Morin v. Carney

• Decision Date: 10 March 1933
• Parties: MORIN v. CARNEY. CARNEY v. MORIN (two cases).
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

165 A. 166

MORIN

v. CARNEY.

CARNEY

v. MORIN (two cases).

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

March 10, 1933.

Motions and Exceptions from Superior Court, Aroostook County.

Actions by Magloire Morin against George Carney, and by Stella B. Carney and by George W. Carney against Maxime Morin, which were tried together. Verdict for defendant in first action, and for plaintiffs in other two actions. On motions and exceptions.

In each case, exception overruled, motion sustained, verdict set aside and new trial granted.

Argued before PATTANGALD, C. J., and DUNN, STURGIS, BARNES, and THAXTER, JJ.

J. Frederic Burns, of Houlton, for Magloire Morin.

A. S. Crawford, Jr., of Houlton, for Stella B. and George W. Carney.

DUNN, Justice.

These three actions were tried together. The accident from which they arise occurred when two automobiles, destined oppositely, collided on the highway between Masardis and Ashland, at a point known as Doak Pitch. The day, December 4, 1930, was clear; the hour was quarter after 3 In the afternoon. Magloire Morin, plaintiff in the first of the above-entitled cases, and defendant (under the name of Maxime Morin) in the other two, was driving his Ford automobile toward Ashland, that is, northerly on the practically north and south road. Another man was riding with him. In the other suits, the respective plaintiffs, George W. Carney and Stella B. Carney, are husband and wife. Mr. Carney owned the Chevrolet automobile in which they were riding; it was progressing southerly. An adult son, Henry Carney, was driving, Mr. Carney was seated next his son, and Mrs. Carney was on the rear seat; another guest passenger sitting beside her.

Mr. Morin sues Mr. George Carney for personal injuries and property damage. On the trial, an exception to the exclusion of a conversation was noted and allowed. A witness, being examined in rebuttal, was asked to state what Henry Carney (who witnessed for his father) had told him. Objection was interposed. The judge said, in gist, that if the answer would go to contradiction of Henry Carney's testimony, the evidence would be admissible; otherwise not. Counsel stated: "It certainly has some bearing on what Mr. Carney said in direct examination; it has to do with the rate of speed of the car." Counsel did not, however, so far as the bill of exceptions discloses, indicate what he expected to prove. Whether the answer would have had any probative force cannot, therefore, be known. Johnson v. Day, 78 Me. 224, 3 A. 647. The exception must be overruled.

Mr. Morin alleges, as actionable negligence, the operation of his adversary's car at an illegal, unreasonable, and excessive speed: the negligent loss of control of the vehicle; and proximately resultant injury and damage. The jury returned a general verdict for the defendant. It decided, in effect, that the burden resting upon the plaintiff to prove negligence was not sustained. Mr. Morin filed a general motion for a new trial. Discussion of this motion, and of the motions filed by him as party defendant in the cases by Mr. and Mrs. Carney, respectively, will be had together.

Of the persons in the Carney car, apparently only Mrs. Carney was seriously injured. The jury awarded her damages, for personal injuries, in the sum of $5,000. Her husband, for reimbursement of expenses incurred because of her injury, to compensate him for the loss of her services and companionship, and for property damage, recovered a verdict for $1,500.

The same exception as in the first case, except that here the defense is the excepter, was taken in each of these cases. Error not affirmatively appearing in either bill, the exceptions are overruled. Johnson v. Day, supra.

The stating of certain further facts seems essential to consideration of the cases on the merits.

The road, one of graveled surface, in open country, was twenty feet wide. There was evidence that it was frozen, and, on the east side, rough and rutted, due to the operation of trucks. Though this condition may have retarded travel, the road was not impassable. In some places the snow was two inches deep; in others it had blown off, exposing a partial coating of ice. The opposite, or west, side of the road, was relatively smooth. Mr. Morin was, and for some distance had been, driving on this side of the highway, which, until the car that proved to be Mr. Carney's approached, was otherwise unobstructed.

The allegations of negligence against Mr. Morin are, in brief, that despite the fact that the Carney car was, of legal right, in continuous forward movement on the west side of the road, he (Morin) did not seasonably turn to the right of the middle of. the traveled part, that the cars might pass without interference. R. S. chap. 29, § 2. The statute provides, in its application to present day traffic, what course shall be pursued by a motor vehicle when approaching to meet another; it defines what each driver shall himself do, and may expect of others; these being among the purposes of the law of the road.

Where, in a civil action, on the issue of negligence, a defendant is shown to have violated a valid statutory regulation, enacted in behalf of and to protect a plaintiff as one of the public, such is evidence from which, if uncontrolled by direct proof or circumstances, the jury may find a defendant negligent.

Mr. and Mrs. Carney claim that because of Mr. Morin's...