Morel ex rel. Moorehead v. Estate of Davidson, No. CA. 99-480 L.

• Decision Date: 18 July 2001
• Docket Number: No. CA. 99-480 L.
• Parties: Joseph P. MOREL, a minor By and Through Robin MOOREHEAD, his parent and next friend, Plaintiff, v. The ESTATE OF John J. DAVIDSON, Kenneth Freed, in his capacity as Executor of the Estate of the late John J. Davidson, Amateur Athletic Union, and New England Mariners, Inc., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Rhode Island

148 F.Supp.2d 161

Joseph P. MOREL, a minor By and Through Robin MOOREHEAD, his parent and next friend, Plaintiff, v. The ESTATE OF John J. DAVIDSON, Kenneth Freed, in his capacity as Executor of the Estate of the late John J. Davidson, Amateur Athletic Union, and New England Mariners, Inc., Defendants.

No. CA. 99-480 L.

United States District Court, D. Rhode Island.

July 18, 2001.

Robert M. Brady, East Providence, RI, William Arthur Poore, Poore & Rosenbaum, Providence, RI, for Plaintiff.

Neil J. Straub, Melissa M. Tartaro, Straub & Lyons, LLP, Salem, MA, William Wheatley, Law Offices of Michael Rudman, Fall River, MA, Susan M. Carlin, Stephen R. Famiglietti, Famiglietti & Carlin, Matthew F. Medeiros, Little, Bulman, Medeiros & Whitney, Providence, RI, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

LAGUEUX, District Judge.

The matter is before the Court on the motion of defendant Estate of John J. Davidson (the "Estate") to dismiss. The Estate, represented by Kenneth Freed as Executor, seeks dismissal on two grounds: (1) lack of personal jurisdiction and (2) improper venue. The Estate maintains that Davidson lacked the requisite "continuous and systematic" contacts with Rhode Island to subject the Estate to this forum's in personam jurisdiction. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 415-16, 104 S.Ct. 1868, 80 L.Ed.2d 404 (1984)(discussing Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 438, 72 S.Ct. 413, 96 L.Ed. 485 (1952)). Further, the Estate claims that even if this Court has personal jurisdiction over it, the case should be dismissed because Massachusetts, not Rhode Island, is the proper venue for this action. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(3).

Joseph P. Morel ("plaintiff"), a minor and Rhode Island resident, has brought this diversity suit by and through Robin Moorehead, his mother and next friend, against the defendants seeking $1,000,000 in damages for physical and mental injuries plaintiff sustained as a result of repeated sexual assaults allegedly committed upon him by Davidson, now deceased. For the reasons discussed below, the Court grants the Estate's motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(2) because plaintiff has not established that Davidson had sufficient contacts with Rhode Island to subject the Estate to personal jurisdiction in this forum.

Background

Plaintiff alleges that from the Spring of 1997 to the Spring of 1998 he was repeatedly sexually assaulted by John J. Davidson, then coach of the New England Mariners, an Amateur Athletic Union ("AAU") baseball team of which plaintiff was a member. In addition to his coaching duties, Davidson was the primary officer, stockholder, and employee of New England Mariners, Inc. ("Mariners"), a Massachusetts corporation. The Mariners recruited outstanding high school age baseball players to travel throughout the East Coast and play games against other AAU teams.

Davidson recruited players to play on his baseball team by distributing pamphlets, advertising, and playing exhibition games against local high school teams. Some of these recruiting efforts were directed at players from Rhode Island. In 1996, plaintiff received one of the Mariners' pamphlets from Ed Halloway, the head baseball coach at Bishop Hendricken High School in Rhode Island. According to plaintiff, Halloway distributed these pamphlets at Davidson's request. After viewing these pamphlets, plaintiff applied to be a member of the Mariners and, through his parents, paid the requisite fees. His application was accepted and plaintiff joined the Mariners ball club in the Spring of 1997.

Plaintiff alleges that from the Spring of 1997 through the Spring of 1998 he was sexually assaulted, battered, and molested by Davidson. In early October 1998 Davidson was criminally indicted on 28 counts of sexual assault and molestation with respect to plaintiff. Davidson never stood trial on these charges, however, because he took his own life later that month. Shortly after Davidson's death, Kenneth Freed was appointed as Executor of the Estate, and he is sued in that capacity in this case.

In addition to the Estate, plaintiff has sued the AAU. Plaintiff alleges that the AAU owed a duty to players on AAU sanctioned teams to investigate and determine that coaches and other authority figures in AAU sanctioned events are appropriate coaches and monitors of young children. Plaintiff further asserts that the AAU knew, should have known, or should have informed itself as to the propensities of Davidson to molest minor boys. Plaintiff alleges that the failure to investigate Davidson's propensities and background was negligence and that this negligence was a direct and proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries. The AAU answered plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint and does not join in the Estate's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction or improper venue.

Plaintiff also sued the Mariners, but plaintiff and the Mariners have settled that portion of the case. Because the plaintiff is a minor, the Court appointed a Guardian Ad Litem to safeguard plaintiff's interests. On January 17, 2001, this Court granted plaintiff's Motion to Approve and Accept the Report and Recommendations of the Guardian Ad Litem and approved and authorized the settlement between plaintiff and the Mariners as set forth in the Guardian Ad Litem's Report.

With that background in mind, the Court now directs its attention to the one matter currently before it, the Estate's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction or improper venue.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff filed this suit in federal court invoking this Court's diversity jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). Simply put, a federal district court has subject matter jurisdiction over a suit in which the plaintiff is a citizen of a different state from all of the defendants and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. § 1332(a)(1). In this case, the diversity requirement is satisfied because plaintiff is a citizen of Rhode Island while all of the named defendants are citizens of states other than Rhode Island. For purposes of diversity, an executor of an estate adopts the citizenship of the decedent. § 1332(c)(2). In this case, because Davidson was a citizen of Massachusetts, his executor is considered a citizen of Massachusetts. Id. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1), corporations are considered citizens of the state in which they are incorporated and the state in which they have their principal place of business. Id. Therefore, the New England Mariners Inc., which is incorporated in Massachusetts and has its principal place of business in Massachusetts, is a resident of Massachusetts. The same standard applies to a non-profit corporation. The AAU, a non-profit corporation, is incorporated in New York and maintains its principal place of business in Florida. Because complete diversity exists between plaintiff and all the defendants and plaintiff's claim for damages exceeds the statutory minimum of $75,000, this Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this controversy. See § 1332.

Although meeting the diversity requirements enables plaintiff to bring this suit in some federal court, it does not ensure that the case is appropriately before this Court. Before a court may hear a case, it must have both subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute and personal jurisdiction over the parties to the litigation. The Estate argues that this Court does not have personal jurisdiction over it and that this Court should dismiss the suit against it on that basis.

The personal jurisdiction requirement can be satisfied in two ways. First, a court has specific jurisdiction over a defendant when the harm complained of by the plaintiff resulted directly from the defendant's contact with the forum state. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414 n. 8, 104 S.Ct. 1868. See also Donatelli v. Nat'l Hockey League, 893 F.2d 459, 462-63 (1st Cir.1990)(citing Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317-18, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945)). Second, a court has general jurisdiction over a defendant when that defendant has such continuous and systematic contacts with a particular forum that he could reasonably expect to be sued there. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414 n. 9, 104 S.Ct. 1868. See also Donatelli, 893 F.2d at 462-63 (citing Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317-18), 66 S.Ct. 154; Capizzano v. Walt Disney World Co., 826 F.Supp. 53, 55 (D.R.I.1993). Initially, plaintiff argued that both specific and general jurisdiction applied in this case. At oral argument however, plaintiff abandoned his specific jurisdiction argument and relied instead on his argument that Davidson's contacts with Rhode Island were sufficient to subject the Estate to general personal jurisdiction in Rhode Island. As a result, the Court focuses its attention on whether plaintiff has demonstrated that general jurisdiction applies in this instance.

In deciding whether an executor is subject to suit in a particular jurisdiction, a district court looks to the law of the forum state. Fed.R.Civ.P. 17(b). See also Martel v. Stafford, 992 F.2d 1244, 1246 (1st Cir.1993). The Rhode Island long-arm statute permits courts in this forum to exercise jurisdiction over non-resident individuals or their executors if such jurisdiction accords with due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-5-33 (1997); Donatelli, 893 F.2d at 461; McKenney v. Kenyon Piece Dye Works, Inc., 582 A.2d 107, 108 (R.I.1990); Conn v. ITT Aetna Fin. Co., 105 R.I. 397, 252 A.2d 184, 186 (1969). The long-arm statute states, in relevant part, that:

every individual not a resident of this state or his or her executor ... that shall have the necessary minimum contacts with the state of Rhode Island, shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the state of Rhode Island, and the courts of this state shall hold ... such nonresident individuals or their executors ... amenable to suit in Rhode Island in...