Morille–hinds v. Hinds

• Decision Date: 02 August 2011
• Citation: 2011 N.Y. Slip Op. 06120,928 N.Y.S.2d 727,87 A.D.3d 526
• Parties: Theodora MORILLE–HINDS, respondent,v.Alfred HINDS, appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

87 A.D.3d 526
928 N.Y.S.2d 727
2011 N.Y. Slip Op. 06120

Theodora MORILLE–HINDS, respondent,
v.
Alfred HINDS, appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

Aug. 2, 2011.

[928 N.Y.S.2d 728]

Dikman & Dikman, Lake Success, N.Y. (David S. Dikman of counsel), for appellant.REINALDO E. RIVERA, J.P., ANITA R. FLORIO, LEONARD B. AUSTIN, and JEFFREY A. COHEN, JJ.

[87 A.D.3d 526] In an action for a divorce and ancillary relief, the defendant appeals, as limited by his brief, from stated portions of a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Gartenstein, J.H.O.), entered June 15, 2010, which, upon a decision of the same court dated October 16, 2009, made after a nonjury trial, inter alia, awarded him only 15% of the value of the parties' real property, the plaintiff's retirement accounts, and certain bank accounts, and imputed an annual income to him in the sum of $80,000 for the purpose of his child support obligation, and thereupon directed him to pay child support in the sum of $233 per week.

[87 A.D.3d 527] ORDERED that the judgment is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, on the facts, and in the exercise of discretion, with costs, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Queens County, for further proceedings consistent herewith and for the entry of an appropriate amended judgment thereafter.

The guiding principle of equitable distribution is that “both parties in a matrimonial action are entitled to fundamental fairness in the allocation of marital assets, and that the economic and noneconomic contributions of each spouse are to be taken into account” ( Holterman v. Holterman, 3 N.Y.3d 1, 8, 781 N.Y.S.2d 458, 814 N.E.2d 765). The factors a court must consider in distributing marital property are set forth in Domestic Relations Law § 236(B)(5)(d). “ ‘In fashioning an award of equitable distribution, the Supreme Court is required to discuss the statutory factors it relied upon in distributing marital property’ ” ( Spera v. Spera, 71 A.D.3d 661, 662, 898 N.Y.S.2d 548, quoting

[928 N.Y.S.2d 729]

Milnes v. Milnes, 50 A.D.3d 750, 750, 857 N.Y.S.2d 168; see Domestic Relations Law § 236[B][5] [g] ). Nevertheless, “ ‘[w]here it is evident that the Supreme Court considered all relevant factors and the reasons for its decision are articulated, the court is not required to specifically cite to and analyze each statutory factor’ ” ( Spera v. Spera, 71 A.D.3d at 662, 898 N.Y.S.2d 548, quoting Milnes v. Milnes, 50 A.D.3d at 750, 857 N.Y.S.2d 168). Although this Court has the same power to distribute marital property as the trial court ( see O'Brien v. O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d 576, 589, 498 N.Y.S.2d 743, 489 N.E.2d 712; Kobylack v. Kobylack, 62 N.Y.2d 399, 403, 477 N.Y.S.2d 109, 465 N.E.2d 829; Spera v. Spera, 71 A.D.3d at 662, 898 N.Y.S.2d 548), “absent a detailed...