971.24 for merchandise sold and delivered to them. Harber and Electro-Way thereafter sold and transferred their assets and business to one Angerman and one Graham. Angerman and Graham then filed suit against Harber and Electro-Way in the District Court of Oklahoma County to rescind the contract of purchase entered into by them, and the defendants therein, Harber and Electro-Way, filed a cross-petition for the recovery of the balance of the purchase price agreed to be paid thereunder in the amount of some $8,000. The attorney of record for the defendants Harber and Electro-Way in such action was John C. Moran, the defendant in the case at bar. Plaintiff, or plaintiff's attorneys, conceived the idea of attempting to collect the indebtedness due plaintiff from Harber and Electro-Way by intervening in the action brought by Angerman and Graham against Harber and Electro-Way. Accordingly, an application for leave to intervene was filed in such action. Such application came on for hearing before the trial court, and after hearing arguments the court announced that the application should be denied, but at the request of plaintiff's counsel deferred the making of a formal ruling upon the application and such application was later withdrawn the same day. Immediately following the hearing upon the application for leave to intervene, a discussion took place between one of plaintiff's lawyers and defendant, as attorney for Harber and Electro-Way. It appears that defendant suggested to plaintiff's counsel that defendant's clients, Harber and Electro-Way, had several creditors, including plaintiff, but no assets except the cause of action against Angerman and Graham which was being prosecuted by cross-petition; that Harber and Electro-Way would like to be able to settle all their indebtedness from the proceeds of their cause of action against Angerman and Graham and be released therefrom; that defendant felt that the prospects of recovering judgment on the cross-petition against Angerman and Graham were good, but that should plaintiff succeed in intervening in the action, the possibility of such recovery would be greatly reduced. Apparently some tentative agreement of some kind was reached and defendant was asked to furnish a letter relative thereto, which he did. The letter written by defendant was as follows:
'Tax Consultant
Phone FO 5-6848
'John C. Moran
'Attorney at Law
'310 Petroleum Bldg. (Now Republic Building)
'Oklahoma City 2, Oklahoma.
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma
'In re: Loffler-Green Supply vs. Electro-Way of Oklahoma.
'Dear Mr. Dierker:
'As you know I am representing the above named corporation in an action in district court defending the actions of this corporation against the plaintiff who is Pat Angerman and Lee Graham. They have filed an action to rescind the contract of sale and I believe that this action can be won on its merits.
'This is to advise you that you will be notified if any settlement is offered with regard to this law suit and no settlement will be made unless I secure your approval regarding that settlement. This case is set for trial June 5, 1953, and I suggest that as soon as this case is over we immediately get together and decide on the proper course of action at that time, in order that your claim then will be protected.
'/s/ John C. Moran
John C. Moran.'
Thereafter, and on June 16, 1953, the action brought by Angerman and Graham against Harber and Electro-Way was tried and a judgment rendered therein in favor of Harber and Electro-Way in the amount of some $8,750. After securing the judgment, defendant, as attorney for Harber and Electro-Way, attempted to effect collection thereof but experienced considerable difficulties in that regard and did not succeed in collecting the judgment by means of execution. Some time around October, 1953, however, Angerman and Graham offered to pay the sum of $6,500 in exchange for satisfaction of the judgment and a general release of all claims. Defendant submitted this offer to his client, Harber, who had moved to California after the trial of the case, and Harber agreed to accept the offer. Accordingly, Harber executed and forwarded to defendant a release and satisfaction to be delivered in exchange for the sum of $6,500. Angerman and Graham, who were apparently in Kansas City at the time, purchased a cashier's check in the amount of $6,500 which they forwarded to their attorneys in Oklahoma City, who in turn delivered the same to defendant in exchange for the release and satisfaction executed by Harber. Upon receipt of the cashier's check, defendant found that it had been made payable to Fred D. Harber and Electro-Way of Oklahoma, Incorporated. Harber was in California and defendant did not know who the officers of Electro-Way were, other than that Harber was one of such officers. Defendant therefore placed the check in the mail to Harber in California, with the request that Harber endorse or procure the proper endorsement of the check and then return the same to defendant in order that defendant could cash it and disburse the money to the creditors in accordance with Harber's previously expressed intentions and instructions. One of plaintiff's attorneys inquired of defendant with reference to whether defendant had been able to collect the judgment, and defendant advised him that he had received the cashier's check above mentioned and had forwarded the same to Harber for proper endorsement and return and expected to receive it back within a few days, after which he intended to cash it and disburse the proceeds among the creditors.
After some ten days had elapsed, however, without defendant having received the check, he called Harber in California. As a result of the call, defendant received through the mail a check from Harber for his attorney fee in the case, but nothing else. He then called Harber again in California to find out what was the matter. Harber then advised defendant that the U. S. Government had moved a tax claim pending against him and Electro-Way of Oklahoma, Inc., for withholding and Social Security Tax on his employees, to California and was pressing him for payment and that he wasn't going to send the check, or the money, back to defendant, but was going to keep it there and use it to pay off the tax claim. Defendant then advised plaintiff's attorney of the developments with reference to Harber's decision not to return the check to defendant.
Thereafter, and on June 10, 1954, plaintiff instituted this action against defendant Moran. Plaintiff's petition alleged that Harber and Electro-Way were indebted to it in the amount of $971.24; that defendant was attorney for Harber and Electro-Way; that Harber and Electro-Way had filed a cross-petition against Angerman and Graham for the recovery of some $8,000 and that such claim was their only asset within this state; that plaintiff filed an application for leave to intervene in the action between Angerman and Graham and Harber and Electro-Way, which application was orally argued to the court on May 14, 1953, but no formal ruling was made thereon; that immediately after such oral argument, defendant, the attorney of record for defendants in the case argued, had an oral discussion with one of the attorneys for plaintiff in which he stated that if plaintiff were allowed to intervene in the cause it would seriously handicap him in the trial of such cause, and that if plaintiff would withhold procuring an order for and filing said petition in intervention, he would personally pay the amount due plaintiff out of any sums recovered in said lawsuit which passed through his hands; that the attorney for plaintiff then requested a letter of confirmation addressed...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Morris v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co.
...667 P.2d 1061, 1068; Palomo v. St. Bar of California (1984), 36 Cal.3d 785, 205 Cal.Rptr. 834, 685 P.2d 1185; Moran v. Loeffler-Greene Supply Co. (Okla.1957), 316 P.2d 132, 138; Crahe v. Mercantile Trust & Savings Bank (1920), 295 Ill. 375, 129 N.E. 120; Pearcy v. First Natl. Bank in Wichit......
-
Shebester v. Triple Crown Insurers
...On the other hand, an agent is contractually liable only when acting for an undisclosed principal. See Moran v. Loeffler-Greene Supply Company, Okl., 316 P.2d 132, 137 (1957); Osenbaugh v. Virgin & Morse Lumber Co., 173 Okl. 110, 46 P.2d 952, 954 (1935).Oklahoma law is in accord with that o......
-
Chickasaw Telephone Co. v. Drabek
...parties, to produce or prove by his oath, or otherwise, the authority under which he appears...."11 See Moran v. Loeffler-Greene Supply Company, Okl., 316 P.2d 132, 137 (1957); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311, 1316 (7th Cir.1978); Nolan, supra note 12 at 1129. Se......
-
Bane v. Anderson, Bryant & Co.
...is that a contract made with a known agent for a disclosed principal is a contract with the principal alone. Moran v. Loeffler-Greene Supply Co., 316 P.2d 132, 134 (Okla.1957). However, equally true is the exception to the general rule: "If the agent, acting within the scope of his authorit......