Morgan v. Sec'y, Case No. 5:11-CV-662-Oc-27PRL
| Decision Date | 12 September 2014 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 5:11-CV-662-Oc-27PRL |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
| Parties | STANFORD MORGAN, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Respondents. |
Petitioner is a State of Florida inmate serving a six year sentence. 'His Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Dkt. 6) challenges his underlying 2010 conviction for racketeering. Respondents filed a response to the amended petition (Dkt. 13), and Petitioner filed a reply (Dkt. 14).
The matter is now before the Court for consideration on the merits of Petitioner's claims. An evidentiary hearing is not required for the disposition of this matter. Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases 8(a).
Petitioner was charged with one count of racketeering (count one), one count of conspiracy to commit racketeering (count two), five counts of grand theft first degree (counts three, six, nine, eleven, and thirteen), and eight counts of grand theft second degree (counts four, five, seven, eight, ten, twelve, fourteen, and fifteen). See Petitioner's App. A.1 Petitioner entered into a pleaagreement in which he agreed to enter a plea of guilty to racketeering (count one). See Petitioner's App. J. The trial court held a hearing on the plea and accepted it. See Petitioner's App. K. The trial court then adjudicated him guilty and sentenced him on February 3, 2010, to imprisonment for a term of six years (followed by probation for a term of twenty years). See Petitioner's App. C. The remaining counts were dismissed. See Dkt. 33 at 277. Petitioner did not file a direct appeal.
Petitioner subsequently filed a motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, which the trial court denied on December 14, 2010. See Petitioner's App. D. The state appellate court affirmed the denial per curiam on August 2, 2011. See Petitioner's App. L.2
Petitioner timely filed the Amended Petition, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d), raising three grounds for relief. His petition is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA") effective April 24,1996. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997). Section 104 of the AEDPA amended 28 U.S.C. § 2254 by adding the following provision:
Section 2254, as amended by the AEDPA, establishes a highly deferential standard for reviewing state court judgments. Parker v. Secretary, Dep't of Corr., 331 F.3d 764 (11th Cir. 2003) (citing Robinson v. Moore, 300 F.3d 1320, 1342 (11th Cir. 2002)).
Review under § 2254(d)(1) is limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits. Section 2254(d)(1) refers to a state-court adjudication that "resulted in" a decision that was contrary to, or "involved" an unreasonable application of, established law. This language requires an examination of the state court decision at the time it was made. It follows that the record under review is limited to the record in existence at that same time, i.e., the record before the state court. Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1398-1401 (2011). In addition, § 2254(e)(1) "provides for a highly deferential standard of review for factual determinations made by a state court." Robinson, 300 F.3d at 1342. The federal court will presume the correctness of state court findings of fact, unless the petitioner is able to rebut that presumption by clear and convincing evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). When measured against the AEDPA standard, it is clear that Petitioner's petition is due to be denied.
Petitioner claims that his trial counsel was incompetent and performed substantially below the standard guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment and that he was prejudiced as a result.
In Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985), the Supreme Court held that "the two-part Strickland v. Washington test applies to challenges to guilty pleas based on ineffective assistance of counsel." The Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), established a two-part test for determining whether a convicted person is entitled to relief on the ground that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance. The first prong of the Strickland test requires that thedefendant demonstrate that counsel's performance was deficient and "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. The second prong of the Strickland test requires the defendant to show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Id. at 687.3 A court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonably professional assistance. Id. at 689-90. As both prongs of the Strickland test must be satisfied to establish a constitutional violation, the failure to satisfy either prong requires that an ineffective assistance claim be denied. Id. at 700.
Further, "a defendant's knowing and voluntary guilty plea waives all nonjurisdictional defects in the proceedings." Duhart v. United States, 556 F. App'x 897, 898 (11th Cir. 2014). However, Id.
Petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that his prosecution was barred by the statute of limitations and for advising him to enter a plea under the circumstances. This claim was raised in Petitioner's motion for postconviction relief and denied, the state trial cout finding that there was no statute of limitations violation.
The information in this case was filed on September 3, 2008. It alleged that the racketeering activities occurred between June 18, 2003, and March 19, 2004. See Dkt. 33 at 73. It also allegedthat Petitioner "was continuously absent from the State of Florida or had no ascertainable place of abode of work therein for purposes of Sec. 775.15(5), Florida Statutes" from October 16, 2007, through September 3, 2008. Id. at 112. Petitioner acknowledged that he was incarcerated in the State of Washington from October 16, 2007, through June 19, 2009.4 Id. at 350-51; Dkt. 34 at 159.
Petitioner argues that the applicable statute of limitations is found in section 895.05(10), Florida Statutes and that it expired on March 19, 2009 (5 years after the racketeering activities ended). See Dkt. 6 at 48. According to Petitioner, his arrest on June 19, 2009, was "92 days beyond [the] Racketeering's expiration date of its limitation period of March 19,2009." Id. He argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise this matter with the trial court.
The trial court found that the statute of limitations was tolled during Petitioner's incarceration in the State of Washington and that, therefore, the statute of limitations expired on November 23, 2009. Id. at 82. Consequently, the trial court found that counsel acted reasonably with regard to this matter. Id. at 80.
Respondents argue that the applicable statute of limitations is in section 775.15(2)(a). Racketeering is a first degree felony. Under section 775.15(2)(a), Florida Statutes, a prosecution for a felony of the first degree "must be commenced" within four years after it is committed. Section 775.15(5) provides, however, that "[t]he period of limitation does not run during any time when the defendant is continuously absent from the state or has no reasonably ascertainable place of abode or work within the state." In addition, section 775.15(5) "shall not be construed to limit the prosecution of a defendant who has been timely charged by indictment or information or other charging document and who has not been arrested due to his or her absence from this state or has not been extradited for prosecution from another state."
The State established, and Petitioner acknowledged that, he was in custody in the State of Washington and remained continuously absent from the State of Florida until his arrest. He was in out-of-state custody from October 16, 2007, through June 19, 2009.
As noted, section 775.15(5) does not limit the prosecution of a defendant who has been timely charged by information and who has not been arrested due to his absence from this state or has not been extradited for prosecution from another state. See also State v. Paulk, 946 So. 2d 1230, 1231 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (). Under section 775.15(2)(a), the statute of limitations would have expired on March 19, 2008 (4 years after the racketeering activities ended). However, pursuant to section 775.15(5), the period of limitation was tolled from the date of his arrest in Washington on October 16, 2007. At that time, there was 155 days until the period of limitation expired on March 19, 2008. Under such circumstances, the statute of limitations would have expired on November 23, 2009 (155 days after Petitioner's arrest on June 19, 2009).5 Because Petitioner was charged by information and arrested prior to November 23, 2009, Respondents argue that Petitioner's counsel did not act unreasonably in failing to raise the statute of limitations as a defense,...
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