Moreland v. Farren-Davis
| Decision Date | 22 June 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. WD,FARREN-DAVIS,WD |
| Citation | 995 S.W.2d 512 |
| Parties | Joseph MORELAND, Jr., Appellant, v. Helen Marie, et al., Respondents. 55794. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Patrick J. Berrigan, Kansas City, for appellant.
Jill E. Frost, Sandra C. Midkiff, Kansas City, for respondents.
Before EDWIN H. SMITH, P.J., and HANNA and SPINDEN, JJ.
Joseph Moreland, Jr., appeals from the summary judgment of the circuit court in favor of the respondents, Helen Marie Farren-Davis, William Davis, and Karen Davis, on his claim against them for damages for the personal injuries he sustained when he was stabbed by Ramon Gonzales, who he alleges was a tenant and employee of the respondents.
In his sole point on appeal, the appellant claims that the trial court erred in entering summary judgment in favor of the respondents because there was a genuine dispute as to the material facts on which the respondents relied for summary judgment.
We dismiss for a lack of jurisdiction.
On September 13, 1992, the appellant was involved in an altercation with Gonzales and was stabbed. The stabbing took place at 3928 Terrace in Kansas City, Missouri, on property owned by the respondents, William Davis (William) and Karen Davis (Karen). Both the appellant and Gonzales lived in an apartment building owned by respondent Helen Marie Farren-Davis (Helen), William's stepmother, located at 3932 Terrace. Gonzales was subsequently arrested and charged with assault in the first degree. On October 7, 1992, he pled guilty and was sentenced to ten years imprisonment with a suspended execution of sentence and four years probation.
As a result of the stabbing, the appellant filed a one-count petition for damages in the Circuit Court of Jackson County on August 20, 1996, naming the respondents as defendants. In the petition, the appellant alleged that Gonzales lived at 3932 Terrace in the apartment building owned by Helen. He also alleged that William and Karen managed the 3932 property on behalf of Helen and had hired Gonzales to do odd jobs at both 3928 and 3932 Terrace in return for a reduction in his rent. He further alleged that all of the respondents knew or should have known, prior to the stabbing, that Gonzales was dangerous and should have taken action to prevent the stabbing. In this respect, the appellant alleged that the respondents were negligent in: (1) failing to protect him from Gonzales; (2) failing to exclude Gonzales from the premises where the stabbing occurred; (3) failing to adequately screen tenants; (4) failing to adequately screen employees; and (5) hiring Gonzales.
On September 26, 1997, Helen filed a motion for summary judgment. In her motion, she admitted that Gonzales was a former tenant, but denied that he was still a tenant at the time of the stabbing. She further admitted that Gonzales performed various tasks for her in return for a reduction in his rent. However, she denied that William and Karen managed the property at 3932 Terrace. In her suggestions in support of her motion for summary judgment, Helen first argued that she was not liable for the appellant's injuries in her capacity as owner of the building where the appellant and Gonzales lived because the stabbing did not occur on her property. She next argued that there is no general duty to protect others from the criminal acts of third parties and that the appellant could only establish that she had a duty to protect him from Gonzales if he established that either the "special relationship" or "special facts and circumstances" exception applied to create such a duty and that under the undisputed facts neither exception applied. As such, she claimed that she was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because she had established facts which negated an element of the appellant's cause of action.
On February 9, 1998, William and Karen filed their motion for summary judgment. In their motion and suggestions in support thereof, they alleged that they did not own, manage, or have any right to control the property at 3932 Terrace where the appellant and Gonzales lived. They further argued that neither the appellant nor Gonzales was on their property at 3928 Terrace at the time of the stabbing for any purpose related to their tenancy at 3932 Terrace. As such, they argued that they could not be liable for any allegedly negligent acts with respect to the premises at 3932 Terrace. They also argued that the appellant was, at best, a licensee when he entered their property on the day of the stabbing and that they had no duty to protect him from an unknown danger, such as a criminal attack by a third person. They further argued that they did not see that Gonzales was armed with a knife and that there was nothing they could have done to prevent the attack on the appellant. Thus, they argued that, under the undisputed facts, they owed no duty to the appellant, there was no breach of any duty, and nothing they did caused the appellant to be injured. As such, they argued that they were entitled to summary judgment because they had established facts which negated one or more of the proof elements of the appellant's cause of action.
In his responses to the respondents' motions for summary judgment, the appellant claimed that summary judgment was not proper because there were genuine issues of material fact in dispute. As to Helen's motion for summary judgment, he claimed that there was a genuine dispute as to whether she exercised any control over the premises at 3928 Terrace, whether Gonzales was her tenant at the time of the stabbing, and whether she was aware of Gonzales's previous acts of violence. As to William and Karen's motion for summary judgment, the appellant claimed that there was a genuine dispute as to whether William and Karen managed the 3932 property on behalf of Helen, whether they were aware, before the stabbing occurred, that Gonzales was armed with a knife, and whether they could have warned him of the danger before the attack.
On November 7, 1997, a hearing was held on Helen's motion, at the conclusion of which the motion was taken under advisement. On March 27, 1998, the trial court entered its judgment on Helen's motion, as well as William and Karen's, finding that there were no genuine issues of material facts on which they were relying for summary judgment, and that the respondents were entitled to judgment as a matter of law in that the respondents did not owe a duty to protect the appellant from the criminal acts of the third party, Gonzales.
This appeal follows.
Before we can address the merits of the appellant's claim, we are required first to determine, sua sponte, our jurisdiction. Burch Food Servs., Inc. v. Missouri Div. of Employment Sec., 945 S.W.2d 478, 481 (Mo.App.1997).
Unless otherwise expressly provided by rule or law, our jurisdiction is limited to appeals from final judgments. Perniciaro v. McDonald, 974 S.W.2d 620, 621 (Mo.App.1998). For a judgment to be final and appealable when more than one claim is presented or multiple parties are involved, it must dispose of all of the claims as to all of the parties in the case leaving nothing for future determination. Pen-Yan Inv., Inc. v. Boyd Kansas City, Inc., 952 S.W.2d 299, 308 (Mo.App.1997); Rollie v. Richmond, 860 S.W.2d 383, 386 (Mo.App.1993). The only exception to this rule occurs when fewer than all of the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all of the parties are adjudicated and the judgment is certified by the trial court as being final for purposes of appeal upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay. Rule 74.01(b); 1 Pen-Yan Inv., Inc., 952 S.W.2d at 308. However, a trial court cannot so certify unless at least one entire claim as to one party is fully adjudicated. Pen-Yan Inv., Inc., 952 S.W.2d at 308.
Our reading of the appellant's one-count petition reveals that he pled that the respondents were jointly and severally liable on his claim for damages under the alternative theories of premises liability and negligent hiring and retention. For the reasons discussed, infra, we find that the summary judgment entered by the trial court did not completely dispose of the appellant's claim for damages against the respondents, William and Karen Davis, in that, although it disposed of the claim on the theory of premises liability, it did not dispose of the claim on the alternative theory of negligent hiring and retention. As such, the judgment of the trial court was not final as to William and Karen, depriving us of jurisdiction as to the appellant's claim against them. Perniciaro, 974 S.W.2d at 621; Pen-Yan Inv., Inc., 952 S.W.2d at 308. And, as a result, even if we were to find that the trial court's summary judgment completely disposed of the appellant's claim against Helen, given the fact that this case involved multiple defendant...
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