Morningstar v. Maynard, 01A05-0305-CV-224.
| Decision Date | 21 November 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 01A05-0305-CV-224.,01A05-0305-CV-224. |
| Citation | 798 N.E.2d 920 |
| Parties | Jayla MORNINGSTAR and Robert Mendez, Individually and as Next Friends of Corbin Mendez, a minor, Appellants-Plaintiffs, v. Brian MAYNARD and Elizabeth A. Maynard, Appellees-Defendants. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Paul R. Sturm, Brian M. Simpson, Shambaugh, Kast, Beck & Williams, LLP, Fort Wayne, IN, Attorneys for Appellants.
Dane L. Tubergen, P. Michael Miller, Fort Wayne, IN, Attorneys for Appellees.
Jayla Morningstar ("Jayla") and Robert Mendez, individually and as next friends of Corbin Mendez ("Corbin"),1 filed a tort claim against Brian and Elizabeth Maynard in Adams Circuit Court. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Maynards. The Plaintiffs appeal, raising the issue of whether the doctrine of attractive nuisance may be asserted in this case. Concluding as a matter of law that the plaintiffs cannot prevail on the theory of attractive nuisance, we affirm.
In the spring of 2000, the Maynards bought a fourteen-foot circular trampoline and installed it at their home. On October 4, 2001, Jayla, and her seven-year-old son Corbin, went to visit her father, who lived near the Maynards. While there, Corbin asked and received permission from his step-grandmother, Jenny Morningstar ("Jenny"), to go outside with his uncle, ten-year-old Perry Morningstar ("Perry"), to play on the Maynard's trampoline. Because Brian was away—due to his sister's death—and Elizabeth was in Ohio on work-related matters, the Maynards were not home while Corbin and Perry were using their trampoline.
Jenny could see Corbin and Perry, as well as two other neighbor children, jumping and playing on the trampoline. Appellee's App. p. 4. Shortly thereafter, Jenny heard Corbin crying, looked out her window, and saw him on the ground near the trampoline. Allegedly, all four children simultaneously were jumping on the trampoline; as a result, Corbin was catapulted from the trampoline and fell to the ground, causing injury.
Through the trampoline's owner's manual and expert deposition testimony, the Plaintiffs submitted evidence indicating that it is not safe for more than one person to jump on the trampoline at the same time and that many backyard trampoline-related injuries occur when there are multiple users bouncing at the same time. The Plaintiffs further allege that the Maynards had constructive knowledge of this danger, knew or should have known that neighborhood children might use their trampoline without permission, and did not take reasonable steps to prevent injury.
The Maynards moved to dismiss the Plaintiffs' claims by way of summary judgment. The trial court granted the Maynards' motion, and the Plaintiffs now appeal.
When reviewing the grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment, our standard of review is the same as it is for the trial court: whether there is a genuine issue of material fact and whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Catt v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 779 N.E.2d 1, 3 (Ind.2002). Summary judgment is appropriate only where the designated evidence shows there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. All facts and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom are construed in favor of the nonmoving party. Id. Summary judgment is rarely appropriate in negligence cases. Crossno v. State, 726 N.E.2d 375, 381 (Ind.Ct.App.2000) (citing Jump v. Bank of Versailles, 586 N.E.2d 873, 875 (Ind.Ct.App.1992)). However, when the question is one of the plaintiff's visitor status, the issue is a matter of law and is proper for summary judgment. Jump, 586 N.E.2d at 875.2
The first step in resolving premise liability cases is to determine the plaintiff's visitor status, which defines the duty owed by the landowner. A person enters the land of another either as an invitee, licensee, or trespasser. Harris v. Traini, 759 N.E.2d 215, 222 (Ind.Ct.App.2001), trans. denied. A landowner owes a trespasser the duty to refrain from willfully or wantonly injuring him or her. Kelly v. Ladywood Apartments, 622 N.E.2d 1044, 1048 (Ind.Ct.App.1993) (citing Burrell v. Meads, 569 N.E.2d 637, 639 (Ind.1991)). However, with regard to children, Indiana courts long have recognized that landowners may sometimes owe a higher duty of care, even when the children are trespassers. Id. (citing Lowden v. Lowden, 490 N.E.2d 1143, 1144 (Ind.Ct.App.1986)).
The attractive nuisance doctrine recognizes that a child may be incapable of understanding and appreciating all of the possible dangers that may be encountered in trespassing. Id. (citing 62 Am.Jur.2d Premises Liability §§ 270, 273 (1990)).
The attractive nuisance doctrine applies when the problem complained of is (1) maintained or permitted upon the property by the owner; (2) particularly dangerous to children, and of such a nature that they will not comprehend the danger; and (3) particularly attractive to children. Cunningham v. Bakker Produce, Inc., 712 N.E.2d 1002, 1007 (Ind. Ct.App.1999),trans. denied. Further, (4) the owner must have actual or constructive knowledge of the condition, and that children do or are likely to trespass, and to be injured; and (5) the injury must be a foreseeable result of the wrong. However, the doctrine is limited to cases where the danger is latent.
City of Indianapolis v. Johnson, 736 N.E.2d 295, 299 (Ind.Ct.App.2000). Thus, if the doctrine of attractive nuisance applies to this case, the Maynards owed Corbin a heightened duty of care; if the doctrine does not apply, the Maynards only were required to refrain from willfully or wantonly injuring Corbin.
The policy reasons behind the attractive nuisance doctrine include the consideration that children may not be mature enough to understand the dangers associated with trespassing and the latent dangers associated with the objects in question. See Kelly, 622 N.E.2d at 1049
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