Morel v. Napolitano
| Decision Date | 21 July 2011 |
| Docket Number | C.A. PC 06-5510 |
| Parties | ELIZABETH MOREL v. STEPHEN NAPOLITANO, Alias in His Capacity as Treasurer for the CITY OF PROVIDENCE |
| Court | Rhode Island Superior Court |
DECISION
Before the Court is Plaintiff Elizabeth Morel's ("Plaintiff") motion for pre-judgment interest pursuant to G.L. 1956 §§ 9-21-10 and 9-31-3. Finding that Defendant City of Providence's ("Defendant") maintenance of city roads is governmental in nature, the Court holds that Plaintiff is not entitled to pre-judgment interest.
This suit arises from an April 5, 2006 accident in which Plaintiff, a school bus driver, sustained injury when her school bus tires became lodged in a trench on Fairview Street in Providence. Defendant, through its agent the Providence Water Supply Board ("PWSB"), dug the trench on March 22, 2006 to replace a water line.
On October 20, 2006, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant for negligence by and through its public utility the PWSB. A jury trial commenced on March 1, 2010. During trial, the Court instructed the jury as follows:
On March 4, 2010, the jury returned a verdict for Plaintiff in the amount of $59, 239.00, and the Court entered judgment on the verdict without interest. On March 18, 2010, Plaintiff filed the instant motion to include interest to which Defendant has objected.
A brief chronology of our law pertaining to municipal immunity and pre-judgment interest is informative. Until 1970, municipal immunity for torts committed in the course of performing governmental functions was the general rule in Rhode Island. Laird v. Chrysler Corp., 460 A.2d 425, 428 (R.I. 1983) (citing Markham v. State, 99 R.I. 650, 210 A.2d 146 (1965); Quince v. State, 94 R.I. 200, 179 A.2d 485 (1962)); see also Becker v. Beaudoin, 106 R.I. 562, 571-72, 261 A.2d 896, 901 (1970) (abrogating municipal immunity). In 1896, however, the Rhode Island General Assembly saw fit to create an early exception to the municipal immunity rule, exposing cities and towns to liability for injuries caused by defective town roads. P.L 1896, ch. 72, s. 12. Today, G.L. 1956 § 24-5-13, entitled "Liability of cities and towns for injuries from defective roads, " mandates that "[t]he cities and towns shall also be liable to all persons who may in any way suffer injury to their persons or property by reason of any neglect, to be recovered in a civil action . . . ." "Neglect, " as used in § 24-5-13 is a breach of the duty owed by towns to travelers upon town roads, a duty defined as follows in § 24-5-1(a):
"All highways, causeways, and bridges, except as provided by this chapter, lying and being within the bounds of any town, shall be kept in repair and amended, from time to time, so that the highways, causeways, and bridges may be safe and convenient for travelers with their teams, carts, and carriages at all seasons of the year . . . ."
Read together, §§ 24-5-13 and 24-5-1 obligate cities and towns to repair and keep their roads in safe condition and allow travelers to seek recovery in civil actions for injuries caused by the cities' and towns' negligent failure to do so.
Concurrently, the General Assembly established parameters for the cause of action against cities and towns for damages from negligent road maintenance. P.L. 1896, ch. 36, s. 15. The relevant statute now provides:
"If any person receives or suffers bodily injury or damage to that person's property by reason of defect, want of repair, or insufficient railing, in or upon a public highway, causeway, or bridge, in any town which is by law obliged to repair and keep the same in a condition safe and convenient for travelers with their vehicles, which injury or damage might have been prevented by reasonable care and diligence on the part of the town, the person may recover, in the manner provided in this chapter, from the town, the amount of damages, sustained by the aggrieved person, if the town had reasonable notice of the defect, or might have had notice of the defect by the exercise of proper care and diligence on its part." G.L. 1956 § 45-15-8 (emphasis added).
Section 45-15-8 thus sought to further define a cause of action against towns for a breach of the duty set forth in Section 24-5-1(a).
Several years later, in 1909, the General Assembly placed a cap on the damages recoverable for personal injuries sustained from municipalities' neglect to maintain town roads, thereby resurrecting some small semblance of municipal immunity in the context of road maintenance. P.L. 1909, ch. 46, s. 17 (setting cap at $4000). Today, the maximum recovery for personal injuries under that law is $100, 000. Sec. 45-15-12.
In 1958, the Rhode Island General Assembly first enacted a statute providing for pre-judgment interest on awards for damages in tort actions. P.L. 1958, ch. 126, s. 1; see also Kastal v. Hickory House, Inc., 95 R.I. 366, 368-69, 187 A.2d 262, 264 (1963) (). In its current iteration, § 9-21-10 provides for pre- and post-judgment interest in "any civil action in which a verdict is rendered or a decision made for pecuniary damages." Sec. 9-21-10.
In 1970, our Supreme Court addressed municipal immunity from tort liability beyond the context of road maintenance. The Court, in Becker, noted that "[t]he immunization of municipal corporations from liability for the tortious conduct engaged in by their officers or servants during the performance of a governmental function has been repudiated repeatedly, " and followed suit in entirely abrogating the doctrine of municipal immunity by judicial decision. Becker, 106 R.I. at 566, 571-72, 261 A.2d at 899, 901. The Becker holding prompted passage of the Rhode Island State Tort Claims Act, which became effective July 1, 1970, and provided that "[t]he state of Rhode Island and any political subdivision thereof, including all cities and towns, shall . . . hereby be liable in all actions of tort in the same manner as a private individual or corporation." Sec. 9-31-1. In addition, much like § 45-15-12 (), the State Tort Claims Act established a ceiling for recovery in all tort actions against municipalities. Sec. 9-31-3. Section 9-31-3 of the R.I. Gen. Laws addresses the cap on damages for tort claims against municipalities and may be read in pari materia with § 9-31-2, which similarly addresses the cap on damages for tort claims against the state. It specifies:
"In any tort action against any city or town or any fire district, any damages recovered therein shall not exceed the sum of one hundred thousand dollars ($100, 000); provided, however, that in all instances in which the city or town or fire district was engaged in a proprietary function in the commission of the tort, the limitation on damages set forth in this section shall not apply." Sec. 9-31-3 (emphasis added).
In cases where the identical § 9-31-2 limitation on recovery applies, our Supreme Court has recognized that no pre-judgment interest may be attached. Lepore v. R.I. Public Transit Auth., 524 A.2d 574, 575 (R.I. 1987) (citing Andrade v. State, 448 A.2d 1293, 1297-98 (R.I. 1982) (Bevilacqua, C.J. dissenting)). Thus, where a municipality is engaged in a governmental— rather than proprietary—function in the commission of a tort, damages are capped and pre-judgment interest is barred.
This Court sees no reason to depart from the governmental-versus-proprietary pre-judgment interest analysis customarily used in tort actions against municipalities simply because this cause of action arose from a town's negligent maintenance of a roadway rather than some other municipal tort. Indeed, in Mulvaney v. Napolitano, 671 A.2d 312 (R.I. 1995), a plaintiff who sustained personal injuries from a slip and fall on a Providence city road sued for—and recovered—damages for injury from negligent road maintenance pursuant to § 45-15-8, the correlate to §§ 24-5-1 and 24-5-13. Mulvaney, 671 A.2d at 312. The plaintiff then sought post-judgment interest. Id. In denying the plaintiff interest, the Mulvaney Court explained:
To continue reading
Request your trial