Morrell v. State, U--449

• Decision Date: 27 June 1974
• Docket Number: No. U--449,U--449
• Citation: 297 So.2d 579
• Parties: David Earl MORRELL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 579

297 So.2d 579

David Earl MORRELL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. U--449.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

June 27, 1974.

Rehearing Denied Aug. 6, 1974.

Richard W. Ervin III, Public Defender; and Michael J. Minerva, Asst. Public Defender, for appellant.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Richard W. Prospect, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

SPECTOR, Acting Chief Judge.

Appellant seeks reversal of his conviction of sale and possession of a narcotic drug, cocaine.

It is urged that the trial court erred when appellant was limited in the scope and extent of cross-examination of the State's undercover agent who was called to give evidence of the sale and the circumstances surrounding the sale leading to appellant's conviction. Defense counsel attempted to cross-examine the State's witness concerning prior arrests he might have had in order to demonstrate to the jury that the witness was motivated by self-interest in becoming an undercover agent. On direct, the prosecutor had adduced evidence from the witness as to his background and experience in narcotics cases so that he could induce the jury to believe that the witness' testimony was both credible and accurate.

When the trial court sustained the prosecution's objection to the inquiry about the witness' prior arrests, a proffer was made by defense counsel showing that the undercover agent had gotten into police work as an undercover narcotics agent in order to prevent criminal charges from being prosecuted against him following his own arrest in a narcotics case in a nearby state some two years earlier. The proffer also revealed that the charges against the undercover agent had in fact been dropped some six months or a year earlier.

Appellant relies on Kirkland v. State, 185 So.2d 5 (Fla.App.166); Simmons v. Wainwright, 271 So.2d 464 (Fla.App.1973), and like cases for the proposition that the right of cross-examination for the purpose of discrediting a witness is not to be taken lightly or unduly restricted. In Kirkland, supra, the court stated at page 7:

"For the purpose of discrediting a witness, a wide range of cross-examination is permitted, as a matter of right, in regard to his motives, interest, or animus, as connected with the cause or with the parties thereto, upon which matters he may be contradicted by other evidence, . . ." Wallace v. State, 1899, 41 Fla. 547, 26 So. 713.

In the case at bar, appellant sought to adduce evidence for the jury's consideration that the witness for the prosecution was motivated to give evidence favorable to the State in order to obtain favorable treatment for himself with respect to his own brushes with the law. However, the facts revealed by the proffer indicate that no charges were presently or recently pending against the witness. Those charges were dropped some six...