Morris v. Kadrmas
Citation | 812 P.2d 549 |
Decision Date | 03 June 1991 |
Docket Number | No. 91-7,91-7 |
Parties | Greg D. MORRIS, Appellant (Plaintiff), v. Wayne KADRMAS and Shirley Kadrmas, husband and wife, Appellees (Defendants). |
Court | United States State Supreme Court of Wyoming |
Micheal K. Shoumaker, Sheridan, for appellant.
Stuart S. Healy of Healy & Kinnaird, Sheridan, for appellees.
Before URBIGKIT, C.J., THOMAS, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ., and ROONEY, Retired Justice.
ROONEY, Justice, Retired.
Appellant brought this action against appellees requesting relief in the form of injunction and monetary damages for violations of the protective covenants on the Valley West Subdivision near Sheridan. The action was also against the Valley West Subdivision Land Owners Committee in the form of mandamus and declaratory judgment for failure to enforce the covenants. The district court dismissed the action against the Committee. Appellant appeals from a subsequent grant of appellees' We reverse and remand.
motion for summary judgment and denial of appellant's similar motion. Appellant owns lot 23 in the subdivision. Appellees own lot 24 therein.
The issues presented by appellant in this appeal are whether or not appellees violated the protective covenants by placing a 60' X 40' garage and shop building on lot 24 without (1) an accompanying residential structure, (2) with only a 12-foot set back from the lot line, and (3) with a metal roof. There is no issue of fact in this case. Appellees acknowledge the erection of the 60' X 40' metal-roofed garage and shop building without accompanying residential structure, and with only a 12-foot set back from the lot line, but they contend that such was proper since it had Committee approval. They word the issues on appeal:
The Declaration of Protective Covenants, executed and recorded by the original owners of the land and developers of the subdivision, provided in pertinent part:
parties and all persons claiming under them for a period of twenty-five (25) years from the date these covenants are recorded, after which time said covenants shall be automatically extended for successive periods of ten (10) years unless an instrument signed by 75% of the then owners of the lots has been recorded, agreeing to change said covenants in whole or in part.
We review a summary judgment in the same light as the district court, using the same materials and following the same standards. Baros v. Wells, 780 P.2d 341 (Wyo.1989).
Appellees' contention that approval of the building plans and specifications by the Committee was sufficient authorization to disregard the covenants running with the land to the extent that the violations thereof were contained in such plans and specifications is incorrect. The Committee has no authority to vary the terms of the covenants other than as provided in the Declaration of Protective Covenants themselves.
Covenant No. 1 requires the existence of a residence for accompanying "customary out buildings." Authority is not given to the Committee to make an exception to this requirement. The only authority given to the Committee in the covenant to approve a variance is with reference to the requirement that no residence building shall exceed one and one-half stories in height. An effort by the Committee to approve a variance in the requirement that an outbuilding must have an accompanying residence is without legal force or effect. Appellees are in violation of this covenant. We held in Sutherland v. Bock, 688 P.2d 157 (Wyo.1984) that, under a covenant such as this one, an outbuilding cannot be justified without the existence of a residential structure on the lot. The covenant is specific in providing that the only building or structure shall be a "one-family residence with customary out buildings." (Emphasis added.)
Covenant No. 2 provides that no structure "shall be erected, maintained or located * * * nearer than 25 feet to any side lot line" except "with the prior approval" of the Committee. However, the extent to which the Committee can exercise this approval is limited by Covenant No. 12 which allows a variance of the covenants "to the extent of 10% of the requirements." Accordingly, the Committee cannot authorize a set back of less than 22.5 feet. An effort by the Committee to approve a set back of 12 feet is without legal force or effect. Appellees are in violation of this covenant.
Covenant No. 4 requires all pitched roofs to have cedar shingles or shakes "or
as approved" by the Committee. Again, it may be said that Covenant No. 12 limits the extent to which the committee could exercise the approval. However, the application of Covenant No. 12 is obviously only to the limitations capable of being restricted in degree or in percentage. The limitation relating to the type of roof lacks this capability. The Committee did not exceed its authority in approving a metal roof on the building. Appellees suggest that Covenant No. 12 creates an ambiguity in the Declaration. There is no ambiguity under our holding that the...
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...damage. [An injunction] is proper even in the absence of a showing of irreparable harm or uncompensable injury." Morris v. Kadrmas, 812 P.2d 549, 554 (Wyo. 1991) (citing Dice v. Cent. Natrona Cnty. Improvement & Serv. Dist., 684 P.2d 815 (Wyo. 1989)); see also Persimmon Hill First Homes Ass......
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