Morris v. Comb

• Decision Date: 17 November 1947
• Docket Number: No. 7,7
• Citation: 332 U.S. 422,92 L.Ed. 44,68 S.Ct. 131
• Parties: MORRIS v. McCOMB, Administrator of Wage and Hour Division, U.S. Department of Labor
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

332 U.S. 422

68 S.Ct. 131

92 L.Ed. 44

MORRIS

v McCOMB, Administrator of Wage and Hour Division, U.S. Department of Labor.

No. 7.

Argued Oct. 13, 1947.

Decided Nov. 17, 1947.

Mr. George S. Dixon, of Detroit, Mich., for petitioner.

Mr. Harold Nystrom, of New York City, for respondent.

Mr. Justice BURTON, delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case requires further application of the principles stated in Levinson v. Spector Motor Service, 330 U.S. 649, 67 S.Ct. 931, and Pyramid Motor Freight Corp. v. Ispass, 330 U.S. 695, 67 S.Ct. 954. The first question is whether the Interstate Commerce Commission has the power, under § 204 of the Motor Carrier Act, 1935,¹ to establish qualifications and maximum hours of service with respect to drivers and mechanics employed full time, as such, by a common carrier by motor vehicle, when the services rendered, through such employees, by such carrier, in interstate commerce, are distributed generally throughout the year, constitute 3% to 4% of the carrier's total carrier services, and the performance of such services is shared indiscriminately among such employees and mingled with their performance of other like services for such carrier not in interstate commerce. The other question is whether, if the Commission has that power, the overtime requirements of § 7 of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938² apply to such employees in view of the exemption stated in § 13(b)(1) of that Act.³ We hold that the Commission has the power in question and that the overtime requirements of § 7 of the Fair Labor Standards Act therefore do not apply to such employees.

This action was brought March 26, 1942, in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan by the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division, United States Department of Labor, under § 17 of the Fair Labor Standards Act,⁴ to enjoin the petitioner, James F. Morris, from violating § 15(a)(1) and (2) of that Act⁵ through failure to pay his employees compensation for overtime in accordance with § 7 of that Act.⁶ After a trial based on the pleadings and stipulated facts, the complaint was dismissed September 26, 1945. In its unreported conclusions of law the court stated that neither the petitioner nor his employees were engaged 'in the production of goods for commerce' within the meaning of the Fair Labor Standards Act and that, to the extent that they might be considered to be engaged 'in commerce' within the meaning of that Act, the requirements of its § 7, as to compensation for overtime, did not apply to them. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed this judgment May 29, 1946, and remanded the case for further proceedings. Walling v. Morris, 155 F.2d 832. Because of its importance in interpreting the Motor Carrier Act and the Fair Labor Standards Act and because the question first stated above had not been passed upon in our decisions in the Levinson and Pyramid cases, supra, we granted certiorari, Morris v. Walling, 330 U.S. 817, 67 S.Ct. 1091, limited to the following question:

'2. Where such employees (i.e., those of a common carrier for hire who conducts a general cartage business) during a minority of their time are engaged in the transportation of interstate traffic are they exempt under the provisions of Section 13(b)(1) of the Act from the maximum hours provision of Section 7 of the Act as employees with respect to whom the Interstate Commerce Commission has power to establish qualifications and maximum hours of service pursuant to the provisions of Section 204 of the Motor Carrier Act 1935 (49 U.S.C. sec. 301, et seq., 49 U.S.C.A. § 301 et seq.)?'

In response to our invitation, the Interstate Commerce Commission filed a brief amicus curiae.

The material facts are treated by the parties as being those shown by the record to have been in effect when the complaint was filed in 1942. They may be summarized as follows:

The petitioner then was, and for the past 12 years had been, the sole owner and proprietor of the J. F. Morris Cartage Company which operated a general cartage business as a common carrier by motor vehicle in and about the metropolitan area of Detroit, Michigan, and all within three contiguous counties of that State. His operations were centralized at Ecorse, Michigan, at his garage and yard, used for a dispatching office, general maintenance and repair garage and storage space for equipment.

His principal business was the transportation of steel. In the regular course of his business, in 1941, he generally employed about 60 persons, 40 as truck drivers, 14 as mechanics, painters, washers and repairmen in the garage, three as dispatchers and three as general office workers. His equipment consisted of about 50 trucks or tractors and 60 trailers.

He was prepared to and did render general cartage service to the general shipping public. In 1941, he rendered such service to 47 consigning firms, but about 97% of his revenue came from the Great Lakes Steel Corporation and the Michigan Steel Corporation, both in Ecorse. His general cartage services, in 1941, were made up of three intermingled types of service, generally classifiable as follows on the basis of the revenue derived from them: (1) 35%: Transportation of steel largely within steel plants. This was transported for further processing in those plants and an unsegregated portion of its was shipped ultimately in interstate commerce. (2) 61%: Transportation between steel mills and industrial establishments. These shipments consisted principally of bumper stock, fender stock and other types of steel used in connection with the manufacture of automobiles, a substantial portion of which entered interstate commerce. (3) 4%: Transportation of miscellaneous freight directly in interstate commerce, either as part of continuous interstate movements or of interstate movements begun or terminated in metropolitan Detroit.⁷

Ever since § 7 of the Fair Labor Standards Act took effect, October 24, 1938, petitioner's employees, with the exception of his office workers, consistently worked enough hours to entitle them to additional compensation at the rate of one and one-half times their regular wages if such Section were applicable to them. They were, however, paid on the assumption that the Section did not apply to them and, therefore, for the most part, received only their regular rate of pay for such overtime. Accordingly, if it is found that § 7 is applicable to them, there is ground for an injunction against its further violation. No issue is presented here as to the office workers because there is no proof of overtime services having been rendered by them or being now in prospect. No issue is presented here as to the dispatchers. The Circuit Court of Appeals held that § 7 applies to them as employees engaged in the production of goods for interstate commerce and that they are not exempt as administrative employees. Those issues, however, are not within the limited grant of certiorari. As to the garagemen and laborers, including mechanics, painters, washers and repairmen, together with their superintendent of maintenance, there is no issue presented here, except to the extent that such classifications include mechanics doing the class of work defined as that of 'mechanics' in Ex Parte No. MC-2, 28 M.C.C. 125, 132, 133,⁸ including the making of mechanical repairs directly affecting the safe operation of motor vehicles. All of the garagemen and laborers, except their superintendent of maintenance were paid for their overtime work at 'straight' or regular hourly rates. He was paid a weekly wage, and received no overtime pay, although he devoted approximately 25% of his time to the performance of routine physical tasks of the same general character as those of the employees working under his direction. The Circuit Court of Appeals held that the superintendent of maintenance was not exempt as an executive or administrative employee and should be classified in the same manner as the others in this group. There is nothing in the record showing the extent to which the respective garagemen and laborers devoted themselves to the several classes of work above mentioned and, if this were an action to recover overtime compensation for individual employees, it would be necessary to determine that fact. However, as this is an action only for an injunction relating to future practices, the situation can be met by limiting the injunction to the appropriate classifications of workers. On this basis, the injunction against violation of § 7 of the Fair Labor Standards Act may be issued as to those garagemen and laborers who are not 'mechanics' as defined by the Interstate Commerce Commission, and the issue before us is limited to the proper application of such an injunction to such 'mechanics.'

The drivers are full-time drivers of motor vehicles well within the definition of that class of work by the Commission if the work is done in interstate commerce.⁹ From October 24, 1938, to August 1, 1940, the drivers received their 'straight' or regular hourly rate of pay for all overtime work. Since August 1, 1940, their overtime work has been paid for in accordance with a collective bargaining agreement in force as to union drivers, throughout metropolitan Detroit, employed either in intrastate or interstate general cartage. From August 1 1940, to August 1, 1941, these agreements required payment of overtime in excess of 52 hours a week at one and one-half times the regular rate. After August 1, 1941, as a concession to wartime conditions, this additional rate was applied only to overtime in excess of 54 hours a week. The statutory workweek which would be applicable under § 7 of the Fair Labor Standards Act at all times has been substantially shorter than those just mentioned.¹⁰

As to these drivers and these 'mechanics' whose work affects safety of transportation, the first question here, as in the Levinson case, is whether the...