Morgan v. State
| Decision Date | 28 September 2016 |
| Docket Number | NO. PD-0758-15,PD-0758-15 |
| Citation | 501 S.W.3d 84 |
| Parties | Dewan Morgan, Appellant v. The State of Texas |
| Court | Texas Court of Criminal Appeals |
James Christopher Abel, for Dewan Morgan.
Lisa McMinn, Yael Zbolon, for State of Texas.
Appellant, Dewan Morgan, was convicted of burglary of a habitation and sentenced to sixteen years' imprisonment. Concluding that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury finding that Appellant entered a habitation "without the effective consent of the owner,"1 the Second Court of Appeals reversed Appellant's conviction because he was a "cotenant" of the apartment he broke into.2 We disagree with that holding because, under the facts of this case, it runs contrary to the Texas Penal Code's definition of "owner" as a person with "a greater right to possession of the property than the actor."3 Appellant's girlfriend, as the complainant, was the "owner" of the apartment because she held a greater right to possession than Appellant. And, at the time of the commission of the offense, Appellant did not have her effective consent to enter. Therefore, we hold that the evidence was legally sufficient to support the burglary conviction. We reverse the judgment of the court of appeals.
In November of 2012, when Appellant was unemployed, he moved in with his girlfriend, Regina Raglin. Regina gave him a key to the apartment, but she did not add his name to the apartment lease, and she alone paid the rent. After some time, Appellant found a job and began helping with household expenses. Appellant's driver's license did not reflect Regina's address as his residence.
The testimony at trial revealed that police had been called to a prior argument between Appellant and Regina. In April of 2013, Regina told the police officer responding to her 911 call that Appellant had slapped her face and threatened her with a knife.4 Appellant continued to live with Regina after that incident.
This offense occurred two months later. On the morning of June 20, 2013, Regina and Appellant argued. Although she was trying to avoid him that day, they ran into each other at a convenience store near the apartment. Appellant followed Regina back to the apartment. Regina locked the deadbolt from the inside so that Appellant could not get in with his key.5 Her testimony was clear that, at that time, she did not want Appellant getting in to the apartment. When Appellant tried his key in the lock and it did not work, he knocked on the door and rang the doorbell. Regina did not open the door. Appellant threw a rock, which broke the side window, and then began kicking at the door. Regina fled to her back bedroom and called 911. Appellant finally kicked in the door and came inside. He grabbed Regina, pushed her to the bed, bit her on the side of her left breast, punched her, and choked her. The police arrived and arrested Appellant for assault. He was ultimately charged with burglary.6
At trial
Regina testified at trial that, when the police arrived on the scene, she told them that Appellant lived there—Appellant had a key to the apartment, kept his personal items there, and helped with some bills and expenses. She stated it was not her intent, by locking Appellant out of the apartment, that he not live there anymore, but to just stay away to cool off. However, Regina admitted that, at the time Appellant forced his way into the apartment by kicking in the door, she had not wanted him to come into the apartment.
The court's charge to the jury included the following definitions:
The jury found Appellant guilty of burglary of a habitation.
On Direct Appeal
Noting that Appellant "lived at the apartment and kept his possessions inside it," the court of appeals reasoned that Appellant, as a cotenant, was also an owner of the apartment, and he therefore "had the right to occupy and control the apartment until his tenancy was terminated."11 In holding that the evidence was insufficient to support the burglary conviction, the court of appeals concluded that "[t]here is no evidence that Appellant's tenancy was terminated before his arrest for the incident, but there is evidence in the form of complainant's testimony that she specifically did not intend to terminate Appellant's tenancy."12 We granted the State's Petition For Discretionary Review to address this holding.13
The standard for reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence is whether "any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt."14 We must view "the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict."15 This Court's role on appeal "is restricted to guarding against the rare occurrence when a fact finder does not act rationally," and we must "defer to the responsibility of the trier of fact to fairly resolve conflicts in testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts."16 The key question is whether "the evidence presented actually supports a conclusion that the defendant committed the crime that was charged."17 Sufficiency of the evidence is a question of law.
The issue on appeal is not whether we as a court believe the prosecution's evidence or believe that the defense evidence "outweighs" the State's evidence. If there is evidence which establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and if the trier of fact believes that evidence, we are not in a position to reverse the judgment on sufficiency of the evidence grounds.18
Legal sufficiency of the evidence "is measured by the elements of the offense as defined by the hypothetically correct jury charge."19 The hypothetically correct jury charge "sets out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State's burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict the State's theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for which the defendant was tried."20 Our Legislature has made it clear that the jury charge must "set[ ] forth the law applicable to the case."21 "[D]efinitions for terms that are not statutorily defined are not considered to be the applicable law under Article 36.14 and it is thus generally impermissible for the trial court to define those terms in the jury instructions."22
As correctly set forth in the charge to the jury, a person commits the offense of burglary of a habitation if, without the effective consent of the owner, he (a) enters a habitation with intent to commit an assault; or (b) enters a habitation and commits or attempts to commit an assault.23 "A person charged with burglary under Section 30.02(a)(1) is guilty of that offense the moment that he crosses the threshold of a habitation without consent and with the intent to commit the underlying felony."24
Appellant disputes the element of ownership. Essentially, his argument is that he is an "owner" of the apartment, and thus he cannot be guilty of burglarizing his own residence. The court of appeals agreed with Appellant, finding that he was a cotenant with Regina. As noted above, the court of appeals cited to Article 21.08 in support of its conclusion that Appellant, as a cotenant with Regina, was an equal "owner" of the apartment. However, Article 21.08"is a rule of pleading," and it is "not a part of the definition of the offense."25 The jury charge rightfully did not include Article 21.08 in its instructions. Article 21.08 is only applicable in evaluating the sufficiency of an indictment.26 It does not provide a true definition of the term "owner."
The Penal Code imparts a specialized and technical meaning to the word "owner," defining it as a person who (1) has title to the property, (2) possession of the property, or (3) a greater right to possession of the property than the actor.27 This definition was properly included in the jury charge as the law applicable to the case. The "greater right of possession" doctrine applies to any prosecution for burglary.28
The Penal Code definition of "owner" clearly indicates that a defendant who has some, but less, right to control a habitation than the alleged owner may be prosecuted for burglary.29 The key is not whether Appellant had a right to possession of the property, but whether Regina's right to possess the property was greater than Appellant's. Only her name was on the lease, and she paid the rent. Regina is the one who gave Appellant a key to the apartment, and she is the one who could take it away. His status as her roommate at the time did not...
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...A defendant who has some, but less, right to control a habitation than the alleged owner may be prosecuted for burglary. Morgan v. State, 501 S.W.3d 84, 91 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). Where there are competing equal possessory interests in the property the time of the actual commission of the o......
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Evidence
...A defendant who has some, but less, right to control a habitation than the alleged owner may be prosecuted for burglary. Morgan v. State, 501 S.W.3d 84, 91 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). Where there are competing equal possessory interests in the property the time of the actual commission of the o......
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Evidence
...A defendant who has some, but less, right to control a habitation than the alleged owner may be prosecuted for burglary. Morgan v. State, 501 S.W.3d 84, 91 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). Where there are competing equal possessory interests in the property the time of the actual commission of the o......
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Evidence
...A defendant who has some, but less, right to control a habitation than the alleged owner may be prosecuted for burglary. Morgan v. State, 501 S.W.3d 84, 91 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). Where there are competing equal possessory interests in the property the time of the actual commission of the o......