Moran v. Turnamics, Inc., No. COA04-1339 (NC 8/16/2005)
| Decision Date | 16 August 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. COA04-1339,COA04-1339 |
| Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
| Parties | TERRANCE J. MORAN, Employee/Plaintiff, v. TURNAMICS, INC., Employer, and NORTH CAROLINA INSURANCE GUARANTY ASSOCIATION, (Cambridge Integrated Services Group) Servicing Agent, Defendants. |
Root & Root, P.L.L.C., by Louise Critz Root, for plaintiff-appellee.
Hedrick, Eatman, Gardner & Kincheloe, L.L.P., by Ryan W. Keevan and Edward L. Eatman, for defendants-appellants.
Defendants appeal from an Opinion and Award of the Industrial Commission awarding plaintiff medical and disability workers' compensation benefits. We affirm.
The factual background of this appeal is largely undisputed, and may be summarized as follows. Plaintiff (Terrance Moran) was 38 years old at the time of the hearing before the deputy commissioner. He attended school through the ninth grade, and later obtained a GED. In 2000 he had been working for defendant (Turnamics, Inc.) for over 13 years. Plaintiff was employed as a machine operator, a position requiring the use of both hands to set up and run machines.
In May 2000 plaintiff experienced weakness in his right wrist, hand, and fingers, and an inability to extend the first, second, and third fingers of his right hand. His family physician referred him to a neurosurgeon, Dr. Seyed Emadian. At Dr. Emadian's recommendation, plaintiff underwent nerve conduction velocity testing with another physician, Dr. Daniel Garber. In Dr. Garber's opinion, plaintiff appeared to have posterior interosseous syndrome, which was "definitely work-related." Plaintiff was then referred to Dr. Christopher Lechner, an orthopaedic surgeon who diagnosed plaintiff as suffering from posterior interosseous palsy. When nonsurgical treatment failed to bring plaintiff any relief, Dr. Lechner recommended surgery.
Plaintiff's first wrist surgery was performed by Dr. Lechner on 6 November 2000, and revealed that plaintiff suffered from compression of the posterior interosseous nerve, and from a second point of compression of the nerve under the supinator. When Dr. Lechner saw plaintiff in April 2001, he noted plaintiff's inability to extend his wrist, fingers, or thumb of his right hand, a condition known as "wrist drop." He diagnosed plaintiff with overuse syndrome of the right upper extremity with mild tendonitis, and increased plaintiff's weight restriction to ten pounds.
In May 2001 plaintiff's family physician prescribed medication to treat plaintiff's symptoms of depression and anxiety. On 23 May 2001 he was admitted to Copestone, the psychiatric unit of the Mission-St. Joseph's Health System. At Copestone, plaintiff began treatment with a psychiatrist, Dr. Stewart Hudson. Plaintiff spent 12 days as an inpatient at Copestone, then continued outpatient psychotherapy with a clinical social worker, Sarah Mimms. On 14 August 2001 plaintiff underwent a second wrist surgery, which provided some improvement in his physical condition. Plaintiff returned to his employment with defendant on 19 November 2001, and worked until 9 February 2002, when his employment was terminated.
On 4 March 2002, several weeks after plaintiff lost his job, he was readmitted to Copestone Hospital. On his release, plaintiff worked at another machine shop, Wright's Machine and Tool, for about six weeks; plaintiff lost this job when he was readmitted to Copestone in May 2002. He was released from the hospital in June 2002, and next worked for Day International from 5 August to 8 November 2002. However, plaintiff's wrist drop prevented him from performing up to his employer's standards; on 8 November 2002 he was told his work was not "up to par" and he was let go. Plaintiff then worked as a machine operator for Black Mountain Machine for several weeks, starting 18 November 2002. In January 2003 plaintiff was fired by Black Mountain, and was readmitted to Copestone. At the time of the hearing Dr. Hudson testified that plaintiff was not capable of working, and was still in Copestone.
Defendants filed two Industrial Commission Forms No. 60, admitting that plaintiff's hand and wrist injury was a compensable occupational disease, and paid plaintiff workers' compensation disability benefits for the time periods 26 September to 13 October 2000, and 20 August to 19 November 2001. On 31 August 2001 plaintiff filed an Industrial Commission Form No. 18 for medical and disability workers' compensation benefits for his psychological treatment. When defendants denied plaintiff's claim for psychiatric benefits, plaintiff filed a Form 33 request for hearing. The case was heard before Industrial Commission Deputy Commissioner George R. Hall, III, on 19 November 2002. On 27 June 2003 Commissioner Hall filed an Opinion and Award that awarded plaintiff medical and disability benefits, "including psychiatric care and counseling for the psychiatric problems [that] developed after this injury[.]" Defendants appealed to the Full Commission, which heard the case on 20 January 2004. On 3 June 2004 the Commission issued an Opinion and Award affirming the deputy commissioner. From this Opinion and Award defendants timely appealed.
Review of an opinion and award of the Industrial Commission is generally Cannon v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, ___ (2005 N.C. App. Lexis 1254) (filed 5 July 2005) (citations omitted)). "The findings of fact of the Industrial Commission are conclusive on appeal when supported by competent evidence, even though there [may] be evidence that would support findings to the contrary." Jones v. Desk Co., 264 N.C. 401, 402, 141 S.E.2d 632, 633 (1965). In making determinations of fact, "`[t]he Commission is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony.'" Adams v. AVX Corp., 349 N.C. 676, 680, 509 S.E.2d 411, 413 (1998) (quoting Anderson v. Lincoln Constr. Co., 265 N.C. 431, 433-34, 144 S.E.2d 272, 274 (1965)). Furthermore, "[f]indings of fact not assigned as error are conclusively established on appeal." Hensley v. Indus. Maint. Overflow, 166 N.C. App. 413, 418, 601 S.E.2d 893, 897 (2004) (citing Robertson v. Hagood Homes, Inc., 160 N.C. App. 137, 140, 584 S.E.2d 871, 873 (2003)), disc. review denied, ___ N.C. ___, 613 S.E.2d 690 (2005).
Defendants argue that the Commission erred by concluding that plaintiff's compensable injury was a significant contributing factor in his psychiatric illness, on the grounds that the Commission "relied upon speculative expert medical testimony" and that it "ignored . . . salient facts" demonstrating the speculative nature of the testimony of Dr. Hudson and Mimms. On this basis, defendants contend that the Commission's conclusions of law are not supported by competent findings of fact. We disagree.
Cannon, ___ N.C. App. at ___, ___ S.E.2d at ___ (). Furthermore, this Court has "previously held that the aggravation of pre-existing psychiatric problems is compensable if that aggravation is caused by a work-related physical injury." Calloway v. Memorial Mission Hosp., 137 N.C. App. 480, 485, 528 S.E.2d 397, 401 (2000) (citing Toler v. Black & Decker, 134 N.C. App. 695, 701, 518 S.E.2d 547, 551 (1999)).
With regard to proof of a causal relationship between a claimant's injury and condition, the North Carolina Supreme Court has held:
In a worker's compensation claim, the employee has the burden of proving that his claim is compensable. An injury is compensable as employment-related if any reasonable relationship to employment exists. Although the employment-related accident need not be the sole causative force to render an injury compensable, the plaintiff must prove that the accident was a causal factor by a preponderance of the evidence.
Holley v. ACTS, Inc., 357 N.C. 228, 231-32, 581 S.E.2d 750, 752 (2003) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Moreover: `[W]here the exact nature and probable genesis of a particular type of injury involves complicated medical questions far removed from the ordinary experience and knowledge of laymen, only an expert can give competent opinion evidence as to the cause of the injury.' However, when such expert opinion testimony is based merely upon speculation and conjecture, it can be of no more value than that of a layman's opinion. As such, it is not sufficiently reliable to qualify as competent evidence on issues of medical causation.
Young v. Hickory Bus. Furn., 353 N.C. 227, 230, 538 S.E.2d 912, 915 (2000) (quoting Click v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 300 N.C. 164, 167, 265 S.E.2d 389, 391 (1980)). Nonetheless, a doctor's expert "testimony of `a very strong linkage' regarding the causation of plaintiff's psychological condition to his accident is sufficient `to take the case out of the realm of conjecture and remote possibility[.]'" Workman v. Rutherford Elec. Membership Corp., ___ N.C. App. ___,...
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