Morris v. Clare
| Decision Date | 28 January 1896 |
| Citation | 33 S.W. 1123,132 Mo. 232 |
| Parties | Morris et al., Appellants, v. Clare |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Appeal from Lincoln Circuit Court. -- Hon. E. M. Hughes, Judge.
Affirmed.
Charles Martin for appellants.
(1) The principal question for consideration in this case, is whether the gift of $ 500 to Clarinda Morris by her father, Richard Wommack, as a part of the consideration in the purchase of the land by James Morris, created a resulting trust in the land purchased in favor of Clarinda Morris. The consideration expressed in the deed is $ 1,050, and prima facie this is what Richard Wommack and James Morris agreed was the value of the land. Henderson v. Henderson, 13 Mo. 151. Of this consideration James Morris paid $ 550 and Clarinda Morris, by the gift from her father, paid $ 500. So that if a trust was created in her favor it would be upon the land, in the proportion that the gift of $ 500 bears to the whole consideration $ 1,050 or ten twenty-first parts. Bowen v McKean, 82 Mo. 594; Shaw v. Shaw, 86 Mo. 594. (2) The gift of $ 500, by Richard Wommack to his daughter Clarinda Morris, was a gift to her and not to James Morris. (3) It is not essential to the creation of a resulting trust that the consideration for the purchase of the land should come directly from the cestui que trust. It may come from another as a gift or loan to the cestui que trust. Kelley v. Johnson, 28 Mo. 249; Seimon v. Schuck, 29 N.Y. 598. (4) A resulting trust does not depend upon contract or arise from agreement -- but is raised by operation of law when an estate is purchased in the name of one and the consideration came from another. Champlin v. Champlin, 29 Am. St. Rep. 323; Reynolds v. Summer, 9 Am. St. Rep. 523. (5) The controlling question in the consideration of resulting trust, is the ownership of the purchase money. If such ownership be established the resulting trust springs into being by implication of law, and follows the ownership of the money. Shaw v. Shaw, 86 Mo. 594; Bick v. Graybill, 28 Pa. St. 66. (6) A resulting trust arises by operation of law when land is purchased in the name of one, and the consideration came from another, or for the benefit of another, in favor of such person furnishing the consideration, or for whose benefit it was furnished. 1 Perry, Trusts and Trustees, sec. 126; Thompson v. Reno, 12 Mo. 151; Paul v. Chouteau, 14 Mo. 580; Baumgartner v. Guessfeld, 38 Mo. 36; Kelley v. Johnson, 28 Mo. 249; Miller v. Davis, 50 Mo. 572; Bowen v. McKean, 82 Mo. 594; Shaw v. Shaw, 86 Mo. 594. (7) The defendant, Clare, has no better title to the land than James Morris had. The deed to James Morris constitutes a link in his chain of title. This deed bears upon its face the notice of the gift of $ 500 of the consideration to Clarinda Morris by Richard Wommack, and the defendant is charged with notice of everything contained in the deeds which lies in, and constitutes the chain of title under which he holds. Orick v. Durham, 79 Mo. 178; Tydings v. Pitcher, 83 Mo. 379; Patterson v. Booth, 103 Mo. 402-414.
Norton & Avery for respondents.
A resulting trust arises by implication of law, and trusts of this description are either implied or presumed from the supposed intention of the parties and the nature of the transaction. If they are raised independently of any such intention and forced on the conscience of the trustee by equitable construction and the operation of the law, they are "constructive trusts." Hill on Trustees [4 Am. Ed.], p. 147. See, also, Richardson v. Seevers, 4 S.E. (Va.) 712.
This is a suit to have a resulting trust declared in certain land in Lincoln county, and to obtain on that account a judgment for an interest in the land.
The facts are agreed upon.
Plaintiffs are the only children and heirs of Clarinda Morris, in whose favor the trust is claimed by virtue of the terms of a deed by Richard Wommack, owner of the property in 1868. Clarinda was his daughter. James Morris, her husband, was grantee in the deed.
The language of that instrument, calling for construction in this case, we have indicated by italics in the following passage:
"This deed, made and entered into this third day of June, eighteen hundred and sixty-eight, by and between Richard Wommack and Elizabeth Wommack, his wife, of the county of Lincoln and State of Missouri, parties of the first part, and James Morris, of the county and State aforesaid, party of the second part, witnesseth: That the said parties of the first part, for and in consideration of the sum of one thousand and fifty dollars, five hundred of said sum the said parties of the first part give to their daughter, Clarinda Morris, wife of the said James Morris, and the other five hundred and fifty dollars to them in hand paid, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, have granted, bargained and sold and by these presents do grant, bargain and sell unto the said James Morris, his heirs and assigns, the following described lot or parcel of land situate in the county of Lincoln and State of Missouri, to wit:" Then follows a description of the land, with the other parts of a formal and regular conveyance.
The deed of Mr. Wommack to James Morris was recorded in January, 1869. Clarinda died in May of that year.
In March, 1874, James Morris and his then wife Eliza conveyed the land to Mr. Wommack and others to secure payment of a loan. Under that mortgage the land was duly sold in foreclosure proceedings in the circuit court of the county, in 1877. Mr. Wommack became the purchaser. He afterwards conveyed the land in the same year to defendant by warranty deed.
James Morris died in 1891. This suit was brought in 1892.
Some other facts are mentioned in the agreed case as tending to strengthen the defendant's title; but they need not be recited.
No question of limitation is raised.
The result turns on a decision of the question whether or not the language of the first deed, above quoted, created a trust in favor of Clarinda Morris. Plaintiffs, her children, assert that it did, and that in consequence they are entitled to a decree for ten twenty-firsts of the land.
Plaintiffs do not claim that an express trust was created by the deed quoted. But they contend that a resulting trust in favor of plaintiffs' mother arose in the circumstances which the deed describes.
The learned trial judge decided in favor of the defendant, and plaintiffs appealed in the usual way.
1. A resulting trust arising from the payment of price by one person and the taking of title in the name of another finds its...
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