Morgan v. State
| Decision Date | 27 September 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. A-7700.,A-7700. |
| Citation | 54 P.3d 332 |
| Parties | Frederick Wilbur MORGAN, III, Appellant, v. STATE of Alaska, Appellee. |
| Court | Alaska Court of Appeals |
Michael D. Dieni, Assistant Public Defender, and Barbara K. Brink, Public Defender, Anchorage, for Appellant.
Kim S. Stone, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Special Prosecutions and Appeals, Anchorage, and Bruce M. Botelho, Attorney General, Juneau, for Appellee.
Before: COATS, Chief Judge, and MANNHEIMER and STEWART, Judges.
The defendant in this case was being tried for sexual assault. He asked the trial judge to allow him to introduce the testimony of several witnesses who purportedly were prepared to say that the complaining witness (the alleged victim) had twice previously made false accusations of sexual assault against other men. In Covington v. State, 703 P.2d 436, 441-42 (Alaska App.1985), we held that this type of evidence is admissible if, as a foundational matter, the defendant establishes the falsity of the prior accusations—"as, for example, where the charges somehow had been disproved or where the witness had conceded their falsity".
In this appeal, we are asked to clarify our holding in Covington. What exactly must a defendant prove when seeking to establish that an alleged sexual assault victim has made a prior false accusation of rape? And what is the burden of proof on this issue?
For the reasons explained here, we conclude that a defendant must convince the trial judge by a preponderance of the evidence (1) that the complaining witness made another accusation of sexual assault, (2) that this accusation was factually untrue, and (3) that the complaining witness knew that the accusation was untrue. The defendant can prove these elements through voir dire examination of the complaining witness or through presentation of extrinsic evidence— i.e., documentary evidence or the testimony of witnesses having knowledge of the prior accusation.
The defendant must present this foundational evidence to the trial judge outside the presence of the jury. If the trial judge concludes that, more likely than not, the complaining witness made a knowingly false accusation of sexual assault on another occasion, then the defendant will be permitted to present this evidence to the jury.
Underlying facts: Morgan's offer of proof and the trial judge's ruling
Frederick Wilbur Morgan, Jr., was charged with engaging in sexual penetration with T.F. while she was so intoxicated as to be incapacitated or unaware that a sexual act was occurring. Morgan defended this charge by asserting that T.F. had been fully aware of the sexual intercourse and had consented to it. In other words, he argued that T.F. was falsely accusing him of sexual assault.
In support of this defense, Morgan asked the trial judge to allow him to present the testimony of four witnesses who (according to Morgan's offer of proof) were prepared to say that T.F. had accused men of sexually assaulting her on two previous occasions, only to later concede that these accusations were false. The trial judge, Superior Court Judge Thomas M. Jahnke, ruled that Morgan's proposed evidence was barred by Covington.
As explained above, Covington states that this type of impeaching evidence is admissible only if "the charges somehow ha[ve] been disproved or where the witness ha[s] conceded their falsity".1 Judge Jahnke interpreted this passage to mean that it was not enough for a defendant to present witnesses who would testify to the falsity of the prior accusations or who would testify that the complaining witness had recanted those accusations. Rather, Judge Jahnke concluded that Covington required Morgan to show either (1) that T.F. had "made [an] official concession that the charges were false by, for example, testifying under oath ... that they were false or conceding their falsity in a deposition or [in an] answer to an interrogatory"; or (2) that T.F.'s prior accusations "ha[d] been adjudicated false by a court or other neutral tribunal". (emphasis in Judge Jahnke's written order).
Based on this interpretation of Covington, Judge Jahnke refused to hear the testimony of Morgan's witnesses concerning T.F.'s alleged prior accusations of sexual assault.
Later, at trial, Judge Jahnke allowed Morgan's attorney to conduct what was essentially a voir dire examination of T.F. to see if she would concede (1) that she had previously accused the two other men of sexual assault and (2) that those prior accusations were false. But T.F. denied accusing these other men of sexual assault. In light of these answers, and given Judge Jahnke's earlier ruling, Morgan's attorney let the matter drop.
The questions left unanswered by our decision in Covington
In Covington, the defendant argued that he should have been allowed to present evidence suggesting that the complaining witness had falsely accused two other men of sexual abuse. The complaining witness agreed that she had accused the two men of abusing her, but she asserted that the accusations were true. Covington wanted to call one of the two men to the stand and have him deny the truth of the accusations.2
This Court noted that "[a] majority of the courts which have considered [this] issue permit such evidence[, but] only if the defendant makes a showing out of the presence of the jury that the witness'[s] prior allegations of sexual assault were false".3 We then declared that we would "adopt this rule for Alaska".4
The problem is that, even though a majority of states allow a defendant to raise the issue of a complaining witness's prior false accusations under certain circumstances, there is no "majority rule" concerning this evidence. Our sibling states rely on several different theories to justify allowing a defendant to inquire or present evidence concerning the complaining witness's prior accusations—and the scope of the permitted inquiry varies from state to state, depending on that state's legal rationale for allowing the inquiry.
The court decisions in this area focus on two potential legal impediments to a defendant's right to introduce evidence of prior false accusations. The first impediment is the rule embodied in Alaska Evidence Rules 405 and 608: the prohibition against attacking a witness's character for honesty by presenting proof of specific instances in which the witness has acted dishonestly. The second impediment is the rule that a party is not allowed to introduce extrinsic evidence to impeach a witness's answers on cross-examination regarding collateral matters (such as the witness's possible acts of dishonesty on other occasions).5
Adhering to these rules, the courts of New Mexico and Maryland allow a defendant to cross-examine the complaining witness about potentially false prior accusations, but these states bar the defendant from presenting extrinsic evidence to rebut or impeach the complaining witness's answers.6 Massachusetts appears to follow this same rule. Moreover, Massachusetts restricts the defendant's right of cross-examination to cases in which the complaining witness's testimony is confused or improbable, there is no corroboration, and the defendant produces evidence of a series or pattern of false accusations of the same type of sexual misconduct.7
Other courts have answered these potential objections by holding that, when a defendant is on trial for sexual assault, the complaining witness's prior false complaints of sexual assault constitute a special kind of prior falsehood that has particular relevance above and beyond the fact that it may indicate the witness's general character for dishonesty.8 In these states, a defendant may both cross-examine the complaining witness and present extrinsic evidence of prior false accusations if the complaining witness denies having made them.9
This result appears to be consistent with the common-law doctrine that a party could present evidence of a witness's "corruption"—a term that encompassed evidence of (1) the witness's general willingness to lie under oath, (2) the witness's offer to give false testimony for money or other reward, (3) the witness's acknowledgement of having lied under oath on prior occasions, (4) the witness's attempt to bribe another witness, or (5) the witness's pattern of presenting false legal claims.10 Dean Wigmore concedes that the precise theoretical foundation of this sort of impeachment is "not easy to determine" because, he says, the impeachment "is related in one aspect to interest, in another to bias, in still another to character (i.e., involving a lack of moral integrity)". Despite this ambiguity, Wigmore concludes that "the essential discrediting element" of the impeachment was its relevance to proving the witness's willingness to corrupt the legal process—the witness's "willingness to obstruct the discovery of the truth by manufacturing or suppressing testimony".11
But the common-law rules of evidence have been superseded in most American jurisdictions by evidence codes modeled after the Federal Rules of Evidence, and not all courts believe that the common-law doctrine of impeachment for "corruption" has survived the enactment of these evidence codes. For example, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that the practice of allowing a complaining witness to be impeached by evidence of prior false accusations "cannot easily be squared with the dictates of [Evidence] Rule 608(b)"—the rule that prohibits a party from attacking a witness's character for honesty by presenting evidence of specific instances in which the witness has acted dishonestly.12
Nevertheless, even these...
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State v. Long
...of rape or sexual assault; (2) this allegation was false; and, (3) the victim knew the allegation was false. Morgan v. State, 54 P.3d 332, 337 (Alaska App.2002). While the second and third requirements are sound, the first is not. Prior false allegations are relevant to the witness' credibi......
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