Morgan v. State

• Decision Date: 14 October 2004
• Docket Number: No. CR 03-1476.,CR 03-1476.
• Citation: 195 S.W.3d 889
• Parties: Jeffery D. MORGAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee.
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

195 S.W.3d 889

Jeffery D. MORGAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee.

No. CR 03-1476.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

October 14, 2004.

Buckley, McLemore & Hudson, P.A., by: Kent McLemore, Fayetteville, for appellant.

Mike Beebe, Att'y Gen., by: Brent P. Gasper, Ass't Att'y Gen., Little Rock, for appellee.

DONALD L. CORBIN, Justice.

Appellant Jeffery D. Morgan appeals the order of the Miller County Circuit Court convicting him of battery in the second degree and kidnapping. He was sentenced to terms of imprisonment of fifteen years and life, respectively. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in: (1) denying his motion for a directed verdict with regard to the kidnapping charge; (2) refusing to allow him to proceed pro se; and (3) allowing the State to introduce evidence of prior bad acts during the trial. Our jurisdiction of this appeal is pursuant to Ark. Sup.Ct. R. 1-2(a)(2). We find no error and affirm.

On August 12, 2002, Appellant drove to the home of Amanda Simmons, his former girlfriend. Once there, he attempted to talk to her, but Ms. Simmons told Appellant that she had nothing to say to him and asked him to leave. Appellant got into his vehicle and then struck Ms. Simmons as she walked to a nearby mailbox. Appellant again exited his vehicle and began to kick Ms. Simmons and drug her into his vehicle. He then drove around while he threatened to kill Ms. Simmons. At one point, Appellant held a knife to her throat and ordered Ms. Simmons to take a bunch of pills, but she was able to spit the pills back out. After Appellant stopped at a friend's house, Ms. Simmons attempted to escape but was caught by Appellant who again tried to run over her.

Ms. Simmons begged Appellant to take her to a hospital so she could receive treatment for her leg that was injured when Appellant ran over her. Initially, Appellant refused and only agreed to take her to a hospital after Ms. Simmons promised to lie about the cause of her injury. Before entering the hospital, Ms. Simmons agreed to tell the hospital staff that she was involved in a four-wheeler accident. Ms. Simmons was admitted to the hospital and surgery was ordered to repair her broken leg. Appellant remained near Ms. Simmons's side during her initial admittance, at one point signing an authorization form after he identified himself as her "husband." Appellant also instructed the nurses that Ms. Simmons wanted no calls or visitors.

Sometime later, Appellant left the hospital in order to retrieve clothes and makeup for Ms. Simmons. Once Appellant left, Ms. Simmons contacted hospital security, expressing fear that Appellant might return and harm her. She decided to be classified as a "no information" patient, meaning that the hospital would not release any information on her. She was also moved to a different hospital room.

Ms. Simmons contacted Paula Cochran of the Texarkana Police Department on August 15, 2002, and made a statement that Appellant had hit her with his car on August 12. Thereafter, on October 2, 2002, a felony information was filed charging Appellant with kidnapping and first-degree battery. Prior to trial, Appellant indicated that he was dissatisfied with his appointed attorney because he would not pursue certain motions that Appellant had attempted to file. The trial court explained to Appellant the perils of representing himself and eventually ruled that the appointed counsel would continue to represent Appellant.

A jury trial was held on August 19-20, 2003, and resumed on August 26, 2003. Several medical personnel employed at St. Michael's Hospital testified about their encounter with Ms. Simmons upon her admission there. Roger Stanley, a registered nurse, testified that he was responsible for assessing Ms. Simmons's condition upon her admission. According to Stanley, Appellant signed an admission form on behalf of Ms. Simmons, after indicating that he was her husband. Stanley also testified that he recalled no specific problems between Appellant and Ms. Simmons.

Misty Rhoden, a floor nurse responsible for patient care, also testified that she first had contact with Ms. Simmons on August 13. Rhoden recalled that a male friend was at Ms. Simmons's bedside when she stated that the injury to her leg was the result of a four-wheeler accident. Rhoden also testified that Pamela Kroll, Ms. Simmons's mother, called and expressed concern that Appellant might be responsible for her daughter's injuries. When Rhoden first told Ms. Simmons that her mother had called, Ms. Simmons told the nurse to tell her mother that "I am out of it at that time." Appellant then told Rhoden that they wanted no phone calls or visitors. Rhoden also testified that she did not notice any problems between Ms. Simmons and Appellant.

Kay Caballero, a security employee for St. Michael's, testified that she was called in to pick up some valuables in Ms. Simmons's room. At that time, Appellant was in the room, and according to Caballero, she noticed an uncomfortable feeling between the two. Later, once Appellant was no longer there, Appellant again contacted Caballero and asked if there was any way Appellant could be kept away from her room. This occurred on August 13, at approximately 4:25 p.m. Ms. Simmons was subsequently designated as a "no information" patient and moved to another room.

Also testifying at trial was Detective Cochran. According to her, Ms. Simmons contacted her on the afternoon of August 15, 2002. She reported that Appellant had run over her with his vehicle and, as a result, she was in the hospital with a broken leg. Ms. Simmons told Detective Cochran that Appellant was trying to kill her and that she was afraid that he was going to hurt her in the hospital, because he had threatened her since she had been there. Detective Cochran also testified that she was aware of a history of complaints made by Ms. Simmons against Appellant.

Mary Works, Ms. Simmons's grandmother, testified that she first saw Appellant on the evening of August 12, at approximately 8:00 p.m., when he drove by her house and honked his horn demanding that Ms. Simmons come and talk to him. Works next saw Appellant at approximately 1:00 a.m., when he came back to her house so that he could retrieve some clothes and makeup for Ms. Simmons. He told Works that her granddaughter was in the hospital with a broken leg after being involved in a "three-wheeler" wreck.

Ms. Simmons testified that she had been dating Appellant for about two and a half years, but that they had recently split. She described how Appellant struck her with his vehicle and then forced her into the car. She said Appellant told her that he was going to have to kill her. Ms. Simmons explained that the only way she could convince Appellant to take her to the hospital was to promise to lie about the cause of her injuries. Once Ms. Simmons agreed to tell the hospital employees that she was injured while riding a four wheeler, Appellant took her to the emergency room at St. Michael's. At the hospital, Appellant continued to threaten to harm Ms. Simmons and her family if she told anyone the truth about her injuries.

At the close of the State's case, Appellant moved for a directed verdict. With regard to the charge of kidnapping, he argued that the evidence demonstrated that he had released Ms. Simmons at a place of safety. The trial court denied his motion. Appellant then rested without presenting any evidence. The jury subsequently convicted Appellant of kidnapping, a Class Y felony, and battery in the second degree. He was sentenced as a habitual offender to life imprisonment on the charge of kidnapping and fifteen years' imprisonment on the battery charge. This appeal followed.

I. Motion for Directed Verdict

For his first point on appeal, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict as to the charge of kidnapping. Specifically, Appellant argues that the evidence demonstrated that he released Ms. Simmons at a place of safety, the hospital, and, thus, under Ark.Code Ann. § 5-11-102(b) (Repl.1997), Appellant can only be found guilty of a Class B felony kidnapping charge. The State counters that the issue of whether Appellant released the victim at a place of safety was a fact question properly submitted to the jury. The State is correct.

This court treats a motion for directed verdict as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. Benson v. State, 357 Ark. 43, 160 S.W.3d 341 (2004); Tester v. State, 342 Ark. 549, 30 S.W.3d 99 (2000). When reviewing the denial of a directed-verdict motion, we will look at the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, considering only the evidence that supports the verdict and will affirm if there is substantial evidence to support the jury's conclusion. Burmingham v. State, 342 Ark. 95, 27 S.W.3d 351 (2000). Substantial evidence is that which is forceful enough to compel reasonable minds to reach a conclusion one way or the other and permits the trier of fact to reach a conclusion without having to resort to speculation or conjecture. Greene v. State, 335 Ark. 1, 977 S.W.2d 192 (1998).

A person commits the offense of kidnapping if, without consent, he restrains another person so as to interfere substantially with his liberty for the purpose of holding him for ransom or reward, or for any act to be performed or not performed for his return or release, or for inflicting physical injury upon him, or of engaging in sexual intercourse, deviate sexual activity, or sexual contact with him. Ark.Code Ann. § 5-11-102(a)(1) & (a)(4) (Repl.1997). "Restraint without consent" includes "restraint by physical force, threat, or deception[.]" Ark.Code Ann. § 5-11-101(2) (Repl.1997). Kidnapping is a Class Y felony, except that if the defendant shows by a preponderance of the evidence that he voluntarily released the person restrained alive and in a safe place prior to trial, it is a Class B felony. Section 5-11-102(b).

The jury...