Morris v. Doe
| Decision Date | 11 February 2013 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 6:12-02236-TMC |
| Parties | Beverly Morris, Plaintiff, v. John Doe; Electric Insurance Company, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina |
This action arises out of injuries sustained during an alleged car theft. The plaintiff, Beverly Morris ("Morris"), alleges that she witnessed John Doe stealing her car, and, in an attempt to stop the theft, climbed partway through the passenger side window. John Doe then pulled away with Morris dangling from the window and, eventually, dragging on the road. At some point, Morris separated from the car and John Doe sped away. As a result of this incident, Morris submitted a claim for uninsured motorist coverage to her insurer, Electric Insurance Company ("Electric"). Electric denied coverage and refused to pay benefits. Morris has brought this action against John Doe for negligence and against Electric for breach of contract. (Dkt. No. 1-1.)
Electric has moved to dismiss Morris's complaint, asserting that she cannot bring this action unless she complies with South Carolina's John Doe Statute, S.C. Code Ann. § 38-77-170. (Dkt. No. 15.) According to Electric, § 38-77-170, requires Morris to produce a witness affidavit because the accident did not involve physical contact. Morris has responded, arguing that she brought the suit under the insurance contract, not the John Doe Statute and that the contract authorizes the suit, even if the statute does not. (Dkt. No. 16.) Electric disagrees and viewssatisfaction of § 38-77-170 as a condition precedent to any John Doe action in South Carolina. (Dkt. No. 18.) The court has heard oral argument from the parties and decides as follows.
Under the federal rules, each pleading must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Accordingly, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a claim should be dismissed when the complaint fails to allege facts upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). When considering a motion to dismiss, the court should "accept as true all well-pleaded allegations and should view the complaint in a light most favorable to the plaintiff." Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993).
In sum, "[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). And, for a claim to have facial plausibility, the plaintiff must plead "factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
In addition, when interpreting insurance policies, the court Diamond State Ins. Co. v. Homestead Indus., 318 S.C. 231, 236 (1995). In South Carolina, "[a]n insured may contract for insurance coverage which is greater than that required by statute." Putnam v. South Carolina Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 323 S.C. 494, 496 (1996). Additionally, a South Carolina insurance contract issued pursuant to statutory law "may give more protection, but notless" than the coverage described in the statute. Hamrick v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 270 S.C. 176, 179 (1978).
South Carolina's John Doe Statute provides that:
If the owner or operator of any motor vehicle which causes bodily injury . . . to the insured is unknown, there is no right of action or recovery under the uninsured motorist provision, unless:
S.C. Code Ann. § 38-77-170.
Similarly, the uninsured motorist provision of Morris's policy with Electric states that Electric "will pay damages which an 'insured' is legally entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an 'uninsured motor vehicle'" because of bodily injury sustained by an insured and caused by an accident. The policy goes on to define "uninsured motor vehicle" as a vehicle to which a liability bond or policy does not apply or a:
hit-and-run vehicle whose operator or owner cannot be identified and which hits or which causes an accident resulting in "bodily injury" . . . without hitting:
In addition, the policy specifies that, "[i]f there is no physical contact with the hit-and-run vehicle the facts of the accident must be corroborated by an affidavit attesting to the truth of the facts of the accident and signed by any eyewitness . . . ."
The court agrees with Electric that South Carolina's John Doe statute is meant to be the gateway to recovery in this type of situation. However, the court believes that under Electric's policy, Morris has stated a viable cause of action.1
First, the court rejects Electric's argument that Morris is not "legally entitled to recover" under the policy until she satisfies the John Doe Statute. Neither the statute nor the policy defines the phrase "legally entitled to recover." However, employing the plain and ordinary meaning of that phrase, Morris is legally entitled to recover if has a legally cognizable cause of action against John Doe. Here, Morris has sufficiently pled a cause of action in negligence, so, she is potentially legally entitled to recover from John Doe. See Lawson v. Porter, 256 S.C. 65, 68 (1971) ()
Because Morris is legally entitled to recover, the court moves next to the policy's definition of "uninsured motor vehicle." Morris's own car falls under this definition because, at the time of the accident, it was operated by an unknown non-permissive operator, and, therefore, falls outside of Morris's liability coverage.
The court construes the plain language of the policy provision regarding hit-and-run vehicles as covering a vehicle whose (1) operator or owner cannot be identified; and (a) which hits you or a family member, a vehicle which you or any family member are occupying, your covered auto, or any of your property; or (b) which causes an accident resulting in bodily injury without hitting you or any family member, a vehicle which you or any family member are occupying, your covered auto, or any of your property. Under this reading of the policy, the affidavit requirement for accidents not involving physical contact would only apply to option (b)above: a car with an unknown owner or operator that causes an accident resulting in bodily injury without hitting anything. This case, however, involves an insured hit by a vehicle with an unknown operator, bringing it under option (a) above, and out of the policy's affidavit requirement.
Although the South Carolina Supreme Court has not addressed similar facts and the John Doe Statute does not provide specific guidance in this case, the court believes that this interpretation of the policy follows the legislative intent of the statute, as expressed by the South Carolina Supreme Court, and brings South Carolina in line with the majority of jurisdictions deciding similar cases.
South Carolina's uninsured motorist laws are meant to "provide benefits and protection against the peril of injury or death by an uninsured motorist to an insured motorist." Ferguson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 261 S.C. 96, 100 (1973). Thus, the laws are "remedial in nature, enacted for the benefit of injured persons, and [are] to be liberally construed." Gunnels v. American Liberty Ins. Co., 251 S.C. 242, 247 (1968).
Although the South Carolina courts clearly require strict compliance with the John Doe Statute in cases involving unknown defendants, see, e.g, Collins v. Doe, 352 S.C. 462 (2002), they balance that requirement against the remedial nature of the uninsured motorist laws. For example, in Enos v. Doe, the South Carolina Court of Appeals held that a plaintiff injured when an unknown driver crashed her vehicle while she was passed out in the passenger seat could not maintain an action against her insurer because she could not comply with the John Doe Statute's affidavit requirement. 380 S.C. 295, 313 (Ct. App. 2008). However, in the court's discussion of the history of the John Doe Statute, it recalls that, in Schmidt, the South Carolina Supreme Court noted that, while "[t]he uninsured motorist statute does not appear to contemplate single-caraccidents," the court does "not believe . . . the legislature intended an otherwise insured passenger to lose coverage when an unauthorized driver takes the wheel." Id. at 307 (quoting Schmidt, 339 S.C. at 368). According to the supreme court, such a construction "would relieve the carrier of responsibility when a named insured is the victim of a carjacking," a result the court found "plainly absurd" and contrary to legislative intent. Schmidt, 339...
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