Moron Barrada v. Department of Educ. of Pr
| Decision Date | 03 May 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. Civ. 02-1933(HL).,Civ. 02-1933(HL). |
| Citation | 368 F.Supp.2d 137 |
| Parties | Mary Flor MORÓN BARRADA, Plaintiff, v. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico |
Mary Flor Moron-Barrada, Isabela, PR, pro se.
Diana L. Pagan-Rosado, Brown & Ubarri, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiff.
Gloria Robison-Guarch, Jose Enrico Valenzuela-Alvarado, Maria Eugenia Villares-Seneriz, Department of Justice, San Juan, PR, for Defendant.
Plaintiff Mary Flor Morón Barrada brings this action against the Department of Education of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., alleging national origin discrimination and retaliation. Pending before the Court is defendant's unopposed1 motion for summary judgment.2 Defendant moves for summary judgment on the grounds that (1) plaintiff has failed to establish prima facie cases of national origin discrimination and retaliation under Title VII, and (2) plaintiff's national origin discrimination claims are barred by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel.
For the reasons set forth below, defendant's motion for summary judgment is hereby granted.
Under Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court will grant a motion for summary judgment "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ.P. 56(c). A genuine issue exists if there is sufficient evidence supporting the claimed factual dispute to require a choice between the parties' differing versions of the truth at trial. Morris v. Gov't Dev. Bank of Puerto Rico, 27 F.3d 746, 748 (1st Cir.1994); LeBlanc v, Great Am. Ins. Co., 6 F.3d 836, 841 (1st Cir.1993). A fact is material only if it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). In determining if a material fact is "genuine" the Court does not weigh the facts but, instead, ascertains whether "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id.; see also Leary v. Dalton, 58 F.3d 748, 751 (1st Cir.1995).
To aid the Court in the task of identifying genuine issues of material fact in the record, the District for Puerto Rico has adopted Local Rule 56 (formerly Local Rule 311.12). D.P.R. L.Civ.R 56(b)-(c). Local Rule 56(b) requires that a party moving for summary judgment submit, in support of the motion, "a separate, short, and concise statement of material facts as to which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue to be tried and the basis of such contention as to each material fact, properly supported by specific reference to the record." Id.; see also Leary, 58 F.3d at 751. Further, D.P.R. L.Civ.R 56(c). "Where the party opposing summary judgment fails to comply, the rule permits the district court to treat the moving party's statement of facts as uncontested." Alsina-Ortiz v. Laboy, 400 F.3d 77, 80 (1st Cir.2005). The Court will only consider the facts alleged in the parties' Local Rule 56 statements when entertaining the movant's arguments. Rivera v. Telefonica de Puerto Rico, 913 F.Supp. 81, 85 (D.P.R.1995).
Once a party moves for summary judgment, it bears the initial burden. Specifically, "`a party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the [evidence] ... which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.'" Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 600 n. 22, 118 S.Ct. 1584, 1598 n. 22, 140 L.Ed.2d 759 (1998) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)). Once this threshold is met, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party. The nonmovant may not rest on mere conclusory allegations or wholesale denials. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Libertad v. Welch, 53 F.3d 428, 435 (1st Cir.1995). Instead, the nonmoving party must "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). Furthermore, the nonmovant "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).
If the nonmoving party fails to file a timely opposition to the motion for summary judgment, the district court is entitled to consider the motion as unopposed and take the moving parties' statement of uncontested facts as true. De La Vega v. San Juan Star, Inc., 377 F.3d 111, 116 (1st Cir.2004); Velez v. Awning Windows, Inc., 375 F.3d 35, 41-42; see also Euromodas, Inc. v. Zanella, Ltd., 368 F.3d 11, 14-15 (1st Cir.2004). However, this does not automatically entitle the moving party to summary judgment. De La Vega, 377 F.3d at 115. "The district court cannot grant a motion for summary judgment merely for lack of any response by the opposing party, since the district court must review the motion and the supporting papers to determine whether they establish the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Id. (citing Jaroma v. Massey, 873 F.2d 17, 20 (1st Cir.1989)); see also Stepanischen v. Merchants Despatch Trans. Corp., 722 F.2d 922, 929 (1st Cir.1983). Even if the motion for summary judgment is unopposed, the moving party must meet its burden to demonstrate undisputed facts entitling it to summary judgment as a matter of law. De La Vega, 377 F.3d at 115-16.
On November 5, 2004, defendant Department of Education filed the present motion for summary judgment.3 On November 19, 2004, plaintiff Morón requested an extension of time to file an opposition to defendant's motion for summary judgment.4 The Court granted Morón until December 8, 2004, to file an opposition.5 This deadline came and passed, and Morón did not submit an opposition or petition the Court for a time extension. On December 30, 2005, the Department of Education filed a motion requesting that the Court deem their motion for summary judgment unopposed.6 On January 10, 2005, Morón objected to defendant's motion to deem their summary judgment motion unopposed and requested an extension of time to file an opposition to defendant's summary judgment motion.7 On January 14, 2005, thirty-seven days after the deadline set by the Court, Morón filed an opposition to the summary judgment motion.8 For the foregoing reasons, the Court will consider defendant's motion for summary judgment as unopposed and will accept as true all material facts set forth by defendant with appropriate record support. See De La Vega, 377 F.3d at 116 (citing Jaroma v. Massey, 873 F.2d 17, 21 (1st Cir.1989); Mendez v. Banco Popular de P.R., 900 F.2d 4, 7-8 (1st Cir.1990)).9
In March of 1999, Mary Flor Morón Barrada received a three month contract with the Department of Education of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico to fill a position as a marketing teacher at the Juan Suarez Pelegrina Secondary School. Subsequently, a marketing teacher position opened at the school for the following (1999-2000) school year. Morón applied for this position but was not selected for the job. Morón petitioned the Secretary of Education to reconsider the Department of Education's hiring decision, on the grounds that she was the more qualified candidate. The Secretary of Education denied this petition.
On April 12, 2000, Morón filed an EEOC charge against the Department of Education alleging national origin, age, and disability discrimination. In the EEOC charge, Morón stated that she is of Venezuelan national origin and that the marketing teacher position had been given to a younger, less-qualified, Puerto Rican female. Morón later amended her EEOC charge to include allegations of retaliation. On May 25, 2000, Morón filed a complaint before the Public Education System Appeals Board ("JASEP" for its Spanish acronym), appealing the Department of Education's decision to not select her as a marketing teacher for the 1999-2000 school year.
Then, on October 26, 2000, Morón filed a pro se Spanish language motion with this Court requesting an extension of time to file a complaint with the Court.10 On July 12, 2001, Morón was issued a "right to sue" letter by the EEOC.11 On August 7, 2001, the Department of Education Certification Division sent Morón a letter stating that it had reviewed her file and listed the additional educational credits and other requirements that she needed to complete in order to receive a marketing teaching license. On November 21, 2001, Morón filed a pro se complaint against the Department of Education with this Court. On June 17, 2002, Judge Salvador Casellas issued an order to close the miscellaneous file pending before the Court and to open a new civil case file to enable Morón to properly serve the defendant.
An administrative hearing was held before JASEP on February 19, 2003, to adjudicate the administrative complaint that Morón had filed almost three years earlier appealing the Department of Education's decision to not select her as a marketing teacher for the 1999-2000 school year. On April 3, 2003, JASEP issued a resolution denying Morón's appeal and...
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Morón-Barradas v. Dept. of Educ. of Com. of Pr
...court denied Morón's motion. On May 3, 2005, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the DOE. Morón Barrada v. Dep't of Educ., 368 F.Supp.2d 137, 140 (D.P.R.2005). The court refused to consider Morón's untimely opposition, and accordingly "accept[ed] as true all material fac......