Morra v. City Clerk of New Bedford

Decision Date07 January 1960
Citation163 N.E.2d 268,340 Mass. 240
PartiesNicola J. MORRA and others v. CITY CLERK OF NEW BEDFORD and others (two cases).
CourtUnited States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Gerald P. Walsh, New Bedford, for plaintiffs-petitioners.

William B. Perry, Jr., Asst. City Sol., New Bedford (Bernard Kestenbaum, Asst. City Sol., New Hartford, with him), for defendants-respondents.

Before WILKINS, C. J., and SPALDING, COUNIHAN, WHITTEMORE, and CUTTER, JJ.

WHITTEMORE, Justice.

The city council of New Bedford on December 15, 1958, in a year 'other than a regular municipal election year' (G.L. c. 44, § 33A, as amended through St.1955, c. 358) by an affirmative vote of more than two thirds of the council, passed over the mayor's veto an ordinance to become effective January 1, 1959, which provided a ten per cent increase to each member of the police and fire departments. On December 17, 1958, there was filed with the registrars of voters a referendum petition protesting the ordinance. The plaintiffs, being several members of the police department and of the fire department, brought a bill of complaint to restrain the city councillors and the city clerk from further acting upon the ordinance. A restraining order issued. The bill was amended to ask for a declaratory decree. The same individuals sought a writ of mandamus to command the same officials not to proceed further in respect of the ordinance. The cases were heard in the Superior Court on a statement of agreed facts. A final decree in the equity case adjudged the referendum petition to be a valid action and dismissed the bill as to matters not pertinent to the bill for declaratory relief. In the mandamus proceedings there was an order for judgment for the respondents.

These appeals of the plaintiffs and petitioners (hereinafter 'plaintiffs') present the question of the effect of G.L. c. 44, § 33A, upon the referendum provisions of the New Bedford Plan B charter. The relevant provisions are set out in G.L. c. 43, § 42, as amended through St.1935, c. 68, § 2 (to be read with §§ 37, 38, and 39).

The provision in G.L. c. 44, § 33A, upon which the plaintiffs rely is the second sentence reading as follows: 'Notwithstanding any contrary provision of any city charter, no ordinance providing for an increase in the salaries or wages of municipal officers or employees shall be enacted except by a two thirds vote of the city council, nor unless it is to be operative for more than three months during the financial year in which it is passed; provided, however, that in any year other than a regular municipal election year, ordinances may be eneacted by a two thirds vote during the month of December providing for an increase in the salaries and wages of officers and employees, to become effective as of January first of the next ensuing year.' 1

We are unable to accept the plaintiffs' construction that the provisions for a referendum are contrary to the requirements of § 33A. It is true that in a broad sense the referendum procedure, if invoked, becomes a part of the enactment procedure. See Foley v. City of Lawrence, 336 Mass. 60, 65, 142 N.E.2d 588; Robinson v. Selectmen of Watertown, 336 Mass. 537, 543-546, 146 N.E.2d 900. The referendum petition forces reconsideration by the city council, and provides opportunity for what is in effect a voters' veto. 2 We think, however, that the second sentence of § 33A is primarily, at least, a limitation on the enactment power of the city council, that such new power as the proviso grants is not exclusive, and that nothing in the sentence affects the power of voters to have a part in determining whether a measure shall take effect. The context is a related group of general and particular provisions stating how and to what extent the city council may act in respect of the budget and salary and wage increases outside the budget. Section 32 requires that the mayor submit an annual budget and sets out the council's powers in approving, reducing, rejecting and adding thereto and preparing a budget if the mayor does not submit one. Section 33 gives the council power, in specified circumstances, by a two-thirds vote, to make an appropriation for a purpose deemed necessary and not included in the budget. Section 33A requires that the budget provide for fixed salaries and places limitations on action by 'ordinance, vote or appointment' which would increase salaries or create new positions.

The proviso in § 33A which enabled the city council to pass the ordinance in December of a nonelection year was added by St.1955, c. 358. This was recommended in 1955 Senate Doc. No. 675, a 'Report of the Special Commission on Budgetary Procedure in Cities.' The report states (pp. 13-14), 'While the Commission recognizes that the mayor * * * has great responsibility * * * it also recognizes that city councils cannot be deprived completely of some responsibility in the financial affairs of a city * * *. The Commission feels that it is during this period [after December 1] in a non-municipal election year that city councils be permitted to consider ordinances providing for salary and wage increases.' This shows an intent to apportion certain powers between the mayor and the city council and the absence of any basis for implying a limitation on referendum powers otherwise applicable. See Brucato v. City of Lawrence, Mass., 156 N.E.2d 676. See, also, for construction of 'Notwithstanding' clauses, Mathewson v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 335 Mass. 610, 614-616, 141 N.E.2d 522.

The second sentence of § 33A was applied, prior to the 1955 amendment, to '[restrict] the power of the city council' otherwise existing in Clements v. Treasurer of Cambridge, 324 Mass. 73, 75, 84 N.E.2d 465, 466, and Booker v. City of Woburn, 325 Mass. 334, 336, 90 N.E.2d 558. The holding in ...

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9 cases
  • Ritchmount Partnership v. Board of Sup'rs of Elections for Anne Arundel County
    • United States
    • Maryland Court of Appeals
    • June 26, 1978
    ...in the county councils of charter counties. While there is some authority to support this position, See Morra v. City Clerk of New Bedford, 340 Mass. 240, 163 N.E.2d 268, 270 (1960); State v. Summers, 33 S.D. 40, 144 N.W. 730, 732 (1913), the better reasoned view, in our opinion, is that th......
  • Fantini v. School Committee of Cambridge
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • July 13, 1972
    ...N.E.2d 527; Casey v. Everett, 330 Mass. 220, 112 N.E.2d 420; Troland v. Malden, 332 Mass. 351, 125 N.E.2d 134; Morra v. City Clerk of New Bedford, 340 Mass. 240, 163 N.E.2d 268; Murphy v. Cambridge, 342 Mass. 339, 173 N.E.2d 616; Sharpe v. Registrars of Voters of Northampton, 342 Mass. 620,......
  • LaBranche v. A.J. Lane & Co., Inc.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • April 24, 1989
    ...to which it applies. Moore v. School Comm. of Newton, 375 Mass. 443, 446-447, 378 N.E.2d 47 (1978); Morra v. City Clerk of New Bedford, 340 Mass. 240, 242, 163 N.E.2d 268 (1960). Referendum does not permit voters "to bring about something that the city council itself could not accomplish di......
  • Mahony v. Board of Assessors of Watertown
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • June 23, 1972
    ...176, 189--190, 52 N.E.2d 27. Carlson v. Lawrence H. Oppenheim Co., 334 Mass. 462, 465--466, 136 N.E.2d 205. Morra v. City Clerk of New Bedrod, 340 Mass. 240, 244, 163 N.E.2d 268. ...
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