Morris-Scarboro-Moffitt Co. v. Southern Express Co.
| Decision Date | 27 November 1907 |
| Citation | 59 S.E. 667,146 N.C. 167 |
| Parties | MORRIS-SCARBORO-MOFFITT CO. v. SOUTHERN EXPRESS CO. |
| Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
Appeal from Superior Court, Randolph County; Moore, Judge.
Action by the Morris-Scarboro-Moffitt Company against the Southern Express Company for loss of goods and penalty for delay in settlement. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed.
The state has the right to establish regulations for public service corporations, and to enforce the same by appropriate penalties, and in so doing the right of classification is largely referred to its discretion.
There was evidence tending to show that defendant company, having undertaken, in the line of its duty as common carrier, to deliver certain goods to plaintiffs at Ashboro, N. C., the same having been shipped from Cincinnati, Ohio, in breach of its contract and agreement delivered only part of said goods the package in which they were shipped having been broken open, while in defendant's custody, and part of goods taken; that after said package had arrived at Ashboro, and been delivered to plaintiffs in its damaged and defective condition, plaintiffs duly filed a claim for damage, pursuant to statute, and defendant wrongfully failed and refused to adjust the claim for more than 90 days, etc., the claim being in amount as follows:
Ashboro N. C., Sept. 25, 1906.
Bought of Morris-Scarboro Moffitt Co., Wholesale and Retail Dealers in Dry
Goods Notions, Groceries, and General Merchandise.
| To one (1) overcoat | $20 00 |
| To one (1) overcoat, less 10 per cent ................................... | 18 00 |
| To one (1) coat and trousers ............................................ | 21 75 |
| To part express ............................................................ | 21 |
| ----------------------------- | |
| $59 96 |
Issues were submitted and responded to by jury: "
There was judgment on the verdict for the amount of the loss and for the penalty of $50, imposed by the statute, and defendant excepted and appealed, and assigned for error that the statute imposing the penalty (section 2634, Revisal 1905) was invalid as to interstate shipments, because in contradiction of article 1, § 8, of the Constitution of the United States, conferring upon Congress the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several states and with the Indian tribes.
John A. Barringer and T. H. Calvert, for appellant.
Elijah Moffitt, for appellee.
The statute in question enacts: It is established that the defendant company had charge of the goods, having undertaken to transport and deliver same as common carriers; that, when delivered to plaintiffs by defendant, the package had been broken open and goods to the value of $59.75 had been taken out, which, with the proportional express charge of 21 cents, caused damage to plaintiff by reason of negligent default in the contract of carriage to the amount of $59.96; that formal demand for this exact amount had been made and filed with defendant's agent, and the company had failed and refused to pay the same for more than 90 days. According to the provisions of the statute, therefore, the penalty would attach as a conclusion of law from the verdict and facts admitted, and, if the statute is valid, the recovery by plaintiffs must be sustained. We have held at the present term, in the case of Efland v. Railroad, 59 S.E. 355, the defendant's appeal, that as a general rule the state or government, having control of the matter, had the right to establish certain regulations for these public service corporations, and to enforce the same by appropriate penalties, and that in the fixing of such penalties the right of classification was referred largely to the legislative discretion, citing case of Tullis v. Railway, 175 U.S. 348, 20 S.Ct. 136, 44 L.Ed. 192, and other authorities referred to and approved in that decision; the limitation on this right of classification being that established in the case of Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 151, 17 S.Ct. 255, 41 L.Ed. 666, as follows: "The mere fact of classification is not sufficient to relieve a statute from the reach of the equality clause of the fourteenth amendment, and in all cases it must appear, not merely that a classification has been made, but also that it has been made on some reasonable ground, something which bears a just and proper relation to the attempted classification, and is not a mere arbitrary selection." The statute construed and upheld in Efland's Case, supra, was section 2642, Revisal 1905, imposing a penalty for wrongfully failing to return the amount of an overcharge, but the principle applies here, and shows that the statute now before us (section 2644) is not open to the objection sustained in Ellis' Case, supra, but is a penalty moderate in amount, imposed only after giving opportunity for investigation, does not attach unless full recovery is had in accordance with demand made, and, moreover, is in reasonable and direct enforcement of the duties incumbent upon common carriers, and imposed alike on all members of a given class. The statute, therefore, is not subject to the criticism that it denies to defendant the equal protection of the law, and we do not understand that the defendant insists on this objection.
It is strongly urged, however, that the law is in violation of article 1, § 8, of the federal Constitution, conferring on Congress the right to regulate commerce among the several states. The decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States have uniformly held that under this clause of the Constitution commerce between the states shall be free and untrammeled by any regulations which place a burden upon it and these decisions also hold that, in the absence of inhibitive congressional legislation, a state may enact and establish laws and regulations on matters local in their nature, which tend to enforce the proper performance of duties arising within the state, and which do not impede, but aid and facilitate, intercourse and traffic, though such action may incidentally affect interstate commerce. Calvert on Regulation of Commerce, pp. 76, 152, 159. A case in this court (Harrill v. Railroad, 144 N.C. 532, 57 S.E. 383) well illustrates the distinction between the two positions, and the decision in that case is an apt authority, we think, in support of the present judgment. In Harrill's Case the consignee demanded his goods held by the carrier at the point of destination, tendering the lawful charges due for the shipment defendant's agent wrongfully refused to deliver. A recovery by consignee of a penalty imposed by a state statute for such wrong was sustained, and it was held as follows: "A railroad company owes it as a common-law duty to deliver freight upon tender of lawful charges by the consignee, and, in the absence of a conflicting regulation by Congress, Revisal 1905, § 2633, imposing a penalty upon default of the railroad company therein, is constitutional and valid, and is an aid to, rather than a burden upon, interstate commerce." The same doctrine was announced and upheld in the case of Bagg v. Railroad, 109 N.C. 279, 14 S.E. 79, 14 L. R. A. 596, 26 Am. St. Rep. 569, as applied to a penalty imposed on the carrier for failure to start an interstate shipment within the time required by law. In that well-sustained opinion Mr. Justice Avery, for the court, said: ...
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