Morganton Mfg. & Trading Co. v. Anderson
Decision Date | 15 April 1914 |
Citation | 81 S.E. 418,165 N.C. 285 |
Parties | MORGANTON MFG. & TRADING CO. ET AL. v. ANDERSON ET AL. |
Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
Appeal from Superior Court, Forsyth County; Lane, Judge.
Action by the Morganton Manufacturing & Trading Company and others against E. L. Anderson and another to enforce liens for materials furnished. From the judgment, plaintiffs appeal. Affirmed.
In construing a codified statute, resort may be had to the original legislation.
The defendant E. L. Anderson was the owner of a lot in Winston and on the 28th day of August, 1911, he entered into a contract with the defendant C. A. Crews, as contractor, by which the latter agreed to build a house thereon for $4,600.
The parts of the contract material to be set out are:
By agreement the bond provided for in the contract was executed by the defendant the Maryland Casualty Company, instead of by the American Surety Company, and the penalty in the bond was $4,600 and not $1,000.
The bond contains the following provisions, among others
The Morganton Manufacturing & Trading Company furnished materials for said building, and which were used therein, of the value of $1,063.31, and the other creditors materials of the value of $1,877.18, all of which were furnished under contract with the said Crews, contractor. All of said creditors filed notice of their claims with the defendant Anderson, and, at the time of filing such notice, there was due the contractor Crews, who is insolvent, by the owner Anderson, $1,328.39. Said creditors also filed notice of lien in the office of the clerk of the superior court; the notice of lien of the Morganton Manufacturing & Trading Company being the first filed.
The matters in controversy were tried before a referee, Mr. J. E Alexander, and upon the facts found by him, substantially as herein stated, his honor adjudged that the Maryland Casualty Company was not liable to the creditors, and that the balance in the hands of Anderson should be distributed pro rata among all the creditors, to which the creditors excepted and appealed.
The creditors, other than the Morganton Manufacturing & Trading Company, except to: (1) "The refusal of the court to find, as a matter of law, that the Maryland Casualty Company was bound to said parties who furnished material in the completion of the house of E. L. Anderson, and further except to the judgment of the court that the bond executed by the surety company was bound only to the extent of protecting E. L. Anderson, and did not protect materialmen and laborers for work done and material furnished. * * *" The Morganton Manufacturing & Trading Company excepts: "To the ruling of the court overruling the said plaintiff's first exception to the report of the referee, and holding that this plaintiff was not entitled to priority by reason of filing the first lien in the office of the clerk of the superior court of Forsyth county, as set forth in said exception, which is hereby referred to and made a part hereof as fully as if written herein." (2) "To the ruling of the court in overruling said plaintiff's second exception to the report of the referee, and holding that the parties were entitled to prorate in the fund, and that this plaintiff was not entitled to priority, as set forth in said exception, which is hereby referred to and made a part hereof, as fully as if written herein." (3) "To the judgment of the court that the fund should be prorated between all claimants, notwithstanding this plaintiff has filed the first lien in the office of the clerk of the superior court of Forsyth county."
J. T. Perkins, of Morganton, for Morganton Mfg. & Trading Co.
Watson, Buxton & Watson and L. M. Swink, all of Winston-Salem, for other creditors.
F. P. Hobgood, Jr., of Greensboro, for Maryland Casualty Co.
The contract entered into between the defendants Anderson and Crews, and the bond executed by the Maryland Casualty Company to secure its performance must be considered together, as contended by the creditors, in order to properly determine the extent of the obligations of the bond, and, when we examine the contract, we find first an agreement upon the part of the contractor to provide all the materials and to perform all the work necessary to erect the building.
The contention of the creditors is that this is an agreement to furnish the materials and labor and impliedly to pay for them, and, as the bond was executed to secure performance of the contract, the casualty company is bound for the payment of the claims for materials. If this is a proper construction of the contract, and the casualty company is bound for obligations not expressed in the bond, the conclusion contended for would seem to follow, in the absence of restrictive words in the bond, but we are of opinion this is not a correct view of the agreement of the parties.
The stipulation that the contractor will furnish the materials and labor adds nothing to the agreement to build the house, because it could not be built without the materials and labor, and there can be no implied promise to pay between the contractor and the owner, the parties to the contract, as the contractor was to furnish the materials, and consequently there could be no implied promise to pay him for them, and the owner made the express promise to pay $4,600 for the building, which included materials.
The parties undertook to reduce their agreement to writing, and presumably inserted every provision regarded material, and it is a well-recognized principle that there can be no implied contract, where there is an express contract...
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