Morgan v. State

• Decision Date: 04 March 1913
• Docket Number: 22,278
• Citation: 101 N.E. 6,179 Ind. 300
• Parties: Morgan v. State of Indiana
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

101 N.E. 6

179 Ind. 300

Morgan v. State of Indiana

No. 22,278

Supreme Court of Indiana

March 4, 1913

From Vigo Circuit Court; Charles M. Fortune, Judge.

Prosecution by the State of Indiana against Calvin Morgan for murder. From a judgment committing him to be confined in the Indiana Hospital for Insane Criminals, the defendant appeals.

Reversed.

Frank R. Miller, Robert E. Guinn and Thomas F. O'Mara, for appellant.

Thomas M. Honan, Attorney-General, and Thomas H. Branaman, for the State.

OPINION

Erwin, J.

This was a prosecution by the State of Indiana against the appellant, on a charge of murder. The indictment herein was returned by the grand jury of Vermillion County, and on an application for change of venue the case was sent to the Vigo Circuit Court. To the indictment the defendant entered a plea of not guilty, and also filed a special plea in writing, alleging that at the time of the alleged commission of the crime, that he, appellant, was of unsound mind. Trial by a jury which returned a verdict as follows "We, the jury find the defendant not guilty, and find that the defendant did kill Bert Hardy at the time and place charged in the indictment, and find that the defendant was insane at the time he committed such act. Joseph Gilbert Foreman."

The defendant thereupon moved the court, that he have judgment discharging him, which motion, without setting it out in full, was for the following reasons: (1) that the defendant is now under no charge, by reason of his acquittal; (2) that § 16 1/2 of the act of March 5, 1909, Acts 1909 p. 202, is unconstitutional and void, both under the Constitution of the United States and of this State; (3) that defendant cannot be held under § 2071 Burns 1908, Acts 1905 p. 584, § 200, for the reason that said section is unconstitutional and void, and further that the verdict found him not guilty, but failed to state it was for the sole reason that he was insane at the time of the commission of the act. This motion was overruled by the court, to which ruling the defendant at the time excepted, and assigns said ruling as error. The court thereupon entered the finding "that defendant is not guilty of the crime with which he is charged in the indictment herein, and further finds that the defendant did kill Bert Hardy at the time and place charged in the indictment, and finds that the defendant was insane at the time of the commitment of such act," and on said finding entered judgment that defendant (appellant) be committed to and confined in the Indiana Hospital for Insane Criminals, so long as his insanity shall continue. To this judgment appellant excepted and appeals to this court.

The assignment of errors presents the question whether after the return of a verdict of not guilty, the court has any authority, to summarily commit the defendant to the Indiana Hospital for Insane Criminals, as provided under § 16 1/2 of the act of the General Assembly, approved March 5, 1909 (Acts 1909 p. 202), or whether defendant is entitled to his discharge, unless proceedings are had under § 2071 Burns 1908, supra, in relation to persons acquitted of crime under a plea of insanity. In support of his contention appellant insists that § 16 1/2 of the act of March 5, 1909, Acts 1909 p. 202, is unconstitutional and void, being in contravention of § 19, article 4 of the Constitution of the State of Indiana, in that the subject matter of § 16 1/2 is not within the title of the act; that said § 16 1/2 is void, as being in conflict with the provision of the 14th amendment to the Constitution of the United States, in that he is now confined without due process of law; that said § 16 1/2 is void for the reason that it is in further conflict with the 14th amendment to the Constitution of the United States, in that it denies to this defendant the equal protection of the law, and that said section includes only male and does not include female defendants; and that a verdict of acquittal entitles the defendant to his discharge.

It is the duty of the courts to uphold the acts of the legislature if it can possibly be done, without doing violence to the Constitution, and in doing so, every reasonable presumption must be indulged in favor of the legality of the act. State, ex rel., v. Roby (1895), 142 Ind. 168, 184, 41 N.E. 145, 33 L. R. A. 213, 51 Am. St. 174; State v. Louisville, etc., R. Co. (1912), 177 Ind. 553, 96 N.E. 340, 342; State v. Barrett (1909), 172 Ind. 169, 87 N.E. 7, and cases cited; Barrett v. State (1911), 175 Ind. 112, 93 N.E. 543; Hirth-Krause Co. v. Cohen (1912), 177 Ind. 1, 97 N.E. 1; Booth v. State (1913), post 405, 100 N.E. 563.

The title of the act in question (Acts 1909 p. 202), reads as follows: "An Act authorizing and providing for the establishment of a 'hospital for insane criminals' as a part of the 'Indiana state prison', making appropriations therefor, providing for its government and maintenance, defining the manner of holding insanity inquests in cases of convicts alleged to be insane and for their transfer and discharge, repealing all laws in conflict and declaring an emergency." Section 16 1/2, supra, of said act reads as follows: "After the passage of this act, if upon the trial of any male person accused of a felony the defense of insanity is interposed whether upon a special plea or a general plea of not guilty, the court or jury trying said cause shall make a finding both as to the sanity of said defendant at the time so claimed and as to whether he committed the act as charged. And if it shall be found in favor of said defendant on such plea of insanity, but against him as to the commission of the act as charged, he shall, upon order of the court be committed to and confined in the Indiana colony for the insane criminals in like manner and on such conditions and for such terms as is now provided for by law for the confinement of insane criminals in a state hospital for the insane." It will be observed that the title of the act refers to "insane convicts," their care, manner of holding inquests, in cases of convicts alleged to be insane, for their transfer and discharge; but nowhere refers to procedure in criminal trials, or in what manner patients other than convicts may be admitted to such institutions. Section 19 of article 4 of the Constitution of Indiana, reads as follows: "Every act shall embrace but one subject and matters properly connected therewith, which subject shall be expressed in the title. But if any subject shall be embraced in an act which shall not be expressed in the title, such act shall be void only as to so much thereof as shall not be expressed in the title". We are inclined to conclude that as the subject of § 16 1/2 is not included in the title of the act, the same is in conflict with § 19, article 4 of the Constitution and is therefore void. State, ex rel., v. Board, etc., (1906), 166 Ind. 162, 198, 76 N.E. 986; Henderson v. London, etc., Ins. Co. (1893), 135 Ind. 23, 34 N.E. 565, 20 L. R. A. 827, 41 Am. St. 410; Wabash R. Co. v. Young (1904), 162 Ind. 102, 69 N.E. 1003, 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1091; Ex parte Knight (1906), 52 Fla. 144, 41 So. 786, 120 Am. St. 191.

We are of the opinion that the most serious objection to § 16 1/2 of the act in question is the one presented by appellant that said section is in violation of the last clause of the 14th amendment to the Constitution of the United States, wherein it provides "Nor shall any state deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the law." Section 16 1/2 provides that upon the trial of any male person, etc., and does not include females. In the case of Duncan v. Missouri (1893), 152 U.S. 377, 382, 14 S.Ct. 570, 38 L.Ed. 485, the court, speaking by Chief Justice Fuller, uses the following language: "Equal protection of the laws are secured, if the laws operate on all alike, and do not subject the individual to an arbitrary exercise of the powers of government." In the case of Gulf, etc., R. Co. v. Ellis (1897), 165 U.S. 150, 17 S.Ct. 255, 41 L.Ed. 666, it being a case arising under a law of the state of Texas, wherein it provided that any person having a claim against any railway company shall be entitled to recover attorney's fees, etc., the court, speaking...