Morris v. Morris
| Decision Date | 19 July 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 2014–0688.,2014–0688. |
| Citation | 148 Ohio St.3d 138,2016 Ohio 5002,69 N.E.3d 664 |
| Parties | MORRIS, Appellee, v. MORRIS, Appellant. |
| Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
Flanagan, Lieberman, Hoffman & Swaim, and Richard Hempfling, Dayton, for appellant.
{¶ 1} This case was accepted as a certified conflict between judgments of the Second District Court of Appeals and the Tenth District Court of Appeals. The Second District certified the issue in conflict as follows:
"Does a trial court have jurisdiction under Civ.R. 60(B) to vacate or modify an award of spousal support in a decree of divorce or dissolution where the decree does not contain a reservation of jurisdiction to modify the award of spousal support pursuant to R.C. 3105.18(E) ?"
139 Ohio St.3d 1427, 2014-Ohio-2725, 11 N.E.3d 283, quoting 2d Dist. Greene No. 2013–CA–29 (Apr. 3, 2014).
{¶ 2} The conclusion of the Second District that relief under Civ.R. 60(B)(4) is unavailable is consistent with the Ohio Constitution, the mandates of the General Assembly, and our precedents. Accordingly, we hold that a trial court does not have jurisdiction under Civ.R. 60(B) to vacate or modify an award of spousal support in a decree of divorce or dissolution when the decree does not contain a reservation of jurisdiction to modify the award of spousal support pursuant to R.C. 3105.18(E). Moreover, based on our precedents, if the parties' separation agreement, incorporated into a decree of dissolution, reserves the jurisdiction of the court to modify, a party is limited to seeking relief from judgment under Civ.R. 60(B)(1), (2), or (3) ; a litigant may not seek relief from the decree under Civ.R. 60(B)(4) or (5). See Knapp v. Knapp, 24 Ohio St.3d 141, 493 N.E.2d 1353 (1986), paragraph two of the syllabus; In re Whitman, 81 Ohio St.3d 239, 245, 690 N.E.2d 535 (1998).
{¶ 3} We therefore answer the certified question in the negative and affirm the judgment of the Second District Court of Appeals.
{¶ 4} On July 25, 2000, appellee, Jill Morris, and appellant, Michael Morris, jointly filed a petition for dissolution of marriage in the Greene County Court of Common Pleas. The petition alleged that the parties had been married since 1985 and had three children born of the marriage. A separation agreement entered into by the parties was attached and incorporated into the petition. The separation agreement included the following provision:
The parties agree that the Husband shall pay as and for spousal support the sum of $1,300.00 a month for [the Wife's] lifetime. Said spousal support shall commence with the month a final decree is rendered herein and continue for until [sic] the Wife dies or the Husband dies, whichever event occurs first. The Court shall not have continuing jurisdiction on this subject. For income tax purposes, the Husband shall NOT claim this spousal support as support but treat it as property settlement and the Husband shall pay all the income taxes on same.
(Capitalization sic.)
{¶ 5} On October 10, 2000, the trial court entered a decree of dissolution approving and incorporating the separation agreement that the parties had attached to their petition.
{¶ 6} Less than a year after the dissolution was finalized, appellant filed a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B)(1), (3), (4), and/or (5). Among other matters, the motion requested that the spousal-support order be vacated. The trial court denied appellant's motion and stated with respect to spousal support that "jurisdiction was not retained, as to the amount or the duration."
{¶ 7} On March 22, 2012, almost 11 and a half years after the dissolution was finalized, the prosecutor's office filed in the trial court a motion for contempt of court based in part on appellant's failure to abide by the spousal-support provision of the separation agreement. In response, appellant filed a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to " Civ.R. 60(B)(4) and/or (5)," requesting that the trial court vacate the award of spousal support in the parties' separation agreement.
{¶ 8} Appellant's motion was based on a series of employment-related events in his life that caused his annual income to become increasingly lower than it had been at the time of the dissolution. During the 11 and a half years, his annual income decreased from about $100,000 to less than $4,000.
{¶ 9} Following a hearing held on the contempt motion, a magistrate issued two separate decisions and orders, granting the contempt motion and dismissing appellant's motion for relief from judgment. In dismissing appellant's motion, the magistrate determined that Civ.R. 60(B) relief was not available because the trial court had not retained jurisdiction to modify the spousal-support award.
{¶ 10} Overruling appellant's objections, the trial court adopted the decision of the magistrate. From that decision, appellant timely appealed to the Second District Court of Appeals. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's decision as to this issue.
{¶ 11} Thereafter, the Second District granted appellant's motion to certify a conflict, concluding that its holding in this case was in direct conflict with the holding of the Tenth District in Noble v. Noble, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 07AP–1045, 2008-Ohio-4685, 2008 WL 4233915. We agreed and ordered the parties to brief the issue as framed by the Second District.
{¶ 12} The 1802 Ohio Constitution included no provision for divorce or spousal support. Dillingham v. Dillingham, 9 Ohio App. 248, 259 (1st Dist.1917). Instead, the legislature would pass a special act providing for the divorce of a married couple. Id.
{¶ 13} In 1824, legislation was first enacted vesting this court with exclusive jurisdiction to grant a divorce when one of the enumerated causes for divorce was demonstrated. 22 Ohio Laws 341. The act also provided for custody, child support, and spousal support. Id. Eventually, in 1853, jurisdiction to grant a divorce was vested in the courts of common pleas. See 51 Ohio Laws 377.
{¶ 14} The divorce statutes have gone through countless iterations since 1824. Today, there are 11 grounds on which divorce may be granted for cause. See R.C. 3105.01. In resolving a complaint for divorce, a trial court is required to make a determination of separate property and marital property, a property-division award, a determination of the allocation of parental rights and responsibilities and child support, and—after the property is divided—an award of spousal support, if any. See R.C. 3105.171, 3109.04, 3105.21, and 3105.18.
(Ellipses and brackets sic.; emphasis deleted.) Welly v. Welly, 55 Ohio App.3d 111, 112–113, 562 N.E.2d 914 (6th Dist.1988), quoting Greiner v. Greiner, 61 Ohio App.2d 88, 99, 399 N.E.2d 571 (8th Dist.1979).
{¶ 16} In 1974, the General Assembly enacted provisions making dissolution of marriage permissible through a no-fault-divorce proceeding. Am.Sub.H.B. No. 233, 135 Ohio Laws, Part II, 603, 615–616. An "[a]greement between the spouses [was] the linchpin of the procedure." In re Adams, 45 Ohio St.3d 219, 220, 543 N.E.2d 797 (1989).
{¶ 17} A petition for dissolution must be signed by both spouses and incorporate a separation agreement agreed to by both spouses. R.C. 3105.63(A)(1). The separation agreement must provide for the division of all property, spousal support, and—if there are minor children of the marriage—a resolution of all issues pertaining to the allocation of parental rights and responsibilities and child support. Id.
{¶ 18} The trial court has limited authority at the dissolution hearing. See R.C. 3105.65. The court has no unilateral authority to modify any provision of the separation agreement.See R.C. 3105.65(A) ; Adams at 219, 543 N.E.2d 797. If the parties are "satisfied with the separation agreement" and "wish a dissolution of the marriage" and the court approves the agreement, then the court must grant "a decree of dissolution * * * that incorporates the separation agreement." See R.C. 3105.65(A) and (B). The separation agreement then becomes "a binding contract between the parties." Adams at 220, 543 N.E.2d 797.
{¶ 19} The distinctions between divorce and dissolution in the context of spousal support were succinctly stated by the Tenth District Court of Appeals in Alban v. Alban, 1 Ohio App.3d 146, 147–148, 439 N.E.2d 963 (10th Dist.1981) :
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