Morin v. Clark

• Decision Date: 27 January 1937
• Citation: 6 N.E.2d 830,296 Mass. 479
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
• Parties: JOSEPH E. MORIN v. GEORGE M. CLARK & another.

296 Mass. 479

6 N.E.2d 830

JOSEPH E. MORIN v. GEORGE M. CLARK & another.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

January 27, 1937

November 12, 1936.

Present: RUGG, C.

J., PIERCE, FIELD DONAHUE, & QUA, JJ.

Equity Pleading and Practice, Master: report of evidence, recommittal, Decree. Sale, What constitutes, Transfer of title. Analysis by QUA J., of Rule 90 of the Superior Court (1932).

The method, adopted by a master in declining a request, properly presented under Rule 90 of the Superior Court (1932), for a summary of so much of the evidence as was necessary to enable the court to determine whether it was sufficient in law to support certain findings of fact in the report, of stating in substance that his subsidiary findings were so far detailed and so closely followed the evidence which he believed that they themselves constituted such a summary, was not commended by this court but an examination of the report failed to disclose that the master's statement was not true, and therefore a failure to comply with the rule was not shown.

A motion to recommit a report to a master on the ground that a summary by him, purporting to set forth so much of the evidence as is necessary to enable the court to determine whether it was sufficient in law to support certain findings of fact in the reports was not accurate and fair, should be accompanied by affidavit setting forth facts to substantiate such contention and, if not so accompanied, properly may be denied.

On all the facts respecting the title to pattern plates for the manufacture of "pouring sheets" used by publishers in casting stereotype plates, which patterns were manufactured by the plaintiff on the defendant's order and were retained in the plaintiff's possession for a period of years while the pouring sheets were from time to time manufactured from them for the defendant's customers, the proper conclusion was that it was the intention of the parties that the patterns should be the property of the defendant.

An injunction in a final decree in a suit in equity, granting relief sought by the defendant by counterclaim by restraining the plaintiff from making use of certain information given him by the defendant, was improper as being beyond the scope of the counterclaim, which did not allege that such information was of a secret nature or given confidentially.

BILL IN EQUITY, filed in the Superior Court on November 27, 1935. The suit was heard on a master's report by O'Connell, J., by whose order there were entered an interlocutory decree overruling exceptions by the plaintiff to the master's report and confirming the report, and a final decree (1) dismissing the bill, (2) adjudging the title to the patterns in question to be in the defendant Clark, (3) ordering the plaintiff to pay that defendant $200 as damages, and (4) enjoining the plaintiff or any person in privity with him from unlawfully competing with that defendant by utilizing information given by that defendant to the plaintiff as to the specifications of pouring sheets used by that defendant's present or past customers, giving such information to others for the purpose of manufacturing pouring sheets for that defendant's present or past customers, or by directly or indirectly making, selling, or offering for sale, pouring sheets made from the said pattern sheets and made in accordance with the information furnished by that defendant to the plaintiff. The plaintiff appealed.

H. E. Cole, for the plaintiff.

H. A. Baker, (A.

B. Bagley with him,) for the defendants.

QUA, J. The bill in substance alleges that the defendant Clark has replevied from Morin eighty pattern plates for the manufacture of the "pouring sheets" which are used by publishers in casting stereotype plates; that these pattern plates are the property of Morin; that they have peculiar value in addition to the value of the labor and materials employed in forming them as indicating the sizes and shapes of the casting boxes used by the various publishers who buy the pouring sheets made from the patterns; that Clark now intends to make pouring sheets for said publishers and that he replevied the patterns in bad faith for the purpose of securing possession of them long enough to obtain the benefit of the special information which cannot be had in any other way. There are prayers for injunctive relief, for a return of the pattern plates and for damages. The defendant Clark, in his answer, denies material allegations of the bill, claims title to the pattern plates in himself, asserts that Morin wrongfully withheld them and seeks relief by way of counterclaim.

A master's report has been confirmed, and a final decree has been entered dismissing Morin's bill and, on Clark's counterclaim, declaring that title to the pattern plates is in Clark and that he is entitled to possession of them, ordering Morin to pay damages and enjoining Morin from utilizing information given to him by Clark as to the specifications of pouring sheets used by Clark's customers and from making or selling pouring sheets made from the patterns in accordance with such information.

There was no error in denying Morin's motion to recommit. This motion was based upon the alleged failure of the master to comply with Rule 90 of the Superior Court (1932) in not appending to his report at Morin's written request brief, accurate and fair summaries of so much of the evidence as should be necessary to enable the court to determine whether the evidence was sufficient in law to support certain findings to which Morin presented objections as the basis of his exceptions. Preliminary requirements of the rule as to furnishing the master with a transcript of the evidence by an approved stenographer had been observed. The master appended a statement, referring as we construe it to all of the objections in question, in which he says, "the report in itself contains a brief, accurate and fair summary of so much of the evidence presented to the master as is necessary to enable the court to determine such questions . . . the report and its findings of subsidiary facts adequately summarize the evidence upon which such findings were based, and in each instance . . . such finding is based on credible evidence, the substance of which supports the finding and is embodied therein. Under these circumstances it seems to me that no further summary of the evidence is necessary or required." Certainly a bald assertion by a master that his findings are supported by credible evidence adds nothing to the report and does not satisfy the rule. But here the master means to say that the subsidiary findings are so far particularized and so closely follow the evidence which the master believed as in themselves to constitute a summary of that evidence within the requirements of the rule.

Rule 90 is a valid exercise of the power to regulate procedure and practice in equity confirmed in the Superior Court by St. 1926, c. 138. See now G.L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 214, Section 6. The rule binds alike the parties, the master and the court. It is not to be ignored or evaded, but is to be made effective in all its parts according to their true meaning and intent. The provisions as to appending a summary of evidence, which were inserted by the revision of the rules in 1932, were in part little more than declaratory of then existing practice Cook v. Scheffreen, 215 Mass. 444 , 447, but in so far as they relate to objections raising the question whether there was any evidence upon which a finding could rest, they were undoubtedly intended to go somewhat further and to define a clear and ready method by which a party could bring to the court the question of law involved. This would do away with an anomaly supposed to exist in that although in cases tried before a judge or jury the question whether there was any evidence to support a finding could easily be saved as of right, it was widely believed that the same question arising before a master could be saved only if the court could be prevailed upon in its discretion to order the evidence reported, which the court might be reluctant to do. See First Report of Judicial Council, 57, 59; Third Report of Judicial Council, 62; Smith v. Lloyd, 224 Mass. 173; Wood v. Baldwin, 259 Mass. 499 , 508. The new procedure was carefully guarded to avoid the evils of delay, prolixity and unnecessary expense which are often associated with reports of evidence. The rule does not call for a report of evidence, but calls only for a brief summary of evidence. It does not even necessarily require that all the evidence on the point in question he summarized. It is enough if the master summarizes "so much of the evidence as shall be necessary" to show that there was evidence "sufficient in law to support a finding," care being taken to see that the summary of so much as is summarized is "accurate and fair" and that it does not by reason of omissions present a distorted picture. The summary is not to be used to attack before the court the correctness of the master's findings of fact, but is to...