Moreland v. Eplett
| Decision Date | 15 November 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. 20-1600,20-1600 |
| Citation | 18 F.4th 261 |
| Parties | Samuel MORELAND, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Cheryl EPLETT, Warden, Respondent-Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
Joshua G. Vincent, Attorney, Peter Gonzales, Attorney, Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP, Chicago, IL, for Petitioner-Appellant.
Daniel J. O'Brien, Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General, Wisconsin Department of Justice, Madison, WI, for Respondent-Appellee.
Before Brennan, Scudder, and St. Eve, Circuit Judges.
Samuel Moreland argues his federal habeas corpus petition was erroneously dismissed when the district court concluded that the petition was time barred and circumstances did not warrant equitable tolling. But Moreland's arguments either fall short of the relevant legal and equitable standards or fall outside the scope of the certificate of appealability. So, we affirm the district court's denial of habeas relief.
Moreland was convicted in Wisconsin state court of first-degree reckless homicide by delivery of a controlled substance.
He received a sentence of 10 years' initial confinement followed by 10 years' extended supervision. Moreland unsuccessfully appealed his case, State v. Moreland , 353 Wis.2d 429, 839 N.W.2d 616 (2013), and on August 11, 2013, his direct review ended when the opportunity to file a petition for writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court expired. Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), he had one year from that date to file a petition for writ of habeas corpus in federal district court. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).
Moreland moved for collateral postconviction relief in Wisconsin state court on July 30, 2014, 353 days after direct review of his conviction concluded. This process ended on March 7, 2016, when the Wisconsin Supreme Court denied Moreland's petition for review. State v. Moreland , 371 Wis.2d 605, 885 N.W.2d 377 (2016). For purposes of his later federal habeas petition, all 586 days of the state postconviction process were tolled. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) ().
Next, Moreland filed a habeas petition in the Eastern District of Wisconsin on March 28, 2016, 21 days after the conclusion of his state postconviction review. At this point, a total of 374 untolled days had elapsed since the end of Moreland's direct review. Moreland's federal habeas petition raised six constitutional claims related to due process, the ineffective assistance of counsel, the right to confrontation, and the right to a fair and impartial jury. The State of Wisconsin moved to dismiss, arguing the petition was untimely. Moreland responded that the time for filing his petition should be equitably tolled because he suffered from schizophrenia
, and on several occasions he was unable to research his case due to lack of access to the prison library.
The district court granted the State's motion to dismiss, concluding that the petition was filed nine days after the one-year statute of limitations elapsed. Nevertheless, the court granted a certificate of appealability "on the issue of equitable tolling":
While this court does not believe that the petitioner has demonstrated extraordinary circumstances or reasonable diligence to warrant equitable tolling, the court supposes that his allegations about his schizophrenia
and the various institutional barriers to timely filing could persuade a reasonable jurist to debate whether to apply the doctrine of equitable tolling and allow his untimely petition.
Moreland appealed and filed a motion requesting the appointment of counsel and an expert.
On August 24, 2020, this court issued an order granting Moreland's request for counsel and denying his request for an expert without prejudice. That order acknowledged that the district court's certificate of appealability failed to "identify a constitutional issue." The order then indicated Moreland raised "at least two substantial constitutional claims"—Moreland's right to confrontation, as well as "numerous theories of ineffective assistance of counsel."
Moreland presents three arguments to us. First, he contends the district court should have tolled the time connected with the motion for postconviction discovery filed on September 23, 2013, and the motion for reconsideration filed on October 10, 2013. Second, he says the district court abused its discretion when it did not equitably toll the time to file his habeas petition. Third, he argues this court should remand with instructions to appoint counsel and conduct an evidentiary hearing regarding the impact of schizophrenia
and the other circumstances on his ability to meet the one-year statute of limitations.
Before we reach the merits of Moreland's claims, we consider the district court's certificate of appealability. The State argues that certificate fails to indicate a specific issue for which Moreland made a "substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." In the alternative, the State claims Moreland's timeliness and appointment-of-counsel arguments exceed the scope of the certificate.
We initially examine the statutory bases for the certificate of appealability. As always, we begin our analysis with the text. In relevant part, the statute states:
28 U.S.C. § 2253(c).
These statutory provisions create the framework by which we evaluate Moreland's appeal. Section 2253(c)(1) states that "until a [certificate of appealability] has been issued federal courts of appeals lack jurisdiction to rule on the merits of appeals from habeas petitioners." Gonzalez v. Thaler , 565 U.S. 134, 143, 132 S.Ct. 641, 181 L.Ed.2d 619 (2012) (quoting Miller-El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322, 336, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003) ). It is, in other words, a jurisdictional provision. See id. Section 2253(c)(3), on the other hand, has been interpreted by the Supreme Court as a "mandatory but nonjurisdictional rule." Id. at 154, 132 S.Ct. 641. The Court has suggested § 2253(c)(2) be interpreted the same. Id. at 143, 132 S.Ct. 641. So, per subsection (c)(1) the issuance of a certificate of appealability is a jurisdictional requirement, and per subsections (c)(2) and (c)(3) the certificate's contents and justification are mandatory, but nonjurisdictional.
Also, as we have explained before, subsection (c)(3)'s indication requirement "is directed not at advocates' briefs, but at judges' issuances of certificates of appealability." Holmes v. Hardy , 608 F.3d 963, 966 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing Beyer v. Litscher , 306 F.3d 504, 505–07 (7th Cir. 2002) ). These rules "are principally designed to save time for the litigants and judges." Davis v. Borgen , 349 F.3d 1027, 1028 (7th Cir. 2003) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). So, "there is little point in revisiting the question whether a certificate should have been issued," once the briefs are filed. Id. (citations omitted). Typically, it makes sense for a court of appeals to entertain a motion to vacate a certificate only when it "is made early enough to produce savings for the litigants."
Id. (citing Buie v. McAdory , 322 F.3d 980, 981–83 (7th Cir. 2003) ). Even then, it makes sense for a court to entertain the motion only when the "issuance of the certificate was an obvious blunder, so that the court of appeals need not traverse the same ground twice." Id. (citing Buie , 322 F.3d at 981–83 ). But note, there is no "deadline for submitting a motion to vacate the certificate." Id.
The procedural history of this case shows the importance of statutory compliance. The first error arose when the district court's certificate of appealability failed to indicate a specific issue for which Moreland made "a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." This statutory requirement is particularly important in cases involving multiple constitutional issues. Moreland's case is one example. As the State argued, neither the litigants nor our court know which of the six constitutional claims—if any—the district court considered substantial.1
The errors do not stop there. This court, too, mistook § 2253(c)'s framework. By issuing an order that indicated two substantial constitutional rights, it attempted to complete the district court's certificate itself. But that is not what subsection (c) provides. In the past, this court has dismissed cases for this same type of deficiency. See, e.g., Young v. United States , 523 F.3d 717, 718 (7th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (). Although the relevant statutory provision is nonjurisdictional, it is nonetheless mandatory, and we must faithfully comply with it. Gonzalez , 565 U.S. at 146, 132 S.Ct. 641.
These initial errors created confusion, which adversely affected the litigation of this appeal. For example, the State first questioned the certificate's deficiency in its response brief. That challenge came only after Moreland incurred significant litigation costs and our court was about to schedule the case for oral argument. Similarly, it...
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