Wabash Railroad Co. v. Young

• Decision Date: 03 February 1904
• Docket Number: 20,206
• Citation: 69 N.E. 1003,162 Ind. 102
• Parties: Wabash Railroad Company v. Young
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

69 N.E. 1003

162 Ind. 102

Wabash Railroad Company v. Young

No. 20,206

Supreme Court of Indiana

February 3, 1904

From Miami Circuit Court; D. H. Chase, Special Judge.

Action by John W. Young against the Wabash Railroad Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.

Reversed.

E. P Hammond, W. V. Stuart and D. W. Simms, for appellant.

D. E Rhodes, for appellee.

OPINION

Dowling, J.

--This is a proceeding by the appellee against the appellant for the review of a judgment against him. The case is here for the second time. Wabash R. Co. v. Young, 154 Ind. 24, 55 N.E. 853. Upon the reversal of the judgment first rendered in this proceeding, the appellee filed an amended complaint in the trial court. A demurrer by the appellant for want of facts was overruled, and, upon its refusal to plead further, judgment was rendered in favor of the appellee reversing the judgment reviewed. The demurrer to the amended complaint questioned the sufficiency of that pleading as a whole, and also separately, in detail, as it related to the first and second paragraphs of the complaint in the original action. Error is assigned upon the several rulings on these demurrers.

The action in which a review of the proceedings and judgment is sought was for damages for the alleged blacklisting of the appellee by the appellant, and for certain wrongful acts charged to have been done by the appellant whereby the appellee was prevented from obtaining employment, and from retaining employment when secured by him. Counsel for appellee insist that the complaint is sufficient both under the statute (Acts 1889, p. 315, § 7077 Burns 1894) and under the rule of the common law. On the other hand, counsel for appellant argue that the statute does not apply to the case made by the complaint, and that no common law liability is shown.

The title of the act of March 9, 1889, supra, in force at the time the supposed grievances occurred, was "An act for the protection of discharged employes and to prevent blacklisting." The section of the act relied upon by appellee is as follows: "Section 2. If any railway company or any other company or partnership or corporation in this State shall authorize or allow any of its or their agents to blacklist any discharged employes, or attempt by word or writing or any other means whatever to prevent such discharged employe, or any employe who may have voluntarily left said company's service, from obtaining employment with any other person, or company, except as provided for in section one of this act, such company or copartnership shall be liable in treble damages to such employe so prevented from obtaining employment, to be recovered by him by a civil action."

An act of the legislature can embrace but one subject and matters properly connected therewith, which subject must be expressed in the title. If any subject is embraced in an act which is not expressed in its title, such act is void as to so much thereof as is not expressed in its title. Const., Art. 4, § 19. The subject of the act of March 9, 1889, supra, is the protection of discharged employes. The prevention of blacklisting of discharged employes was a matter properly connected with this subject. But the subject of the protection of discharged employes does not include the protection of employes who have not been discharged, or who voluntarily quit the service of their employer. Nor is the protection of employes who voluntarily quit their employment matter properly connected with the subject of the protection of discharged employes. Every section of the act refers to employes who have been discharged, and only in the second section is any provision found which relates to employes who have voluntarily left the service of an employer. This single provision is the prohibition of any attempt by word, writing, or other means, to prevent a discharged employe, or any employe who may have voluntarily left such service, from obtaining employment with any other person, except as authorized in the first section of the act.

So far as the provision just referred to applies to any employe who may have voluntarily left the service of an employer, it is not embraced in the subject of the act as expressed in its title, nor is it properly connected therewith. The protection of discharged employes was a proper and complete subject for an act of the legislature. But, under that title, provisions for the protection of employes who had not been discharged could not be included without a violation of article 4, § 19, of the Constitution. The blacklisting prohibited by section two of the act is expressly confined to discharged employes. The complaint does not allege that the appellee was a discharged employe of the appellant, but, on the contrary, it avers that he voluntarily left the service of the company. Therefore, he does not come within the purview and protection of the statute, and his action can not be maintained under its provisions. Indianapolis, etc., Transit Co. v. Foreman, ante, 85.

The question remains whether the complaint is good under the rule of the common law in such cases, either as charging the appellant with libel, or with a wrongful interference with appellee's occupation. The material facts alleged against the...