Morris v. Laughlin Chevrolet Co.

Decision Date17 April 1940
Docket Number383.
Citation8 S.E.2d 484,217 N.C. 428
PartiesMORRIS v. LAUGHLIN CHEVROLET CO. et al.
CourtNorth Carolina Supreme Court

This is an action brought by R. A. Morris, employee, against Laughlin Chevrolet Co., employer, and Lumber Mutual Casualty Co. carrier, for compensation for injuries, under the N. C Workmen's Compensation Act, N.C.Code 1939 (Michie), § 8081(h) et seq. (Public Laws 1929, Chap. 120, and amendments thereto).

It is alleged that the plaintiff, on December 31, 1936, suffered an "injury by accident arising out of and in the course of the employment". Sec. 8081(i), definition (f). He was injured when working under a car in a sitting position directly under the gas tank. The car was hoisted by a chain fastened to a chain hoist. The chain was fastened around the bumper of the car and then hooked back to the chain. Movement of the car caused the hook to slip off the chain, letting the car fall on the back of plaintiff. The alleged injury resulted in total and permanent disability from paralysis.

An agreement for the payment of compensation was entered into and an award issued thereon the 26th day of January, 1937 and payments were made as a result of said award both to the plaintiff and for medical services to August, 1939. A hearing was held for the purpose of determining whether or not further hospitalization should be granted to plaintiff, and an award was entered ordering hospitalization stopped. The award was made by T. A. Wilson, hearing Commissioner, on October 17, 1939.

The defendants contend that they have paid the sum of $2,376.00 directly to the employee at the rate of $18 per week, and $3,667.74 for medical, hospital, nursing, drugs, physicians and surgeons fees, which totals $43.74 more than $6,000.

The hearing Commissioner decided against defendants' contentions, and the defendants appealed to the full Commission. which sustained the hearing Commissioner. The full Commission, after setting forth its reasons, said: "The full Commission, therefore, is definitely of the opinion that medical and hospital services rendered the injured employee by the defendants, as provided in the Act, should not be considered a part of compensation as compensation is defined in said Act and that, therefore, should not be rightfully included in the $6,000.00 limit placed upon the amount of compensation to be paid to an injured employee. The full Commission affirms, approves and adopts as its own the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Award as made by hearing Commissioner Wilson."

An appeal was taken by defendants to the Superior Court, and the following judgment was rendered: "This cause being heard upon appeal of the defendants from the conclusions of law and award of the North Carolina Industrial Commission, and the Court being of the opinion and finding that the findings of fact, conclusions of law and award of the Commission are correct: It is, Therefore, Ordered, Adjudged and Decreed that the findings of fact, conclusions of law and award of the North Carolina Industrial Commission be, and they are hereby in all respects affirmed. This the 6th day of March, 1940. S. J. Ervin, Jr., Judge Presiding."

To the foregoing judgment, defendants excepted, assigned error and appealed to the Supreme Court.

Hartsell & Hartsell, of Concord, for plaintiff.

Sapp & Sapp, of Greensboro, for defendants.

CLARKSON Justice.

N.C.Code 1939 (Michie), § 8081(ww), Public Laws, 1929, Chap. 120, Sec. 41, is as follows: "The total compensation payable under this article [Act] shall in no case exceed Six Thousand ($6,000) Dollars." Do the words "total compensation" include money paid by the employer or carrier for medical, hospitalization, doctors, nurses and drugs for the employee? We think not.

In Arp v. E. A. Wood & Co., 207 N.C. 41, 175 S.E. 719, it is held: "The amount allowed by the Industrial Commission for serious facial or head disfigurement is to be included with other amounts allowed an injured employee in determining the total compensation allowed such employee, which in no case may exceed six thousand dollars. N.C.Code, §§ 8081(kk), 8081(mm), 8081(ww)."

In section 8081(i) definition (k) is as follows: "The term 'compensation' means the money allowance payable to an employee or to his dependents as provided for in this act, and includes funeral benefits provided herein."

"The object of all interpretation of statutes is to ascertain the meaning and intention of the Legislature, and to enforce it. The courts are not bound by the letter of the law, which has been denominated its 'body,' but may consider its spirit, which has been called its 'soul.' Nor can the courts, when the intention is once discovered, refuse to enforce it, because the facts of some particular case present a seeming hardship. *** 'In the construction, both of statutes and contracts, the intent of the framers and parties is to be sought, first of all, in the words employed, and if the words are free from ambiguity and doubt, and express plainly, clearly, and distinctly the sense of the framers of the instrument, there is no occasion to resort to other means of interpretation.' Black, Inter.Laws, 37." Kearney v. Vann, 154 N.C. 311, 315, 70 S.E. 747, 749, Ann.Cas.1912A, 1189; Blassingame v. Asbestos Co., 217 N.C. 223, 234, 235, 7 S.E.2d 478.

We see no ambiguity or doubt in the statute. It sets forth in clear language "total compensation" shall in no case exceed $6,000, and the statute is a definer. The term "compensation" means the money allowance payable to an employee or to his dependents, etc. The statute included funeral benefits, but omitted hospitals, doctors and nurses. Another section covers these, viz., Section 8081(gg), in part, is as follows: "Medical, surgical, hospital, and other treatment, including medical and surgical supplies as may reasonably be required, for a period not exceeding ten weeks from date of injury to effect a cure or give relief and for such additional time as in the judgment of the commission will tend to lessen the period of disability, and in addition thereto such original artificial members as may be reasonably necessary at the end of...

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT