Moreaux v. Ferrin

• Decision Date: 29 March 1940
• Docket Number: 6000
• Citation: 98 Utah 450,100 P.2d 560
• Court: Utah Supreme Court
• Parties: MOREAUX v. FERRIN

100 P.2d 560

98 Utah 450

MOREAUX v. FERRIN

No. 6000

Supreme Court of Utah

March 29, 1940

Appeal from District Court, Third District, Salt Lake County; Roger I. McDonough, Judge.

Petition by Edward J. Moreaux for a writ of habeas corpus to John J Ferrin, a police officer of Salt Lake City, state of Utah. From a judgment quashing the writ of habeas corpus and ordering petitioner surrendered to the state of California the petitioner appeals.

Affirmed.

Willard Hanson, Joseph R. Haas, and Stewart M. Hanson, all of Salt Lake City, for appellant.

Walter M. Critchlow, of Salt Lake City, for respondent.

TURNER District Judge. MOFFAT, C. J., and WOLFE, LARSON, and PRATT, JJ., concur. McDONOUGH, J., being disqualified, did not participate.

OPINION

TURNER, District Judge.

The appellant in this action sued out a writ of habeas corpus in the District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah. He was in custody of the respondent by virtue of a warrant of arrest issued by the Governor of the State of Utah, on November 17, 1937, which warrant followed an extradition hearing before the Governor on a demand from California for the defendant who stood charged in California with the crime of grand theft.

Hearing on the habeas corpus was had before the District Court of Salt Lake County, on January 17, 1938, after which the writ of habeas corpus was ordered quashed and the appellant surrendered to the State of California. From the ruling of the District Court, appellant Edward J. Moreaux, appealed to this court.

The record of the hearing in the District Court discloses that the extradition hearing before the Governor of Utah was held on November 17, 1937, and it was agreed that the record should show that at the extradition hearing before the Governor the said Edward J. Moreaux offered to show that he had committed no crime in California, and that he had committed no crime whatever; and specifically that he had not committed the crime intended to be set forth in the complaint.

At the hearing before the District Court it was agreed that the record should show that the Governor refused the request of said appellant, upon advice of the Attorney General's office and that of counsel representing the State of California at the hearing before the Governor. It was further agreed that the record should show that Mr. Moreaux was the person named in the information and that he was in the state of California at the time it is alleged in the complaint or information, whichever it may be termed, that the crime intended to be alleged therein was committed. After the foregoing stipulated facts had been dictated into the record, counsel for the appellant stated they would like to call Mr. Moreaux and have him testify; and that he would testify that he was in California at the time the alleged crime was committed; that he is the defendant, but that he committed no such crime in the State of California, nor any crime whatsoever. To this offer, an objection was made on the ground that it would be a conclusion; and further that it would be immaterial and irrelevant. To this proffer, the objection was sustained. Counsel for appellant then offered to prove that the prosecution was for the purpose only of attempting to extort money from the petitioner, Mr. Moreaux, and for no other purpose. To an objection interposed, the court sustained the objection. The court then ordered that the writ be quashed and that the petitioner be surrendered to the State of California.

The appellant assigns four errors, upon which he relies for a reversal of the judgment of the District Court. He also seeks that this court set forth the power and duty of our Governor in extradition matters. The assignments of error in general are: First, the court erred in sustaining the objection to proof that the appellant committed no crime in California, and specifically did not commit the crime alleged in the affidavit or in the information. Second, that the court erred in refusing evidence offered to prove that the prosecution is for the purpose only of attempting to extort money from the said Moreaux. Third, the court erred in quashing the writ of habeas corpus. Fourth, the court erred in ordering the appellant surrendered to the State of California.

In order to dispose of the questions raised by this appeal and to outline the power and duty of the Governor of our state, when a sister state is demanding the return of an alleged fugitive, we believe it advantageous to discuss the general nature of extradition. The return of a fugitive from one state to another is governed by the Constitution of the United States and the Acts of Congress passed pursuant thereto. People of the State of Illinois ex rel. Frank M. Carr, Appellant, v. Frank B. Murray, Sheriff, 357 Ill. 326, 192 N.E. 198, 94 A.L.R. 1487; U.S. Const. Art. 4, par. 2; U.S. Revised Statutes 5278, 18 U.S.C.A. § 662. In extradition proceedings, this court is bound by the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States. See People v. Baldwin, 341 Ill. 604, 174 N.E. 51.

The duty to issue a warrant upon receipt of a proper requisition is ministerial, and although there is no authority whereby any one may compel the Governor to issue his warrant if he refuses to do so, nevertheless, the act is not a discretionary one. Drew v. Thaw, 235 U.S. 432, 35 S.Ct. 137, 59 L.Ed. 302. It has been held that, upon receipt of a requisition, the Governor of the asylum state has but two questions to pass upon: (1) Is the person demanded substantially charged with a crime against the laws of the demanding state by indictment or affidavit, before a magistrate? (2) Is he a fugitive from justice? The first question is one of law, and the second one is one of fact. We believe this to be a proper statement of the questions confronting the Governor in extradition proceedings. We must assume that a sister state, in asking the return of one properly accused of committing a crime in that state, does so in good faith, and for proper motives and we must expect our sister states to look upon our demands with the same degree of regard. While this has not always been done, the comity between states for the preservation of law, order and justice requires all Governors to accede to this principle and perform their duty accordingly.

In People of State of Illinois ex rel. McNichols v. Pease, 207 U.S. 100, 112, 28 S.Ct. 58, 62, 52 L.Ed. 121, 126, the court said:

"When a person is held in custody as a fugitive from justice under an extradition warrant, in proper form, and showing upon its face all that is required by law to be shown as a prerequisite to its being issued, he should not be discharged from custody unless it is made clearly and satisfactorily to appear that he is not a fugitive from justice within the meaning of the Constitution and laws of the United States. We may repeat the thought expressed in Appleyard's Case [Appleyard v. Massachusetts, 203 U.S. 222, 27 S.Ct. 122, 51 L.Ed. 161, 7 Ann. Cas. 1073], above cited, that a faithful,...