Morgan v. Dunwoody

• Decision Date: 17 December 1913
• Citation: 66 Fla. 522,63 So. 905
• Parties: MORGAN v. DUNWOODY.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

63 So. 905

66 Fla. 522

MORGAN v. DUNWOODY.

Florida Supreme Court

December 17, 1913

Appeal from Circuit Court, De Soto County; F. A. Whitney, Judge.

Action by William E. Dunwoody against Mellie M. Morgan. From judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Reversed and remanded, with directions.

Additional Syllabus by Editorial Staff

Syllabus by the Court

SYLLABUS

In proceedings to remove a cloud upon title to real estate, the complainant must show with clearness, accuracy, and certainty the validity of his own title, and the invalidity of the title of the opposing parties.

In suits to cancel or annul the title to real estate claimed to be a cloud upon the title of the complainant, the latter to succeed must do so on the strength of his own title, and not on the weakness of the opposing title. Equity will not aid in such cases where the complainant's title is doubtful.

Where the complainant's title is a legal one, he must be in possession in order to maintain a suit in equity to remove a cloud from such title, unless the land is wild, unimproved and so unoccupied as not to destroy the constructive possession that follows the legal title.

A deed of conveyance from the Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund is prima facie evidence of title in the grantee, but such title may be overcome by a superior title.

In a suit to remove cloud from title, the mere production of a deed from the Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund is not sufficient to warrant the cancellation of an opposing claim of title based on an equity under a statute granting the land to a railroad company; there being no evidence that the conveyance by the trustees was made pursuant to a prior equity.

COUNSEL Leitner & Leitner, of Arcadia, for appellant.

Treadwell & Treadwell, of Arcadia, for appellee.

OPINION

WHITFIELD, J.

Dunwoody brought suit for the cancellation of instruments as being a cloud upon his title to land. The court decreed a cancellation as prayed, and on appeal the defendant, Mellie M. Morgan, contends that there was error in rendering the final decree and in admitting evidence for the complainant.

The bill of complaint in effect alleges that the complainant is the owner in fee simple of the S. 1/2 of the S.W. 1/4 of section 13, township 38, range 24, De Soto county, Fla deraigning title thereto through various mesne grantors from the United States government; that the land is wild unoccupied, and unimproved; that the defendant, Mellie M Morgan, claims some interest in the land by reason of stated conveyances, and first of them being from the Florida Southern Railway Company; that defendant and those under whom she claims had and have no title, legal or equitable, to the lands, but the defendant asserts title under conveyances that are of record, thereby clouding complainant's title to and depreciating the value of the land. The prayer is that the title be decreed to be in complainant, and that the cloud be removed by appropriate cancellations of record. By a sworn answer, the oath not being waived, Mellie M. Morgan 'denies that complainant is the owner of the land,' 'denies that the lands are wild and unseated, but says that she is the owner of the said lands, and the same have been in the actual custody of her and her grantors for more than seven years next before the bringing of this bill.' Defendant admits that she derived her title to the lands as alleged in the bill of complaint, 'but says all of said deeds are good and valid, and the source of her title is predicated upon a good and valid grant by the state of Florida;' that the lands were granted to the state of Florida by an act of Congress of September 28, 1850 (9 Stat. 519, c. 84), and that pursuant to said act, patents were issued to the state on February 14, 1880; that the state by an act of the Legislature (chapter 3167, Laws of Florida) approved March 4, 1879, granted said lands under certain conditions to the Gainesville, Ocala & Charlotte Harbor Railroad Company, which company afterwards changed its name to the Florida Southern Railroad Company, the terms and conditions of said grant being stated as contained in the act hereinafter quoted; that upon information and belief defendant avers that pursuant to said act the railroad company 'did proceed with due diligence to survey its lines and did within the time required by said act complete said route and survey,' and filed a copy of same with the Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund, as directed; that said railroad company, in pursuance to the terms and conditions of its said charter and land grants, did proceed with due diligence and in accordance with the charter and said land grant, and within the time therein specified, to build and construct its said line of road over and within the said six-mile limit of said land. The defendant further avers that the land is within the six-mile limit of said railroad; 'that the land was earned by the said railroad, and the land was withdrawn from sale and held in trust for the use and benefit of the said railroad company; that at the time of the completion of the said road the land was withdrawn from sale and held in trust by the trustees aforesaid for the said railroad company, and that there were no prior equities or rights existing at the time against the land,' that defendant 'and her grantors have been upon said lands cutting ties, saw timber, digging gravel, and otherwise using the said land-- this being the manner in which the said land could then be used most beneficial to the defendant and her grantors--for the last seven years or more.' A replication was filed and testimony taken. An appeal was taken from a decree for the complainant as prayed.

By act of Congress approved September 4, 1841 (5 Stat. 455, c. 16), the United States granted to certain states 500,000 acres of land 'for purposes of internal improvement,' and upon its admission into the Union by the act of March 3, 1845 (5 Stat. 742, c. 48), the state of Florida became entitled to the same acreage 'for purposes of internal improvement.'

An act of Congress approved September 28, 1850, provides 'that to enable the state of Arkansas to construct the necessary levees and drains to reclaim the swamp and overflowed lands therein, the whole of those swamp and overflowed lands, made unfit thereby for cultivation, which remain unsold at the passage of this act, shall be, and the same are hereby, granted to said state.' The act of Congress further provides for the issue of a patent to the state for the granted lands, 'and on that patent the fee simple to said lands shall vest in the said state of Arkansas, subject to the disposal of the Legislature thereof; provided, however, that the proceeds of said lands, whether from sale or by direct appropriation in kind, shall be applied exclusively, as far as necessary, to the purpose of reclaiming said lands by means of the levees and drains aforesaid.' Section 4 of the act enacts 'that the provisions of this act be extended to, and their benefits be conferred upon, each of the other states of the Union in which such swamp and overflowed lands, known and designated as aforesaid, may be situated.'

Chapter 610, Laws of Florida, lentitled 'An act to provide for and encourage a liberal system of internal improvements in this state,' approved January 6, 1855, set apart so much of the 500,000 acres of land as remained unsold, granted to each of certain states 'for purposes of internal improvement,' to which grant the state of Florida became entitled upon being admitted into the Union by act of March 3, 1845, and also set apart therewith all the swamp and overflowed lands granted to the state by the act of Congress approved September 28, 1850, as a distinct and separate fund, to be called the 'internal improvement fund' of the state of Florida, 'to be strictly applied according to the provisions of the act'; and 'for the purpose of assuring a proper application of said fund for the purposes herein declared, said lands and all the funds arising from the sale thereof, after paying the necessary expenses of selection, management and sale,' were 'irrevocably vested' in five state officers and their successors in office, as trustees, 'to hold the same in trust for the uses and purposes' therein stated 'with the power to sell and transfer said lands to the purchasers.' One of the 'uses and purposes' stated in chapter 610 to which the said fund was 'to be strictly applied according to the provisions of the act' was 'to pay out of said fund, agreeably to the provisions of this act, the interest, from time to time, as it may become due on the bonds to be issued by the different railroad companies under the authority of this act.' The railroad companies coming within the provisions of the act were authorized to issue interest-bearing coupon bonds for construction and equipment at the rate of $10,000 a mile, to run not more than 35 years, bearing interest at not more than 7 per cent. per annum. The character of the railroads required to be constructed to have the benefit of the act is specifically stated therein. See Hawkins v. Trustee of Internal Imp. Fund, 34 Fla. 405, 16 So. 311; Wilson v. Mitchell, 43 Fla. 107, 30 So. 703.

Another trust stated in the act was 'that the Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund * * * shall make such arrangements for the drainage of the swamp or overflowed lands, as in their judgment may be most advantageous to the internal improvement fund and the settlement and cultivation of the land.' Section 621, Gen. Stats. See Trustee Internal Improvement Fund v. Root, 63 Fla. 666, 58 So. 371; Trustees Internal Imp. Fund v. Gleason, 15 Fla. 384. By section 29 of chapter 610, now section 621, General Statutes of 1906, the alternative secti...