Morgan v. Corr. S Gifford, CIVIL ACTION NO. 13-CV-1252
| Decision Date | 07 October 2014 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 13-CV-1252 |
| Parties | RAMAR MORGAN Plaintiff v. CORRECTIONAL OFFICERS GIFFORD, WOOD, STEBBINS, CRAWFORD, UNKNOWN CORRECTIONAL OFFICER #1, DELAWARE COUNTY BOARD OF PRISON INSPECTORS, and COMMUNITY EDUCATION CENTERS Defendants |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania |
This Section 1983 action has been brought before the Court on Motion of the remaining Defendants1 for Summary Judgment. For the reasons which follow, the motion shall be granted in part and denied in part.
According to the Amended Complaint, this action arose on March 13, 2011 in the cell which Plaintiff, Ramar Morgan, was then occupying in the Special Management Unit ("SMU") at GeorgeW. Hill Correctional Facility ("GWHCF") in Delaware County, Pennsylvania. Plaintiff alleges that on that date and while he was handcuffed backwards to the door of his cell, Defendants Gifford, Stebbins and Crawford entered his cell, along with two other corrections officers and, after referring to an incident from the preceding day in which Plaintiff purportedly did not cooperate with another corrections officer who was strip-searching him, told him to pick one of them to give him "ten body shots." (Am. Compl., ¶18). When Plaintiff responded that he was "not picking anyone to assault" him, Defendant Gifford allegedly shouted "well, no[w] you'll have to pick one of us to give you twenty body shots." (Id.) When Plaintiff again said that he was not going to pick anyone to assault him, Defendant Gifford "without warning or justification" dropped his water bottle and hit Plaintiff fifteen times in his chest while he was still handcuffed to the cell door. Plaintiff further alleges that Gifford then, again without "warning or justification," handcuffed him to his bed in a prone position and kicked him repeatedly in the back while Defendants Wood, Stebbins and Crawford either held him down or did nothing to intervene and stop the assault. (Am. Compl., ¶s 18-19).
Plaintiff avers that he was left handcuffed to the bed for 20 minutes before he was uncuffed and then had to wait five hours, until the next correctional officer shift change, to betransported to the prison infirmary for medical assistance. As a result of this incident, Plaintiff claims that he sustained a broken rib, contusions to his face and body and emotional distress. (Am. Compl., ¶s 20-22).
By way of his Amended Complaint and pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 and Pennsylvania state law, Plaintiff contends that Defendants violated his right to be free from excessive force under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, assaulted, conspired against and intentionally inflicted emotional distress upon him. He seeks monetary compensation for his physical and emotional injuries and the recovery of his attorney's fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1988.
Defendants, for their part, now contend that judgment is properly entered in their favor as a matter of law on all of plaintiff's claims for the reason that he has no evidence aside from his own uncorroborated testimony to sustain his claims.2
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), which outlines the standards to be employed by the federal courts in considering motions for summary judgment:
A party may move for summary judgment, identifying each claim or defense - or the part of each claim or defense- on which summary judgment is sought. The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law...
In reviewing the record before it for purposes of assessing the propriety of entering summary judgment, the court should view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party's favor. Ma v. Westinghouse Electric Co., No. 13-2433, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 5049, *9 (March 18, 2014); Burton v. Teleflex, Inc., 707 F.3d 417, 425 (3d Cir. 2013). The initial burden is on the party seeking summary judgment to point to the evidence "which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." United States v. Donovan, 661 F.3d 174, 185 (3d Cir. 2011)(quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed.2d 265 (1986)). At the summary judgment stage of proceedings, courts do not "weigh the evidence or make credibility determinations," as those are jury functions and not those of a judge. Murphy v. Radnor Township, No. 12-4202, 542 Fed. Appx. 173, 176, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 21529 at *6 (3d Cir. Oct. 23, 2013)(quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986)). An issue is genuine only if there is a sufficient evidentiary basis on which a reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party, and a factual dispute is material only if it might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law. Kaucher v. County of Bucks, 455F.3d 418, 423 (3d Cir. 2006)(citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505).
However, to survive summary judgment, the non-moving party must present more than a mere scintilla of evidence; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the non-movant. Jakimas v. Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc., 485 F.3d 770, 777 (3d Cir. 2007). Conclusory statements and general denials will not suffice, nor can the non-movant simply reassert factually unsupported allegations contained in the pleadings. Williams v. West Chester, 891 F.2d 458, 460 (3d Cir. 1989); Franklin County Area Development Corp. v. Leos, 462 B.R. 151, 154 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2011); Luther v. Kia Motors America, Inc., 676 F. Supp. 2d 408, 415 (W.D. Pa. 2009). And, "if there is a chance that a reasonable juror would not accept a moving party's necessary propositions of fact," summary judgment is inappropriate." Burton, supra, (quoting El v. SEPTA, 479 F. 3d 232, 238 (3d Cir. 2007)).
As noted, Plaintiff has invoked 42 U.S.C. §1983 as the basis for relief in this action. That section, entitled "Civil action for deprivation of rights," states the following in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. ...
42 U.S.C. §1983. Section 1983 is thus not itself a source of substantive rights but a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred by the United States Constitution and federal statutes. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271, 114 S. Ct. 807, 811-812, 127 L. Ed. 2d 114 (1992); Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 146, n. 3, 99 S. Ct. 2689, 2694-2695, n. 3, 61 L. Ed. 2d 433 (1979). It therefore does not provide redress for common law torts - the plaintiff must allege a violation of a federal right and that the person who has deprived him of that right acted under color of state or territorial law. Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640, 100 S. Ct. 1920, 1923, 64 L. Ed. 2d 572 (1980); Halsey v. Pfeiffer, 750 F.3d 273, 290 (3d Cir. 2014); Berg v. County of Allegheny, 219 F.3d 261, 268 (3d Cir. 2000).
"In addressing an excessive force claim brought under §1983, analysis begins by identifying the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed by the challenged application of force." Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 1871, 104 L. Ed. 2d 443 (1989). In most instances, that will be either theFourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable seizures of the person, or the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishments, which are the two primary sources of constitutional protection against physically abusive governmental conduct. The validity of the claim must then be judged by reference to the specific constitutional standard which governs that right, rather than to some generalized 'excessive force' standard." Id.
However, a §1983 plaintiff who is subjected to excessive force after arrest but before conviction and who is lawfully committed to pretrial detention is a pre-trial detainee. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535-536, 99 S. Ct. 1861, 1872, 60 L. Ed.2d 447 (1979); Anton v. Guarini, Civ. A. No. 09-2899, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136198 at *11 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 22, 2010). "Pre-trial detainees rely on neither the Fourth Amendment nor the Eighth Amendment; instead, they are protected under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Guarini, supra, (citing, inter alia, Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 536; Hill v. Algor, 85 F. Supp. 2d 391 (D. N.J. 2000); Bieros v. Nicola, 860 F. Supp. 226, 230 (E.D. Pa. 1994)). This distinction is significant because, while the Due Process Clause prohibits any form of punishment, the Eighth Amendment only prohibits punishment that is "cruel and unusual," i.e. punishment imposed "maliciously and sadistically to cause harm." Jackson v. Phelps, No. 13-4468, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 15225 at *8, *10 (3d Cir. July 8, 2014)(citing, inter alia,Hudson v. McMillan, 503 U.S. 1, 7, 112 S. Ct. 995, 117 L. Ed. 2d 156 (1992) and Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 535).3 Through it all, the Due Process rights of a pretrial detainee are at least as great as the Eighth Amendment protections available to a convicted prisoner and, where a pretrial detainee's excessive force claim arises...
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