Morris v. Morris, 740987

• Decision Date: 01 December 1975
• Docket Number: No. 740987,740987
• Citation: 219 S.E.2d 864,216 Va. 457
• Parties: Susan Dozier MORRIS v. Harry Arthur MORRIS, Jr. Record
• Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Page 864

219 S.E.2d 864

216 Va. 457

Susan Dozier MORRIS v. Harry Arthur MORRIS, Jr.

Record No. 740987.

Supreme Court of Virginia.

Dec. 1, 1975.

John C. Lowe, Charlottesville (F. Guthrie Gordon, III, Lowe & Gordon, Ltd., Charlottesville, on brief), for appellant.

Harry A. Morris, Jr., pro se.

Before I'ANSON, C.J., and CARRICO, HARRISON, COCHRAN, POFF and COMPTON, JJ.

COCHRAN, Justice.

By order entered June 6, 1974, the trial court ruled that certain provisions of a settlement agreement between Susan Dozier Morris and her former husband, Harry Arthur Morris, Jr., were not incorporated into the final divorce decree, and that the child support payments required of Morris should be reduced. In this appeal Susan has challenged both rulings.

During the pendency of divorce proceedings Susan and Morris executed a settlement agreement dated April 23, 1969. The final decree entered June 17, 1969, in which the trial court granted Susan a divorce a vinculo matrimonii from Morris on the ground of voluntary separation for the period of two years, also provided that the court 'doth approve, ratify and confirm' the settlement agreement. Custody of their three infant children was awarded to Susan and, under the agreement, Morris was required to pay for the support of each child 8% Of his adjusted gross income up to $18,000, and 3% Of such income in excess of $18,000, to a maximum of $30,000. He was also required to pay all medical expenses and, subject to a specific limitation on orthodontist expenditures, all dental requirements for the children.

On October 25, 1973, Susan filed a motion for issuance of a rule against Morris to show cause why he should not be held in contempt for failing to comply with the provisions for child support. In his answer Morris denied that he was in default, moved for dismissal of the motion, and moved that the agreement be declared null and void, and that the court, after hearing evidence, determine a proper amount of support for the children.

An evidentiary hearing was held, at which Susan and Morris testified. Susan, who had remarried, lived in Maryland in an $80,000 house with her second husband, Grotz, and her three children. She testified that in 1973 the aggregate amount of her itemized expenditures for the children was $8,153.21, that she earned $2,400 from parttime secretarial work, and that she received $2,800 in investment income. She estimated that, because of inflation, the expenses of the children were greater in 1973 than in 1969, when she earned $3,000 from teaching kindergarten in Albemarle County and received $3,600 in investment income.

Morris, a practicing attorney, had also remarried. He and his wife lived on a farm in Gloucester County with their child and her two children by a previous marriage. Morris testified that in 1973 he earned $21,917, including salary of $18,000 and bonus of $3,700, as against $14,000 in 1969, that he paid to Susan $4,080 for child support, that he paid medical and drug bills for the children in the sum of $789.50, and that he incurred during that year expenses, including the child support payments, of $11,604. He had outstanding debts, exclusive of real estate mortgages, of about $850. Morris, conceding that he was slow in paying bills, insisted that he could not pay more than the $100 per month, plus 3% Of his adjusted gross income over $18,000, that he was then paying to Susan for the support of each of their three children. Morris testified that, because of the economic recession, the earnings of his law firm had declined during the first three months of 1974, and he doubted that he would receive a bonus over his base salary of $18,000, which, after deductions, would leave him disposable income for the year of about $15,600.

The trial court ruled that the divorce decree of June 17, 1969, incorporated therein by reference the April 23, 1969 agreement, but that, under the court's interpretation of Code § 20--109.1 (Cum.Supp.1974), ¹ such incorporation was operative only as to those provisions the court found to be expressly related to 'child custody, visitation and support, or alimony.' The court declined to 'enforce, interpret or rule upon' the other provisions of the agreement and left these to be enforced by the parties as contractual obligations.

This is an unduly narrow construction of Code § 20--109.1. The purpose of the statute is to facilitate enforcement of the terms of an incorporated agreement by the contempt power of the court. See McLoughlin v. McLoughlin, 211 Va. 365, 368, 177 S.E.2d 781, 783 (1970). When a marriage fails, public policy favors prompt resolution of disputes concerning the maintenance and care of minor children and the property rights of the parties. Voluntary, court-approved agreements promote that policy and should be encouraged. We agree, therefore, with Susan's contention that any provisions of the April 23, 1969 agreement which reasonably relate to the maintenance and care of the children were incorporated into the divorce decree. By this standard the entire agreement was incorporated.

Several of the excluded provisions required Morris to convey or transfer to Susan his interest in the family residence, furniture, furnishings, and automobile. Under paragraph (9) Morris agreed to maintain a $10,000 life insurance policy on his life for the benefit of each child. In paragraph (15) the parties agreed that Morris was entitled to claim the two older children as dependents for income tax purposes, and Susan was entitled to claim the youngest. These provisions reasonably relate to the care and maintenance of the children. Agreements containing similar provisions have been held to be incorporated without question into decrees in other divorce proceedings. See Carter v. Carter, 215 Va. 475, 477, 211 S.E.2d 253, 255--56 (1975); Paul v. Paul, 214 Va. 651, 653, 203 S.E.2d 123, 125 (1974).

Even the last provision, paragraph (20), in which the contracting parties merely acknowledged having received independent legal advice, reasonably may be considered to have a...