Morning View Care Ctr. v. Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 2004 Ohio 6073 (OH 11/12/2004), Case No. 04AP-57.
| Decision Date | 12 November 2004 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 04AP-57. |
| Citation | 2004 Ohio 6073 |
| Parties | Morning View Care Center — Fulton, Plaintiff-Appellee, (Cross-Appellant), v. Ohio Department of Job and Family Services et al., Defendants-Appellants, (Cross-Appellees). |
| Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
Geoffrey E. Webster and J. Randall Richards, for appellee.
Jim Petro, Attorney General, and Rebecca L. Thomas, for appellants.
DECISION
{¶1} Pursuant to App.R. 26(A), plaintiff-appellee/cross-appellant, Morning View Care Center — Fulton ("Morning View"), moves this court for reconsideration of the court's September 21, 2004 opinion and judgment entry reversing the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas and dismissing all of Morning View's claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Defendants-appellants/cross-appellees, Ohio Department of Job and Family Services ("ODJFS"), and its director and deputy director, filed a memorandum in opposition to the motion for reconsideration, which is now before the court.
{¶2} In our September 21, 2004 opinion, we held that the court of common pleas lacked jurisdiction to award money damages on Morning View's claim for declaratory judgment, and also lacked jurisdiction to issue an injunction compelling ODJFS to pay such damages to Morning View. We further held that an action in mandamus is the appropriate vehicle through which a nursing home may compel statutory reimbursement. Although courts of common pleas do have jurisdiction over such original actions, we held that, in the present case, such a claim would be so inextricably intertwined with Morning View's pursuit of injunctive relief and monetary damages (issues over which the trial court does not have subject matter jurisdiction) that the claims cannot be severed one from the other. Accordingly, we determined, the court of common pleas is precluded from exercising jurisdiction over any of Morning View's claims. We dismissed the complaint on that basis.
{¶3} "App.R. 26 provides a mechanism by which a party may prevent miscarriages of justice that could arise when an appellate court makes an obvious error or renders an unsupportable decision under the law." State v. Owens (1997), 112 Ohio App.3d 334, 336, 678 N.E.2d 956, dismissed, appeal not allowed, 77 Ohio St.3d 1487. However, "an application for reconsideration is not designed for use in instances where a party simply disagrees with the conclusions reached and the logic used by an appellate court." Ibid. Furthermore, "App.R. 26 does not provide specific guidelines to be used by an appellate court when determining whether a decision should be reconsidered or modified." Id. at 335. See, also, Matthews v. Matthews (1981), 5 Ohio App.3d 140, 143, 5 Ohio OBR 320, 450 N.E.2d 278.
{¶4} In Matthews, this court stated, "the test generally applied is whether the motion for reconsideration calls to the attention of the court an obvious error in its decision or raises an issue for our consideration that was either not considered at all or was not fully considered by us when it should have been." Ibid. See, also, Erie Ins. Exchange v. Colony Dev. Corp. (2000), 136 Ohio App.3d 419, 421, 736 N.E.2d 950; Corporex Dev. & Constr. Mgmt., Inc. v. Shook, Inc., 10th Dist. No. 03AP-269, 2004-Ohio-2715, ¶4.
{¶5} Recapitulated, appellant's motion for reconsideration presents three arguments, as follows: (1) The court of common pleas has jurisdiction over original actions in mandamus and, because this litigation has been protracted, in the interest of "judicial expediency," this court should have remanded the matter to the court of common pleas for further proceedings in mandamus, rather than dismissing the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction; (2) Because this court failed to dismiss appellant's complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction the first time the case was before us, the "law of the case" prohibits dismissal on that ground in the second appeal; and (3) This court violated the doctrine of stare decisis in failing to adhere to precedent that, according to appellant, holds that a provider may sue the state in courts of common pleas for declaratory and injunctive relief to enforce its right to reimbursement of Medicaid monies.
{¶6} With respect to the first issue, appellant cites no authority for the proposition that this court should, in the interest of "judicial expediency," remand this matter to the court of common pleas to "give that court the opportunity to grant leave for amendment of the complaint to include a count in mandamus."1 Moreover, appellant itself could have abbreviated the present litigation by long ago seeking leave to amend its complaint since, as appellant correctly points out, courts of common pleas generally do have subject matter jurisdiction in cases in which a plaintiff seeks a writ of mandamus against the state.
{¶7} But even if we were to remand this case to the court of common pleas, and direct that court to allow the complaint to be amended, as we pointed out in our September 21, 2004 opinion, the lower court would still be unable to exercise jurisdiction over the petition because the same cannot be severed from the claims for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, claims within the exclusive jurisdiction of the court of claims. Morning View Care Center — Fulton v. Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 10th Dist. No. 04AP-57, 2004-Ohio-5436, at ¶18-19.
{¶8} Next, appellant argues that appellee waived any jurisdictional defect when it failed to raise the same during the first appeal. Appellant further argues that the law of the case operates to prohibit this court from dismissing its complaint despite the fact that we did not do so in our disposition of the earlier appeal. First, the Supreme Court of Ohio has held, "a party cannot waive subject matter jurisdiction regardless of procedural sins." Columbus City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Wilkins, 101 Ohio St.3d 112, 2004-Ohio-296, 802 N.E.2d 637, at ¶20, quoting Shawnee Twp. v. Allen Cty. Budget Comm. (1991), 58 Ohio St.3d 14, 15, 567 N.E.2d 1007. See, also, H.R. Options, Inc. v. Zaino, 100 Ohio St.3d 373, 2004-Ohio-1, 800 N.E.2d 740, at ¶8. Parties to a case may not waive or bestow subject matter jurisdiction upon a court. Elkins v. Access-Able, Inc., 10th Dist. No. 04AP-101, 2004-Ohio-4101, at ¶14, citing State ex rel. White v. Cuyahoga Metro. Hous. Auth. (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 543, 544, 684 N.E.2d 72. Accordingly, that appellee did not raise the issue of subject matter jurisdiction in the previous appeal does not preclude appellee from raising the issue in the present appeal.
{¶9} Appellant also apparently misapprehends the doctrine of the law of the case. Essentially, appellant contends that the doctrine precludes this court's consideration of the issue of subject matter jurisdiction. But the doctrine does not bind the reviewing court in such a manner. Rather, the doctrine provides:
[w]hen a case is remanded to a trial court, that court "may not consider the remanded case for any other purpose, may not give any other or further relief, may not review for apparent error, and may not otherwise intermeddle with it except to settle so much as has been remanded." State ex rel. Natl. Elec. Contrs. Assn. v. Ohio Bur. of Emp. Servs. (Sept. 16, 1999), 10th Dist. No. 97APD07-895, affirmed (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 577, 728 N.E.2d 395.
State v. Maxwell, 10th Dist. No. 02AP-1271, 2004-Ohio-5660, at ¶13. Accordingly, we are not prohibited from dismissing the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction simply because a panel of this court did not do so in the prior appeal.
{¶10} We now address the third and final issue raised by appellant's motion for reconsideration; that is, whether this court's decision violates the principle of stare decisis. Specifically, appellant argues that our decision impermissibly conflicts with the decisions of the Supreme Court of Ohio in Ohio Academy of Nursing Homes, Inc. v. Barry (1990), 56 Ohio St.3d 120, 564 N.E.2d 686; Ohio Hosp. Assn. v. Ohio Dept. of Human Servs. (1991), 62 Ohio St.3d 97, 579 N.E.2d 695, certiorari denied, Ohio Dept. of Human Servs. v. Ohio Hosp. Assn. (1992), 503 U.S. 940, 112 S.Ct. 1483, 117 L.Ed.2d 625; and, most recently, Santos v. Ohio Bur. of Workers' Comp., 101 Ohio St.3d 74, 2004-Ohio-28, 801 N.E.2d 441. After a considered review of these decisions, we do not perceive that our decision in the instant matter violates the principle of stare decisis.
{¶11} "Under the doctrine of stare decisis, 'a determination of a point of law by a court of last resort will be followed by inferior courts in subsequent cases presenting the same legal problem, even though different parties are involved in the subsequent case.' " Burzynski v. Bradley & Bradley & Farris Co., L.P.A. (Dec. 31, 2001), 10th Dist. No. 01AP-782, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 5970, at *18, quoting Nelson v. Ohio Supreme Court (Oct. 6, 1994) 10th Dist. No. 94APE05-624, citing Battig v. Forshey (1982), 7 Ohio App.3d 72, 454 N.E.2d 168.
{¶12} In Barry, supra, a class of 150 nursing homes filed a complaint against the Ohio Department of Human Services, in which the class members sought declaratory and injunctive relief and a writ of mandamus. The basis for the complaint was that the agency violated the constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection, and violated a federal law obligating states to set reasonable Medicaid reimbursement rates (including a portion thereof called the "Boren Amendment") when the agency reduced the ceiling for a particular Medicaid reimbursement cost center for the period of November 15, 1987 through June 30, 1988.
{¶13} According to the Supreme Court of Ohio, the central issue before the court in Barry was "whether the Academy [of plaintiffs] may assert a private cause of action under Section 1983 [of Title 42, U.S. Code] for alleged violations of the...
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