Morris v. Crumlish

• Decision Date: 24 March 1965
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 37331.
• Citation: 239 F. Supp. 498
• Parties: Roosevelt MORRIS v. James C. CRUMLISH, Jr., Howard Leary, William Lennox and Edward J. Hendrick.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

239 F. Supp. 498

Roosevelt MORRIS v. James C. CRUMLISH, Jr., Howard Leary, William Lennox and Edward J. Hendrick.^*

Civ. A. No. 37331.

United States District Court E. D. Pennsylvania.

March 24, 1965.

William F. Hall, Jr., Philadelphia, Pa., for plaintiff.

Theodore Lunine, Asst. City Sol., Philadelphia, Pa., for defendants.

LUONGO, District Judge.

This is a suit under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. The jurisdiction of this court is founded on 28 U.S.C.A. § 1343. Since injunctive relief alone is sought, by agreement of the parties the matter will be disposed of as on final hearing for permanent injunction and not as for preliminary injunction.

FACTS

Roosevelt Morris is confined in the Philadelphia Detention Center awaiting trial on numerous charges of burglary and related offenses. He is there because he was unable, due to his indigency, to post bail which was set at $10,000. Defendants have informed Morris that they intend to place him in a "lineup" at the Center for possible identification by the victim of a rape and a burglary unrelated to the charges on which he is now being held. The injunction which Morris seeks is to prevent the defendants from placing him in the lineup.¹

The lineup, as practiced by the defendants, is conducted in a specially designated room in the Admissions Building at the Philadelphia Detention Center. The Admissions Building is the first one encountered upon entrance to the Center and is connected by passages to the buildings containing cell blocks and dormitories where the inmates are housed. In the Admissions Building are also located administrative offices, infirmary, medical and dental offices, visiting room and facilities for interviewing and classifying inmates upon their arrival at the institution.

The lineup room is divided into two parts by a glass partition. Inmates remain in the custody and control of the institution's guards on one side of the glass partition, while police and victims of crimes under investigation are on the other side. On the inmates' side is a platform on which they are made to stand and, upon order, to present front, side and rear views of themselves to the viewers. Lights are trained on the platform to make those on view more visible to the viewers and the viewers less visible to them. There is a system of communication between the two sections by which requests are transmitted by the police to the guards and by which the voices of the inmate-suspects, responding to questions as to name and age, are heard by the viewers.

Lineups are held at the Detention Center only on Thursday evenings. The police notify the Superintendent of the Center in advance which of the inmates they desire to have placed in a lineup on a specified Thursday evening. The inmate and his counsel are notified and counsel is given the opportunity to be present. As many as four or five lineups are conducted in an evening. Victims of several crimes may be present while an inmate suspected of a particular crime is on view.

It is not feasible to have inmates subjected to the view of victims in cell blocks, dormitories or other general population areas because of the danger of harm to the viewers and the threat to the security of the institution.

Not all persons awaiting trial are placed in lineups nor is the lineup used in the investigation of all crimes. The lineup is used in the investigation of not more than 15% to 20% of major felonies and is seldom used in investigation of lesser crimes. Requests to place persons in lineups are not made indiscriminately, they are made only when the police, on the basis of information already in their possession, have reason to believe that an inmate may have been involved in the commission of a major crime under investigation. The information may consist of one or more of several items such as:

(a) Similarity of modus operandi described by the victim with that known to have been used by an inmate in the commission of other crimes for which he is charged or has been convicted in the past;

(b) Possession by an inmate at the time of his apprehension of articles said to have been taken from the victim of another crime;²

(c) Geographical area of operations;

(d) Physical description.

DISCUSSION

The Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S. C.A. § 1983, provides:

"§ 1983. Civil action for deprivation of rights

"Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress."

The gravamen of plaintiff's charge under the Civil Rights Act is deprivation of rights and privileges secured by the Constitution of the United States.

1. Denial of Equal Protection of the Laws.

Plaintiff's complaint of violation of constitutional rights is pitched primarily to denial of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. His position is that he is in custody only because he is too poor to pay for bail and, in consequence, he is subject to being placed in a lineup while those who are free on bail are not, and since this difference in treatment is based on his indigency, it constitutes invidious discrimination. Griffin v. People of State of Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 76 S.Ct. 585, 100 L.Ed. 891 (1956).

Unquestionably there is a difference in the treatment of those free on bail and those in custody in default of it. The difference is a form of discrimination, but the Constitution only prohibits unequal treatment based on unreasonable classification, i. e. invidious discrimination. As stated in Douglas v. People of State of California, 372 U.S. 353, 356-357, 83 S.Ct. 814, 816, 9 L.Ed.2d 811 (1963),

"* * * it is appropriate to observe that a State can, consistently with the Fourteenth Amendment, provide for differences so long as the result does not amount to a denial of due process or an `invidious discrimination.' * * * Absolute equality is not required; lines can be and are drawn and we often sustain them. * * *."

The equal protection of the laws which the Constitution guarantees is that the laws apply equally to all those within appropriate classifications. There is no valid basis for comparing the status of freedom with that of confinement. The one is the antithesis of the other. Confinement carries with it a suspension of or a restriction upon the exercise of most of the rights of free men, not the least of which is liberty itself. Other rights which are denied those who are confined are the right of privacy, to earn a livelihood, to vote, to speak freely, to associate with persons of one's choosing, and many others equally obvious. If the classification of jail versus bail is a constitutionally permissible one, those in the one category are not entitled to the equal protection of the laws with those in the other. The classification is not only constitutionally permissible, it is expressly provided and guaranteed by the Eighth Amendment to the Federal Constitution³ and, in like terms, by Article I, Section 13 of the Constitution of Pennsylvania, P.S. Since it is constitutionally sanctioned, the classification cannot be made the basis for a charge of discrimination. Butler v. Crumlish, 229 F. Supp. 565 (E.D.Pa.1964).

Not only has plaintiff failed to establish that he has a constitutional right to the same treamtent as one who is free on bail, it is by no means true that one who is free on bail has a constitutional right to be protected from possible identification by the victim of a crime for which he has not been formally charged. Indeed it is clear that persons free on bail may be viewed by victims. That they are not subjected to view as frequently as are those in custody is attributable to lack of police manpower, inconvenience and danger of harm to viewers, not to a constitutional right to be free from it. The major difference, in that regard, between those free on bail and those in custody is that the latter, by reason of the fact that they are in custody are more conveniently available, under conditions affording greater security for viewers, than those who are at liberty.

Since Morris, a person in custody, is not entitled to the same freedom as are those who are at liberty, and since he cannot show that he is treated differently than those who, like himself, are in custody in default of bail, his claim of denial of equal protection of the laws must fail.

2. Self-incrimination.

Another argument advanced by plaintiff is that the lineup procedure violates his constitutional rights in that it compels him to be an unwilling "* * * active participant in police investigation * * *"⁴ He concedes that he may, without violation of his constitutional rights, be looked at and observed by the victim of some other crime while he is in his cell or in some other part of the institution. But he contends that the procedure used here requires him to be an "active participant" in that he is compelled to travel several hundred feet from his cell to the lineup room and is there made to move about and to speak so that his movements and his voice are likewise used as aids in identification. This contention may be viewed as a possible violation of two constitutional provisions, the privilege against self-incrimination as contained in the Fifth Amendment or of due process of law as contained in the Fourteenth Amendment.

It is clear that the privilege against self-incrimination does not prohibit the use of a defendant's body as evidence during a trial when it may be material, as for purposes of identification. Holt v....