Morris v. Brown
| Decision Date | 01 April 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. WD,WD |
| Citation | 941 S.W.2d 835 |
| Parties | Nellie MORRIS and Norma Lemons, Respondents, v. Brenda BROWN and Elbert Huffman, Jr., Appellants. 52434. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Paul Stingley, Fulton, for Respondents.
Robert L. Hawkins, Jefferson City, for Appellants.
Before ULRICH, C.J., P.J., and BERREY and EDWIN H. SMITH, JJ.
Appellants, Brenda Brown (Brown) and Elbert Huffman (Huffman), appeal from a judgment of the Circuit Court of Callaway County reforming a warranty deed based on mutual mistake. Respondents, Nellie Morris (Morris) and Norma Summers Lemons (Lemons), filed a petition to quiet title and reform a warranty deed that granted a life estate to Morris and remainder interests in Lemons and her deceased sister, Louise Massey (Massey). The appellants, the children and intestate successors of Massey, filed a counterclaim to quiet title in the same property. The Honorable Ellen Roper denied respondents' petition to quiet title, but granted their petition to reform the deed, reforming the deed to convey the property to Lemons and Massey as joint tenants with right of survivorship subject to the life estate of Morris, rather than as tenants in common. Because Massey predeceased the life tenant, Morris, the deed as reformed would result in appellants being divested of any interest in the real estate.
The appellants assert that the trial court erred in denying: 1) their motion for judgment on the pleadings as to its petition to quiet title; and 2) their motion to dismiss respondents' petition to reform the deed at the close of respondents' evidence. Because we find that respondents failed to sufficiently plead or prove reformation of the deed based on mutual mistake, and because there is no material issue as to the deed creating a tenancy in common, and that appellants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law, we find the trial court erred in granting respondents' petition to reform the deed and in denying appellants' motion for judgment on the pleadings. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's judgment reforming the deed and reverse and remand its judgment denying appellants' motion for judgment on the pleadings with directions that the trial court enter judgment quieting title to the real estate pursuant to the warranty deed interpreted as creating a tenancy in common in Massey and Lemons.
Nellie Morris (Morris) had two daughters, Norma Summers Lemons (Lemons) and Louise Massey (Massey). Morris decided that she wanted to buy a house, but did not want her name to be on the title to avoid probate. Her intent was to reside in the house and own it, and then to transfer it to her two daughters after her death. At the closing, Morris and Lemons advised the real estate agent handling the sale, Rita Stephens, of this intent. Because she was not an attorney and was unsure of how to word the deed to effectuate their intent, Stephens told them that they should speak with an attorney to ensure the deed was correctly worded. The attorney to which the agent referred them wrote his suggestion on a piece of paper and sent them back to the closing. On February 28, 1973, the grantor, Paul Boone (Boone), executed a warranty deed to real estate located in Fulton, Callaway County, which stated the property was being conveyed to "Mrs. Louise Massey and Mrs. Norma Summers [Lemons], subject to a life estate in Mrs. Nellie Morris." L.F. 25. Morris paid for the property and made it her home.
Massey died intestate on December 1, 1990, with three children surviving: Brenda Brown (Brown), Elbert Huffman (E. Huffman), appellants, and Billy Joe Huffman. During the administration of Massey's estate, the question arose as to whether Massey's heirs had a remainder interest in the real estate conveyed by the deed of 1973. The answer was "yes," provided the real estate was conveyed as a tenancy in common, as opposed to being conveyed as a joint tenancy.
Morris and Lemons filed a petition to quiet title and reform the deed, alleging that the deed was intended to create a joint tenancy with a right of survivorship, thus granting the whole property in fee simple to Lemons, subject to a life estate in Morris. Brown and E. Huffman filed an answer, counterclaim, motion to dismiss and motion for judgment on the pleadings. They claimed that because the deed created a tenancy in common, and Massey died intestate with no surviving spouse, Lemons should receive one-half interest, with Brown, E. Huffman and Morris receiving one-sixth interest, subject to Morris's life estate. Morris was to receive one-sixth because on March 8, 1995, Billy Joe Huffman quit-claimed his disputed interest in the real estate to her. He did this because he believed it was her intent that the property pass to Massey and Lemons as joint tenants with right of survivorship.
Before trial, appellants' motion for judgment on the pleadings was argued and taken under advisement by the trial court. Over appellants' objections as to relevancy, the court heard parol evidence as to the parties' intent in titling the property. At the close of respondents' evidence, appellants moved for dismissal. On February 1, 1996, the court entered the following judgment:
The Court now finds upon clear, cogent and convencing [sic] evidence that Rita Stephens was the agent for Grantor Paul Boone (seller) and Nellie Morris (purchaser), that Mrs. Stephens although not licensed to practice law drafted the deed (Plaintiff's Exhibit 1), that Mrs. Stephens as grantor's agent failed to convey a life estate to Plaintiff Nellie Morris with a remainder entered in joint tenance [sic] to her 2 daughters Louise Massey, now deceased, and Norma Summers, now Lemons as had been requested by Nellie Morris and agreed to by Grantor Boone through his agent. Accordingly the Petitioner [sic] to Quiet Title is denied and Petition to reform deed is granted as prayed. Judgment is accordingly entered in favor of Plaintiffs and against Defendants. Costs taxed against Defendants.
L.F. 28. Appellants now appeal the judgment of the trial court granting respondents' petition for reformation and denying appellants' motion for judgment on the pleadings as to its petition to quiet title.
In their Point I, appellants claim that the trial court erred in denying their motion for judgment on the pleadings as to their petition to quiet title. They contend the trial court erroneously admitted parol evidence in interpreting the deed for its intent. In their Point II, appellants claim that the trial court erred in sustaining respondents' petition for reformation based upon mutual mistake. Because we cannot logically dispose of appellants' claim in their Point I without first disposing of their claim in their Point II, we will, for purposes of our discussion and review, address their Point II as to reformation first.
A motion to dismiss at the close of a plaintiff's evidence in a court-tried case submits the issues on the merits on which plaintiffs have the burden of persuasion, requiring the trial court to determine credibility of the witnesses and to weigh the evidence, so that the appeal from the ruling on the motion is from a final determination of the issues in question. Colombo v. Buford, 935 S.W.2d 690, 694 (Mo.App.1996). Thus, we must affirm the judgment of the trial court denying appellants' motion to dismiss and reforming the deed, unless it is against the weight of the evidence, it is not supported by substantial evidence, or it erroneously declares or applies the law. Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo. banc 1976). In reviewing the judgment, all facts and reasonable inferences are to be viewed in a light most favorable to the judgment, with the judgment to be upheld under any reasonable theory presented and supported by the evidence. Blando v. Reid, 886 S.W.2d 60, 65 (Mo.App.1994).
In this point, appellants claim that respondents did not sufficiently plead or prove mutual mistake, the basis on which the trial court reformed the deed, and thus, that the trial court erred in denying their motion to dismiss and sustaining respondents' petition for reformation of deed at the close of respondents' evidence. The respondents alleged in their petition that the deed required reformation because of a mutual mistake between the grantor, Boone, and the grantees, Morris, Lemons and Massey. Their petition alleges that the deed should have been drafted to create a joint tenancy in Lemons and Massey, rather than a tenancy in common, and the absence of express language creating a joint tenancy, as required by § 442.450, was against the intent of the parties.
In determining the sufficiency of the pleadings, the trial court must determine whether the petition invokes principles of substantive law that would entitle the pleading party to relief. J.H. Cosgrove Contractors, Inc. v. Kaster, 851 S.W.2d 794, 799 (Mo.App.1993). In reviewing the pleadings, the appellate court is required to accept as true the facts pled and to construe all allegations liberally and favorably to the pleading party. Miller v. Enyeart, 893 S.W.2d 901, 904 (Mo.App.1995). "The appellate court will not consider conclusions of the pleader in determining the sufficiency of the petition." Cockrell v. Pleasant Valley Baptist Church, 762 S.W.2d 879, 880 (Mo.App.1989).
A well-pled petition for reformation of a deed because of mutual mistake is characterized by three elements:
[A] preexisting agreement between the parties affected by the proposed reformation that is consistent with the change sought; that a mistake was made in that the deed was prepared other than had been agreed upon; and that the mistake was mutual, i.e., was common to both parties.
Wates v. Joerger, 907 S.W.2d 294, 296 (Mo.App.1995); see also Cockrell, 762 S.W.2d at 881....
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