Morris v. Crawford
| Decision Date | 15 March 2001 |
| Citation | 722 N.Y.S.2d 296,281 A.D.2d 805 |
| Parties | MICHAEL J. MORRIS et al., Respondents,<BR>v.<BR>DAVID J. CRAWFORD, Appellant. (And Another Related Action.) |
| Court | New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division |
Crew III, J. P.
In August 1989, defendant and plaintiff Michael J. Morris entered into a purchase agreement, pursuant to the terms of which defendant was to buy into Morris' engineering firm, plaintiff Morris Associates. Thereafter, in February 1992, defendant, Morris and another individual executed and filed a certificate of business signifying that they were conducting business as a partnership. Beginning in March 1992, defendant and Morris engaged in a series of discussions regarding the direction that the partnership would take, including a proposal to separate the office of Morris Associates located in the City of Hudson, Columbia County, from the firm's primary office in the City of Poughkeepsie, Dutchess County, with defendant assuming responsibility for running the Hudson office. Negotiations between Morris and defendant apparently broke down and, in May 1992, defendant began operating a firm known as Crawford Associates out of the Hudson office.
Plaintiffs thereafter commenced this action in August 1992 seeking to recover damages incurred as the result of defendant's allegedly wrongful takeover of the Hudson office. The complaint initially alleged that defendant failed to make the required payments under the 1989 purchase agreement and, as such, was not a partner in the firm but, rather, a mere employee of Morris Associates. Defendant answered, asserted various affirmative defenses and, insofar as is relevant to this appeal, set forth a counterclaim for an accounting. Ultimately, the parties entered into a stipulation in March 2000, whereby they agreed that Morris and defendant were partners in Morris Associates until such date as Supreme Court determined that the partnership ended. Shortly after the stipulation was executed, defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, contending that plaintiffs' action was premature as no accounting had been conducted. Plaintiffs opposed the motion and cross-moved for leave to amend the complaint to include a cause of action for an accounting. Supreme Court denied defendant's motion and granted plaintiffs' cross motion, prompting this appeal.
We affirm. Turning first to plaintiffs' cross motion to amend their complaint, "[i]t is well settled that `leave to amend a pleading pursuant to CPLR 3025 (b) shall be freely given and will remain undisturbed in the absence of an abuse of discretion'" (Branch v Green, 265 AD2d 646, 647, quoting Hanchett v Graphic Techniques, 243 AD2d 942, 943; see, Architectural Bldrs. v Pollard, 267 AD2d 704, 705). Additionally, the case law makes clear that "[d]elay alone is not sufficient to deny a motion to amend unless accompanied by significant prejudice" (Architectural Bldrs. v Pollard, supra, at 705).
Applying these principles to the matter before us, we perceive no abuse of discretion in Supreme Court's decision to grant plaintiffs' cross motion for leave to amend their complaint to assert a cause of action...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
F&K Supply v. Willowbrook Dev. Co., 3
...we perceive no abuse of discretion in Supreme Court's grant of leave to amend the complaint in action Nos. 7 and 8 (see, Morris v Crawford, 281 A.D.2d 805, 806). Delay alone in making the motion is insufficient as a basis upon which to deny it unless the opposing party demonstrates signific......
- Morris v. Crawford
-
McLaughlin & Stern v. Lipkin
...determined without examination of partnership accounts (see, Kriegsman v Kraus, Ostreicher & Co., 126 A.D.2d 489, 490; see, Morris v Crawford, 281 A.D.2d 805, 806-807). Plaintiff's allegation that defendant boastfully stated to it that he transferred all of his assets to his wife and co-def......
- Town of Nassau v. WESTCHESTER FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY