Morgan Const. Co. v. Pitts

• Decision Date: 03 July 1922
• Docket Number: (No. 103.)
• Citation: 242 S.W. 812
• Parties: MORGAN CONST. CO. v. PITTS.
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

242 S.W. 812

MORGAN CONST. CO. v. PITTS.

(No. 103.)

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

July 3, 1922.

Appeal from Garland Chancery Court; J. P. Henderson, Chancellor.

Action by the Morgan Construction Company against J. E. Pitts, receiver of Southwest Arkansas Road Improvement District No. 1. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

G. E. Garner and Neill Bohlinger, both of Little Rock, for appellant.

Tompkins, McRae & Tompkins, of Prescott, for appellee.

McCULLOCH, C. J.

The General Assembly of 1919, by special statute, created a road improvement district in Garland county designated as Southwest Arkansas road improvement district No. 1. Authority was conferred by the statute upon the commissioners of the district to construct the improvement described, and for that purpose to employ engineers and let a contract for the construction.

Pursuant to the terms of the statute, appellants, a copartnership under the style of Morgan Construction Company, entered into a contract with the commissioners of the district for the construction of the improvement. But the General Assembly of 1921 (Special Acts 1921, p. 334) repealed the former statute creating the district and provided for winding up the affairs of the district by a receivership in the chancery court of Garland county.

The statute provides that all claims against the district shall be adjusted upon the same being filed within 90 days after the passage of the statute, and that, when the indebtedness of the district is thus adjusted, assessments shall be levied upon the real property in the district to raise the funds to pay the indebtedness.

Appellants presented a claim after the expiration of 90 days from the passage of the statute, and the court refused to allow the same — sustained a demurrer and dismissed the plea.

The statute required, as before stated, the filing of all claims within 90 days. This is a reasonable provision, and the court was correct in refusing to allow a claim not filed within the time specified. The statute does not authorize the allowance of any claims except those filed within the time allowed.

It is contended that the statute abolishing the district constitutes an impairment of the obligation of the contract between appellant and the district, and for that reason is void.

The abolishment of the district before the performance of an executory contract for the construction of an improvement was, in effect, a breach of the contract — a refusal, in other...