Morrell v. State, W--234
| Decision Date | 30 June 1976 |
| Docket Number | No. W--234,W--234 |
| Citation | 335 So.2d 836 |
| Parties | Truman P. MORRELL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
C. P. Maddox, of Dawson, Galant, Maddox, Sulik & Nichols, Jacksonville, for appellant.
Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Raymond L. Marky, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
Appellant Morrell was informed against and tried for the crime of rape. The jury returned a verdict of the lesser included offense of assault to commit rape; hence this appeal.
The major point asserted by Morrell is that the trial court erred in not permitting cross examination of the prosecutrix as to her addiction to narcotics and continuing methadone treatment.
The facts primarily reveal a 'one on one' situation. The prosecuting witness testified that on the afternoon of her encounter with Morrell, she was walking home from her doctor's office. At this time a late model Thunderbird automobile pulled alongside her, and the two male occupants offered her a ride. She did not know the two males, however, she accepted their offer. Instead of taking her home, Morrell (the driver of the car and who she later identified) drove to a remote area. There, pursuant to the threat of shooting her to death, Morrell proceeded to rape her. A pistol was found in Morrell's possession at the time of his arrest in the early evening. Without detailing the facts further, suffice it to say that substantial, competent evidence was adduced to uphold the jury's verdict.
On cross examination, Morrell's attorney sought to elicit from the victim the fact that she was addicted to narcotics and, at that time, was taking methadone. Objection to this line of inquiry was sustained. In the jury's absence, Morrell's attorney examined the victim in developing a proffer of her testimony. She testifed that she first became addicted to narcotics at age 18 (she was 21 years old at the time of trial), and that a week and a half prior to trial she had been confined in the Duval County Jail for possession of heroin. In answer to the question, 'Are you under the influence of narcotics at the present time and or methadone?', the witness answered, 'Well, I'm on methadone now.'
Morrell's defense was predicated upon his testimony that the victim was hitchhiking down Kings Road, and when he slowed up she ran over to his car and acted like she knew his companion. Morrell further related that after she got into the car, she pulled out some marijuana and began talking about something stronger. The gist of Morrell's version was they had sexual intercourse in exchange for Morrell offering her some cocaine; although Morrell did not intend to uphold his end of the bargain.
Two main functions of cross examination are: 1) to shed light on the credibility of the direct testimony, and 2) to bring out additional facts related to those elicited on direct examination. As to the first function, the test of relevancy is whether it will, to a useful extent, aid the court or the jury in appraising the credibility of the witness and assessing the probative value of the direct testimony. 1 More than half a century ago, the Supreme Court stated in Pittman v. State: 2
'It is settled in this court that, for the purpose of discrediting a witness, a wide range of cross-examination is permitted as a matter of right in regard to his motives, interest, or animus as connected with the cause or the parties thereto, Upon which matters he may be contradicted by other evidence . . ..'
(Emphasis supplied)
The credibility of the prosecutrix being essential to the issue involved cannot be disputed. Although Morrell did not conclusively proffer proof that the prosecutrix was under the influence of drugs when the event occurred, or when she was on the stand to the extent that her mental faculties were impaired, it is evident that her drug addiction was a subject that was relevant to the facts charged. Thus, for the purpose of impeaching the credibility of the one witness's testimony upon which the conviction had to be founded, the trial judge committed reversible error in precluding cross examination as to the prosecutrix's drug addiction and treatment.
REVERSED.
I differ with the majority's conclusion that the victim's 'drug addiction was a subject . . . relevant to the facts charged.'
I follow the authorities cited, but respectfully suggest that they are neither in point, nor germane to the issue resulting in reversal.
In Pittman, cited by the Court, the issue was whether the defendant who was charged with forgery, uttering and publishing a forgery, could on cross-examination be required to answer questions relating to a possible collateral crime of a similar nature. After stating the general rule as quoted and referring to earlier precedent, the Supreme Court concluded that such questioning and requirement to answer was not error. From the authorities cited by the Court in Pittman, page 394, it is apparent that such testimony was admissible for the purpose of illustrating the intent of the defendant in committing the crime for which he was being tried.
It is interesting to note that the late revered Justice Thornal, in pronouncing the rule for our Supreme Court relative to the admissibility of collateral crimes in Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654, referred to authority which the Pittman Court noted in arriving at the majority's quotation from the latter case.
The Appellant sub judice wanted the jury to know that his victim became addicted to heroin at the age of 18, had been arrested for possessing that drug a week and one-half prior to the event charged and had been taking methadone for the past two years.
I cannot find any evidence in the record, or proffer thereof, that she was on either her prescribed 'treatment' or heroin at the time of the offense, or on the day of trial. In fact, during the proffer, she testified that she had not taken any methadone that day, but would at night.
In Eldridge v. State, 27 Fla. 162, 9 So. 448, the Supreme Court of Florida in reversing a conviction where testimony of a witness's habit of indulging in morphine had been admitted quoted and said as follows on page 453:
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