State v. Parrish

• Decision Date: 16 October 1941
• Docket Number: 7 Div. 671.
• Citation: 242 Ala. 7,5 So.2d 828
• Parties: STATE v. PARRISH.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

5 So.2d 828

242 Ala. 7

STATE v. PARRISH.

7 Div. 671.

Supreme Court of Alabama

October 16, 1941

[Copyrighted Material Omitted] [Copyrighted Material Omitted]

Thos. S. Lawson, Atty. Gen., and John J. Haynes and William H. Loeb, Asst. Attys. Gen., for the petition.

Scott & Dawson and C. A. Wolfes, all of Fort Payne, opposed.

THOMAS Justice.

This is a petition for a writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the Court of Appeals without an opinion in an extradition case.

Extradition of petitioner for habeas corpus was duly requested by the Governor of Georgia for the willful burning of a house on the Alabama-Georgia State Line, in order that the alleged offender might be brought to a proper trial in Georgia where the crime was committed. This demand was duly acceded to by the Governor of this State where the alleged defendant lived. This is all shown by the returns of the sheriff to the writ of habeas corpus. That is to say, a matter of State sovereignty is shown to be involved in this decision. See Article IV, § 2, cl. 2 of the Federal Constitution.

Obviously any State statutes bearing on this subject must complement or enforce this federal constitutional provision and statute, and any inconsistency therewith is obviously void. Ex parte Roberts, 186 Wash. 13, 56 P.2d 703.

It therefore follows that in all extradition cases the first question must be: Has the mandate of the Federal Constitution been given effect? After that question is answered affirmatively, the question of conformity of the procedure with State statutes is pertinent.

In the case at bar, the State of Alabama, as it were for the State of Georgia, has applied for a writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals from a judgment affirming the action of the Probate Judge in releasing the petitioner on a writ of habeas corpus, who was held under a warrant issued by the Governor of Alabama as the result of a due request from the Governor of Georgia for the extradition of said petitioner.

Under the Federal Constitution, the State of Georgia has the right to "demand" that a petitioner "be delivered up to be removed" to Georgia. The Probate Judge denied Georgia's request and released the petitioner. The Court of Appeals affirmed this action of the Probate Judge without an opinion. Can Georgia be denied this right, guaranteed to it in a proper case under the Constitution of the United States and statutes, without the benefit of a ruling on the facts by this Court, by the mere judgment of the Court of Appeals without an opinion?

The question of extradition is treated with elaborate notes in United States Code Annotated, Constitution, Part 2, art. 2, § 2, cl. 2, and several questions material to this inquiry are noted. Pertinent references therein contained are:

"The constitutional provision relating to fugitives from justice, as the history of its adoption will show, is in the nature of a treaty stipulation entered into for the purpose of securing a prompt and efficient administration of the criminal laws of the several states-an object of the first concern to the people of the entire country, and which each state is bound, in fidelity to the Constitution, to recognize. Appleyard v. Massachusetts (Mass.1906) 203 U.S. 222. 27 S.Ct. 122, 51 L.Ed. 161, 7 Ann.Cas. 1073. See, also, McNichols v. Pease (Ill. 1907) 207 U.S. 100, 28 S.Ct. 58, 52 L.Ed. 121.

"'This provision of the Constitution of the United States, requiring the surrender of fugitives from justice, is in the nature of a treaty stipulation between the States of the Union, and it is equally binding upon each State, and all of the officers thereof for its faithful execution, as though it was a part of the constitution of each State, whether Congress had passed laws relating thereto or not.' Hibler v. State (1875) 43 Tex. 197. See, also, to same effect Ex parte Bergman (1910) 60 Tex.Cr.R. 8, 130 S.W. 174." [Italics supplied.]

It has been suggested that there is pertinent analogy to be found in Ornelas v. Ruiz, 161 U.S. 502, 503, 16 S.Ct. 689, 690, 40 L.Ed. 787, wherein it was insisted that the Consul of the Republic of Mexico, not a party to a habeas corpus proceeding seeking discharge of the petitioner from the custody of the Marshal of the United States in extradition proceedings in the District Court of the United States for the Western District of Texas, was without authority to appeal from the order of the court discharging the petitioner. Answering this contention, Mr. Chief Justice Fuller states: "The republic of Mexico applied for the extradition of these petitioners by complaints made under oath by its consul at San Antonio, Bexar county, Tex., under section 5270 of the Revised Statutes [18 U.S.C.A. §§ 651, 652]. The official character of this officer must be taken as sufficient evidence of his authority, and, as the government he represented was the real party interested in resisting the discharge, the appeal was properly prosecuted by him on its behalf. [Mali v. Hudson County Common Jailkeeper] Wildenhus Case, 120 U.S. 1, 7 S.Ct. 385, . * * *" [Italics supplied.] Cleugh v. Strakosch, 9 Cir., 109 F.2d 330, 332.

It is indicated by the authorities in this and other States that the relation akin to a treaty right as to the parties at interest exists as between the States; and that the same rule applies as to the real parties at interest. Such observations were made in Ex parte State of Alabama (In re Mohr), 73 Ala. 503, 509, 49 Am.Rep. 63; Taylor v. Taintor, 16 Wall. 366, 21 L.Ed. 287; Appleyard v. Massachusetts, 203 U.S. 222, 227, 27 S.Ct. 122, 51 L.Ed. 161, 7 Ann.Cas. 1073; People of State of Illinois ex rel. McNichols v. Pease, etc., 207 U.S. 100, 28 S.Ct. 58, 52 L.Ed. 121. The contrary view expressed in State of Tennessee v. Hamilton, 28 Ala.App. 587, 190 So. 306, by our Court of Appeals has not had the sanction of this Court. However this may be, it will be noted that this question is treated with extended notes in United States Code Annotated, Constitution, Part 2, art. 4, § 2, cl. 2.

There can be no question that interstate extradition, as distinguished from international extradition, is a right guaranteed a State adopting the Federal Constitution and its Article IV, Sec. 2, cl. 2. Commonwealth of Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. 66, 103-107, 16 L.Ed. 717; Appleyard v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 203 U.S. 222, 227, 228, 27 S.Ct. 122, 51 L.Ed. 161, 7 Ann.Cas. 1073; Innes v. Tobin, 240 U.S. 127, 131, 36 S.Ct. 290, 60 L.Ed. 562; Ex parte Roberts, 186 Wash. 13, 56 P.2d 703. This right of a State is given effect by 18 U.S.C.A. § 662, and the provisions of this Act have been held to "supersede all state legislation upon the same subject." Prigg v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 16 Pet. 539, 617, 10 L.Ed. 1060; Innes v. Tobin, supra.

It is conceded that in all cases involving interstate extradition, State courts are bound by the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States touching this pertinent constitutional and statutory right. South Carolina v. Bailey, 289 U.S. 412, 419, 420, 53 S.Ct. 667, 77 L.Ed. 1292; People ex rel. Carr v. Murray, 357 Ill. 326, 331, 332, 192 N.E. 198, 94 A.L.R. 1487; Moreaux v. Ferrin, 98 Utah 450, 454, 100 P.2d 560; Ex parte Roberts, supra. And to a right application of the Federal Constitution and statutes dealing with this subject, the decisions " have not been construed narrowly and technically * * * but liberally to effect their important purpose * * *." [Italics supplied.] Biddinger v. Commissioner of Police, 245 U.S. 128, 133, 38 S.Ct. 41, 43, 62 L.Ed. 193; South Carolina v. Bailey, supra.

Therefore, in all extradition cases the primary question is whether the Federal Constitution and the statutes enacted thereunder have been given effect under the liberal construction given them by the Supreme Court of the United States. Ex parte Roberts, 186 Wash. 13, 56 P.2d 703.

At the threshold of this inquiry we are met with the objection that this Court can not review the questions presented in this case by reason of the failure of our Court of Appeals to render an opinion in support of its action as a conclusion of fact from the evidence to which the law must be applied. From the authorities set out and the others collected in 22 Amer. Jur. page 248, Extradition, Section 8, it is obvious that the question of whether the judgment of the Court of Appeals is correct in this case is primarily a federal question and must be determined from the whole record before us on petition for certiorari.

As we have indicated by the foregoing, the State of Georgia is in truth and in fact an interested party to this proceeding under the Federal Constitution and statutes, and we repeat the question here: Can the State of Georgia be denied the federal rights guaranteed to it without the benefit of a ruling on the facts by this Court, by reason of our Court of Appeals rendering a judgment and failing to render an opinion in this case on the facts to which the Constitution, statutes and Federal decisions are applied?

The provisions of Section 237 (b) of the Federal Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C.A. § 344 (b), as interpreted by the Supreme Court of the United States, are broad enough to authorize the State of Georgia to obtain a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States in the event this Court should deny the writ of certiorari under the facts that warrant such redress. Ireland v. Woods, 246 U.S. 323, 38 S.Ct. 319, 62 L.Ed. 745. For this Court to hold that it may not review the whole record in the case at bar because the Court of Appeals of this State rendered judgment without an opinion is to place the Supreme Court of this State in a position of impotence, not contemplated by the Federal Constitution or the Constitution and laws of this state.

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