Morris v. Broska
| Decision Date | 24 June 2019 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 2018-P-0086 |
| Citation | 2019 Ohio 2510 |
| Parties | CLAYTON MORRIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GLENN M. BROSKA, et al., Defendants-Appellants. |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
Civil Appeal from the Portage County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 2016 CV 00511.
Judgment: Reversed and remanded.
Stephen J. Pruneski, Law Offices of Stephen J. Pruneski, LLC, 1 Cascade Plaza, Suite 1445, Akron, Ohio 44308 (For Plaintiff-Appellee).
John D. Latchney, O'Toole, McLaughlin, Dooley & Pecora, 5455 Detroit Road, Sheffield, Ohio 44054 (For Defendants-Appellants).
{¶1} Appellants, the City of Streetsboro, Mayor Glenn M. Broska, and Law Director Paul Janis, appeal the trial court's denial of their motion for summary judgment seeking immunity on three of the seven claims, tortious interference with contract, tortious interference with economic advantage, and civil conspiracy. We reverse and remand.
{¶2} Appellee, Clayton Morris, was employed by the City of Streetsboro as its director of human resources for approximately four years. In March 2016, a dispute arose regarding whether a city employee was wrongfully accessing Mayor Broska's administrative assistant's computer. The dispute was referred for review to Teletronics Services, Inc., the company responsible for managing the city's computer system. Within one day, a senior-systems engineer with Teletronics determined that someone using appellee's account name and security identification had connected to four different city computers on multiple occasions during a three-week period. According to the engineer, the computers of Mayor Broska and Law Director Janis were among those that had been accessed.
{¶3} Appellee's desktop computer was confiscated from his office in the municipal building and given to the senior-systems engineer so that he could review the files saved to its hard drive. When the engineer showed the files to the administrative assistant, she saw personal e-mails belonging to Mayor Broska. After consulting with Law Director Janis, Mayor Broska terminated appellee's employment.
{¶4} Upon inspection of the computer, appellee's expert found that a "malicious application" had been downloaded to its hard drive. And within one day after appellee's termination, an external hard drive was employed to download 1,943 new files to his computer. During deposition, Matthew Coffman, a senior-systems engineer with Teletronics, testified that he was involved in attaching the external hard drive.
{¶5} Mayor Broska, Law Director Janis, and Streetsboro moved for summary judgment on all seven claims. As to tortious interference with contracts, the motion asserted separate arguments for each. Broska contended that this claim pertains solely to the contract between Streetsboro and appellee, and that as appellee's supervisor, he could not be sued for terminating appellee's employment because he was a party to thecontract. Janis argued the claim was based upon alleged advice Janis gave to Broska in firing appellee, and, as a Streetsboro employee, Janis could have no liability for giving that advice because he too was a party to the contract between Streetsboro and appellee.
{¶6} Regarding appellee's civil conspiracy claim, Broska and Janis argued that after they were declared immune from the "tortious interference with contract" claim, appellee would be unable to prevail on the civil conspiracy claim because there would be no underlying tort upon which to base the conspiracy. In relation to Streetsboro, the summary judgment motion asserted, as to the claims of tortious interference with contract, tortious interference with prospective economic advantage, and civil conspiracy, Streetsboro is immune from liability because all three claims are intentional torts.
{¶7} In response, appellee did not contest that Streetsboro cannot be liable for tortious interference with a contract. As to Broska and Janis, though, appellee maintained that they are not immune because the motion mischaracterized the basis of his claim; i.e., according to appellee, the claim is predicated upon the effect Broska's and Janis' actions had on contracts he had with other municipalities, not his contract with Streetsboro.
{¶8} The trial court did not individually address each claim, but generally held that the case should proceed to trial because there is conflicting evidence concerning whether appellee was wrongfully terminated and whether Broska, Janis, and Streetsboro conspired to "frame" him by transferring files to his computer's hard drive after he was terminated.
{¶9} Broska, Janis, and Streetsboro limit their arguments on appeal to the denial of summary judgment based on immunity on appellee's tortious interference with contract, tortious interference with prospective economic advantage, and civil conspiracy claims.Their three assignments of error provide:
{¶10} "[1.] The trial court erred in denying Appellants City of Streetsboro, Law Director Paul Janis, and Glenn M. Broska's motion for summary judgment relative to amended complaint count two for tortious interference with contract.
{¶11} "[2.] The trial court erred in denying Appellants City of Streetsboro, Law Director Paul Janis, and Glenn M. Broska's motion for summary judgment on amended complaint count seven for conspiracy.
{¶12}
{¶13} Generally, a trial court's denial of a summary judgment motion is not a final order that can be immediately appealed because such a ruling does not fully decide the underlying action and prevent the moving party from prevailing on the final merits. Sagenich v. Erie Ins. Group, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2003-T-0144, 2003-Ohio-6767, ¶ 3.
{¶14} Notwithstanding this general proposition, appellants contend that this court has jurisdiction to immediately review limited aspects of the trial court's decision because, as part of their summary judgment motion, they maintained that they were immune from liability as to several of appellee's claims. As to this point, appellants note that pursuant to R.C. 2744.02(C), an "order that denies a political subdivision or an employee of a political subdivision the benefit of an alleged immunity from liability as provided in this chapter or any other provision of the law is a final order."
{¶15} Appellants' first two assignments pertain solely to Broska and Janis. Undertheir first assignment, they assert that appellee's claim of tortious interference with contract is predicated solely upon the employment contract appellee had with Streetsboro. Building upon this, appellants argue that Broska is "immune" from liability under this claim because as appellee's supervisor, he is not an "outsider" to that contract. Similarly, as to Janis, they argue that he is "immune" because he was a fellow city employee.
{¶16} For the following reasons, however, the merits of appellants' first assignment cannot be addressed because they do not raise an immunity argument that is immediately appealable. R.C. 2744.02(C). First, in asserting that appellee's claim of tortious interference with contract is based upon his employment contract with Streetsboro, appellants mischaracterize the nature of the claim. Second, even if their characterization of the claim is correct, the cited authority supports a conclusion that appellee cannot state a viable claim of tortious interference with contract against Broska and Janis, not that they are immune.
{¶17} "To recover under [a tortious interference with contract claim], a plaintiff must prove all of the following elements: (1) the existence of a contract; (2) the defendant's knowledge that a contract existed; (3) the defendant's intentional procurement to breach that contract; (4) the defendant's lack of justification for the procurement to breach the contract; and (5) the damages that resulted from the breach." Andrews v. Carmody, 145 Ohio App.3d 27, 32, 761 N.E.2d 1076 (11th Dist.2001), citing Fred Siegel Co., L.P.A. v. Arter & Hadden, 85 Ohio St.3d 171, 707 N.E.2d 853, paragraph one of the syllabus.
{¶18} Ohio courts have also recognized a claim for tortious interference with anemployment relationship. The elements of this separate claim are similar to the elements for tortious interference with a contract:
{¶19} "'Tortious interference with an employment relationship "occurs when one party to the relationship is induced to terminate the relationship by the malicious acts of a third party who is not a party to the relationship at issue." Tessmer v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co. (Sept. 30, 1999), Franklin App. No. 98AP-1278, 1999 WL 771013 at 6, citing Condon v. Body, Vickers & Daniels (1994), 99 Ohio App.3d 12, 22, 649 N.E.2d 1259. Accordingly, to establish such a claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate: "1) the existence of an employment relationship between plaintiff and the employer; 2) the defendant was aware of this relationship; 3) the defendant intentionally interfered with this relationship; and 4) the plaintiff was injured as a proximate result of the defendant's acts." (Citations omitted).'" Davila v. Simpson, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2017CA00166, 2018-Ohio-946, ¶ 23, quoting Slyman v. Shipman, Dixon & Livingston, Co., L.P.A., 2nd Dist. Miami No. 2008-CA-35, 2009-Ohio-4126, ¶ 11.
{¶20} As noted, in maintaining that Broska and Janis are immune from the second claim in the amended complaint, appellants characterize the claim as interference with his employment contract with Streetsboro. However, the allegations in the amended complaint do not support their assertion:
{¶21} ...
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